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Abstract 
This series of studies was the first to evaluate the effects of the Section 28 pilot study on the 
treatment of vulnerable child witnesses in English Crown Courts. Section 28 of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act implemented mandatory Ground Rules Hearings, during 
which the judge, lawyers, and intermediary (if applicable) discussed appropriate 
accommodations to be made for child witnesses, following which the cross-examination could 
be pre-recorded. Analyses examined 43 cases that implemented the special measures (‘Section 
28’ cases) and 44 cases that did not implement the special measures (‘Non-Section 28’ cases) 
that took place between 2012 and 2016.  
Analyses revealed that children in the Section 28 cases experienced less systemic delay than 
their counterparts. In addition, the trial preparation in the Section 28 cases was more thorough 
and this was associated with less risky questioning in the cross-examinations. However, 
younger children experienced longer delays and had fewer accommodations made for them 
than older children, regardless of condition. Additional analyses demonstrated that the forensic 
interviews replaced the evidence-in-chief in most cases almost entirely, with prosecutors 
asking few substantive questions. In the Section 28 cases, defense lawyers used fewer 
suggestive questions and asked less complex questions than Non-Section 28 defense lawyers. 
However, both types of lawyers still predominantly asked option-posing questions. Regardless 
of condition, defense lawyers asked fewer suggestive questions than their counterparts in other 
common-law countries and they asked younger children less complex questions.  
Results indicate that, although the Section 28 pilot study has not fixed all of the existing 
problems, it has significantly reduced systemic delay and improved the treatment of child 
witnesses in Crown Courts and thus should be rolled out nationally. As well, regardless of 
condition, English lawyers and judges seem receptive to recent special measures and appear to 
be effectively implementing them.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 “We suggest that a fundamental change of attitude towards children 
in the legal context is now required.” – (Pigot, 1989, para.7.9) 
 
A review of English criminal justice reform over the past three decades reveals both 
significant progress (Criminal Justice Act, 1988; Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 
1999) as well as stagnation, particularly with regard to the treatment of vulnerable witnesses 
(Spencer & Lamb, 2012).  Commendably, critical impediments to the attainment of justice 
for young people have been removed due to the combined efforts of legal practitioners, 
academics, psychiatrists, and social workers, demonstrating that problematic policies and 
practices can be overcome when there is interdisciplinary cooperation (Spencer & Lamb, 
2012). Courts are now allowed to convict offenders based on the uncorroborated evidence of 
unsworn children (Criminal Justice Act, 1988, s.34), judges no longer have a duty to warn 
jurors about the ‘dangers’ of believing complainants in sexual cases (Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act, 1994, s.32), and children are no longer assessed on the basis of outdated 
definitions of competency (Criminal Justice Act, 1991, s.52).  
However, children and adults are developmentally different (Lamb, Brown, 
Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2018), making children uniquely vulnerable in the criminal 
justice system. Children are subjected to potentially harmful adversarial cross-examinations, 
which may not only affect their welfare adversely (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009) but may 
also yield inaccurate and unreliable evidence (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Ceci & Bruck, 1995; 
Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007).  
Children’s Developmental Capabilities and Limitations 
 Over the last several decades, researchers have extensively investigated how to elicit 
complete and coherent accounts from children as well as how children’s accounts can be 
contaminated by outside influences (Lamb et al., 2018). As a result, researchers have 
conclusively determined that children as young as five years of age can be reliable witnesses 
if they are questioned in a developmentally appropriate manner (Jack, Leov, & Zajac, 2014; 
Marchant, 2013). With that being said, children’s memory development, language 
capabilities, and susceptibility to suggestion differ from those of adults as a factor of their 
age, and these differences must thus be taken into account in legal contexts. 
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 Firstly, age is the largest determinant of the quantity and quality of details that are 
remembered (Lamb, et al., 2018); therefore, older children will have better recall than 
younger children (Howe, 2011). Memories are also more likely to be encoded and stored 
when they make sense (Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, 2015), or when associations 
exist between past experiences (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Again, younger children may be 
particularly disadvantaged because the events may not make sense (e.g., sexual abuse) and/or 
they have fewer past experiences to form associations with than do adolescents and adults.  
 Secondly, children’s language capabilities differ from those of adults. Both children 
and adolescents may struggle with conventional adult vocabulary, such as ‘always’, 
‘yesterday,’ and ‘before’ (Saywitz, 2002), and they have particular difficulty with legal 
language used in the criminal justice system (Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers, & 
Rotherham, 2010). Adults also commonly overestimate children’s comprehension, which is 
problematic especially because children rarely seek clarification when they do not understand 
(Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 2003). 
 Lastly, research demonstrates that both young children (Eisen, Goodman, Quin, 
Davis, & Crayton, 2007) and adolescents (Otgaar, Howe, Brackman, & Smeets, 2016) are 
more susceptible than adults to suggestion in certain circumstances. Although there is no 
consensus about which age group is more vulnerable to suggestion, research has consistently 
demonstrated that the suggestive questioning styles that are often used in the legal system 
pose a significant threat to the veracity and credibility of children’s accounts (Lamb et al., 
2018).  
 These problems are exacerbated in courtroom settings, where children may be 
extensively questioned about uncomfortable or traumatizing events that they experienced 
months or even years prior to court. The delay in the legal system, accompanied by the stress 
that children endure during their participation, together ensure that young witnesses often 
provide less complete, coherent, and reliable evidence than adults do (Spencer & Lamb, 
2012). Children forget more rapidly than adults do (Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, & Kingma, 
1990), meaning they become less informative and more susceptible to suggestion over time 
(Flin, Boon, Knox, & Bull, 1992). Children commonly experience symptoms of stress while 
awaiting trial, such as depression, anxiety, self-harm, bedwetting, and panic attacks. The 
resulting stress may further inhibit children’s memory retrieval, communicable abilities, and 
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attention span and subsequently reduce the accuracy and/or perceived credibility of their 
testimony (Lamb et al., 2015).  
 In summary, children differ from adults with respect to their memory abilities, 
language skills, and susceptibility to suggestion on account of their age. When children 
become involved in the legal system, the systematic delays and accompanying stress further 
reduce their memory abilities and language skills, and make them more susceptible to 
suggestion, underlining the dire need to adapt legal proceedings to accommodate children.  
The Pigot Committee 
Prompted by growing awareness of children’s vulnerabilities, criticisms of the 
treatment of children in English criminal courts increased during the 1980s, culminating in 
the Pigot Report (1989) and subsequent legal changes in the Criminal Justice Act (1991; 
Spencer & Lamb, 2012). Amongst other things, the advisory group often referred to as the 
‘Pigot Committee’ evaluated the possibility that video-recorded evidence might replace both 
children’s live evidence-in-chief and cross-examination. After thorough investigation, the 
committee concluded that children ought to have the opportunity to be both examined and 
cross-examined in out-of-court pre-trial hearings with the recordings later shown as their 
evidence in any resulting trial (Pigot, 1989, para 2.25-6). The Report provided general 
recommendations for how the pre-recorded interviews should be carried out (Pigot, 1989, 
para 4.1-4.25). Among other things, they noted that the video-recorded interview ‘should be 
conducted as soon as practicable after an offense has been reported,’ that a supplementary 
interview should only be conducted if absolutely necessary, and if so, it should be conducted 
by the same person who conducted the first interview (Pigot, 1989, para 4.11). They 
recommended the interview be conducted by a single interviewer who was professionally 
briefed beforehand, and only if necessary should a third party be present to reassure the child. 
While conducting the interview, they recommended that ‘the structure and content of 
interviews with children be carefully considered by all those involved in advance,’ that 
questioning ‘graduate from open to the specific,’ and that ‘crucial leading questions… be 
avoided wherever possible’ (Pigot, 1989, para 4.17-20). 
 The Pigot Committee cited numerous justifications for their conclusion, including the 
fact that prosecutions were only planned for 28% of sexual abuse cases (from 1983-1987) 
because children and/or parents were unwilling to ‘endure the traumatic court experience’ 
(para 1.6).  They noted that, in other adversarial-styled courts internationally, pre-trial out-of-
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court proceedings were exceedingly common (para 1.12).  The committee also noted that 
‘one of the most substantial difficulties faced by children… is the extraordinary and, in our 
view, quite unacceptable delay which they must often endure before cases come to court’ 
(para 1.20). They believed that video-recorded evidence would ‘maximise the number of 
occasions on which flawed prosecutions do not go proceed and ensure that the preparation of 
cases which are to go to trial is accelerated,’ thereby expediting the child’s participation and 
combatting the systematic delay that detrimentally affects the quality of children’s evidence 
(para 6.12). Most critically, the two cruxes of their argument centred on the child’s welfare 
and the integrity of the evidence (para 2.9). Their report concluded that 1) ‘most children are 
disturbed to a greater or lesser extent by giving evidence in court’ (para 2.10) and 2) because 
stress inhibits accurate memory recall, rather than eliciting truthful and productive accounts, 
the formality of the courtroom proceedings ‘may actually have a deleterious effect on the 
fullness and accuracy of children’s testimony’ (para 2.17; A fuller review of the evidence 
regarding the factors affecting the quality of children’s evidence appears below in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 5). The Pigot committee noted that ‘there are very many other practical, legal, 
and penal issues bearing upon child abuse cases which require careful re-examination in the 
light of modern conditions and research,’ but ‘the guarantee… that children need not appear 
in the Crown Court against their wishes is an important first step,’ (para 7.14).     
In 1991, Parliament permitted only the live evidence-in-chief to be replaced by video-
recorded evidence in the form of what are known today as ‘Achieving Best Evidence’ (ABE) 
forensic interviews, named after the current Home Office guidance (Criminal Justice Act, 
1991, s.54; Home Office, 2011). Years later, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
(1999) introduced several other ‘special measures’, notably including Section 28, which 
permitted video-recorded evidence to replace the cross-examination, although Section 28 was 
not implemented. However, from 2014 to 2016, the Section 28 special measure was piloted in 
Leeds, Liverpool, and Kingston Crown Courts in England, and this study constitutes the first 
independent and detailed evaluation of the Section 28 pilot study trials.  
The Section 28 Pilot Study 
 The Section 28 pilot study aimed to address two of the critical—and unresolved—
issues noted by Pigot that still plague the criminal justice system, both of which negatively 
affect the accuracy of children’s testimony: systematic delays in the criminal proceedings and 
the risky nature of adversarial cross-examinations (Spencer & Lamb, 2012). The Pigot 
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Committee’s report was considered in relation to current psychological research and Best 
Practice guidelines, culminating in the Section 28 pilot study. To begin, a Ground Rules 
Hearing (GRH) took place, involving the prosecutor, defence lawyer, judge, and if 
applicable, an intermediary (i.e., a court-appointed specialist responsible for facilitating 
communication between witnesses and lawyers; Criminal Practice Directions, 2015; Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999, s.29). The implementation of Ground Rules 
Hearings preceding the pre-recorded cross-examination provided the opportunity to address 
issues recommended by Pigot in 1989. In the GRHs, constructive discussions were expected 
to result in agreements about procedures that should reduce children’s stress (e.g., 
familiarising children with the live link technology before questioning). Additionally, 
practitioners discussed how to adapt lawyers’ questioning strategies to accommodate 
children’s developmental capabilities and, thus, ensure that more reliable evidence was 
elicited. The children’s cross-examinations were to be pre-recorded and these recordings later 
played as part of the children’s evidence in any trials that occurred.  
 For the purposes of this research, Section 28 pilot study cases and comparable ‘Non-
Section 28’ cases were identified and made available by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals 
Service (HMCTS) at the Ministry of Justice in London. Originally, 138 Non-Section 28 cases 
and 84 Section 28 cases were identified. Of these 222 cases, 44 Non-Section 28 cases and 43 
Section 28 cases met all of the necessary criteria, meaning they involved children under the 
age of 16, testifying as alleged victims of sexual abuse, and whose case records contained 
complete transcripts of the ABE interview(s), corresponding trial logs, and recordings of the 
cross-examinations.  The 44 NS28 cases came from Bradford (n = 6), Durham (n = 6), Hull 
(n = 7), Luton (n = 6), Newcastle (n = 12), Norwich (n = 5), and Oxford (n = 2), whilst the 43 
S28 cases came from Kingston (n = 1), Leeds (n = 16), and Liverpool (n = 26). Cases took 
place between 2012 and 2016.  
Children were categorised into two age groups for analyses: (1) 6- to 12-year-olds; (2) 
13- to 15-year-olds. These categories were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, there were 
insufficient numbers of young children to create three groups, so the youngest children could 
not be distinguished from the pre-teens. This may be because, on account of their age, 
younger children struggled to provide accounts that met the evidentiary requirement for a 
criminal prosecution. Secondly, the older age group accords with the Sexual Offences Act 
(2003); 16 years is the age of sexual consent, but a person aged 16 or over can claim to be 
innocent of the charge of committing sexual offences with a child aged between 13 and 15 
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years if that person ‘reasonably believed’ that the child was aged 16 or over. However, this 
reasonable belief provision does not apply if the offence involved a child aged 12 years or 
younger. 
 Notably, the Section 28 and Non-Section 28 samples did not significantly differ with 
respect to any case facts (e.g., child’s age, frequency or severity of offense, verdict). Trial 
recordings were transcribed and anonymised at the Ministry of Justice, and relevant portions 
of the trial transcripts, ABE interview transcripts, and trial logs were systematically coded 
according to the specific research questions investigated in each chapter of this dissertation. 
Hypotheses were made in relation to the relevant background research. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that, overall, the implementation of Section 28 would better accommodate 
children, and subsequently elicit higher quality evidence.   
 The findings not only demonstrated the beneficial effects of implementing Section 28, 
but also suggested that English lawyers may be attempting to question children more 
appropriately than in some of the other common-law systems that have been studied. In this 
dissertation, the implications of implementing Section 28 are specifically explored, as well as 
the potential cultural shift occurring in English courtrooms, where practitioners may finally 
be addressing concerns expressed three decades ago.  As the Pigot Committee stated, “radical 
changes are now required if the courts are to treat child witnesses in a humane and acceptable 
way” (Pigot, 1989, 2.14) and the results reported in this dissertation indicate that English 
lawyers may finally be treating child witnesses more humanely and acceptably in court.  
Chapter 2: Pre-Recording Children’s Testimony: Effects on Case Progression1 
 A study conducted by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
(Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009) revealed severe systemic delays in the English criminal 
justice system that negatively affected young witnesses’ health, welfare, and education. On 
average, children (n = 182) were forced to wait 13 months between forensic interview and 
cross-examination and 5.8 hours at the courthouse on the day of trial. As well, 51% of 
English children gave their evidence in the morning, when they had a higher likelihood of 
completing their testimony in one day, whereas the others began testimony later in the day, 
and so often needed to return to court the next day.  Half of the children in the study reported 
                                                          
1 Chapter 2 reproduces the text of an article published in the Criminal Law Review  
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experiencing stress-associated symptoms including depression, anxiety, self-harm, bed-
wetting, and panic attacks whilst awaiting trial.  
Problematically, research also shows that delay has adverse effects on the quality of 
children’s memories (Brainerd et al., 1990; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991), thereby 
detrimentally affecting the quality of evidence elicited in court. Children forget more rapidly 
than adults (Brainerd et al., 1990) and are more likely to confuse events from similar sources 
(i.e., source monitoring; Lindsay et al., 1991). As a result, children become more susceptible 
to suggestion and more willing to guess in response to questions when their memories 
become hazier (Flin et al., 1992). Stress during questioning also inhibits children’s abilities to 
recall details and communicate these details effectively during cross-examination (Hupbach 
& Dorskind, 2014; Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, 2015). Taken together, extended 
delays in combination with children’s specific vulnerabilities (as detailed below) may result 
in legal proceedings likely to discredit truthful witnesses rather than uncover deceptive ones 
(Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Lamb et al., 2015).  
 The first study (Chapter 2) examined whether the implementation of Section 28 in the 
pilot study reduced delays between the forensic interviews and cross-examinations as well as 
on the day the children testified. We hypothesised that children in the Section 28 condition 
would experience shorter delays both awaiting trial and during questioning and would give 
their testimony earlier in the day, thereby making it more likely that they could complete their 
evidence in one day. This reduction in delay would hopefully elicit more reliable evidence 
from children, as well as resolve children’s participation, and associated stress, in the legal 
system sooner.  
 Trial logs detailing the case proceedings from beginning to end were scoured for the 
relevant dates, times, and durations of all dependent variables.  The findings clearly 
demonstrated that the implementation of Section 28 helped reduce the systematic delay both 
between the forensic interview and cross-examination, as well as during questioning on the 
day of cross-examination. Children in the Section 28 condition gave their evidence over 4 
months earlier than children not accorded the same opportunity, thus reducing both the period 
of stress experienced as well as the potentiality for children’s evidence to be contaminated or 
forgotten. Secondly, the implementation of Section 28 reduced both the length of the cross-
examination, thereby reducing the number of unnecessary questions put to children, and the 
duration of breaks during questioning, thereby reducing the amount of time children were 
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under oath.  Lastly, Section 28 children gave their evidence earlier in the morning, thus 
ensuring a higher likelihood that they completed their evidence on the same day and did not 
have to return to court.  
Despite these positive findings, children would not reap the full benefits of the 
Section 28 special measures unless suitable precautions were discussed during GRHs and 
implemented during the cross-examinations, thereby ensuring that the children are questioned 
in developmentally appropriate ways (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2012). The next three chapters 
examine specific elements of the Section 28 trials and the effect that these special measures 
had on lawyers’ questioning strategies.  
Chapter 3: Examining children in English High Courts with and without 
implementation of reforms authorised in Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act2 
Many researchers have demonstrated the effects that question types can have on the 
accuracy and informativeness of children’s responses (e.g., Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Ceci & 
Bruck, 1995; Klemfuss et al., 2014; Lamb et al., 2007). Although experts encourage the use 
of open-ended prompts (e.g., “Tell me what happened”) because they elicit more accurate and 
informative responses (Lamb et al., 2007), field research demonstrates that lawyers use a 
preponderance of close-ended prompts (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss et al., 2014; 
Lamb & Fauchier, 2001), which are more likely to contaminate children’s evidence (e.g., 
Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Lamb & Fauchier, 2001; Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 2003). Suggestive 
questions are especially risky because they communicate the expected response, further 
reducing the credibility of children’s testimony, and thus are strongly discouraged by experts 
(Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Home Office, 2011). Suggestive questions also elicit more self-
contradictions than other closed-ended prompts (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Lamb & Fauchier, 
2001). Despite this, field research from other adversarial legal systems (e.g., Scotland, New 
Zealand, United States) consistently shows that both prosecutors and defence lawyers mostly 
ask option-posing questions (Andrews et al., 2016; Hanna et al., 2012; Klemfuss et al., 2014) 
and that defence lawyers ask fewer open-ended questions and more suggestive questions than 
prosecutors (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss et al., 2014; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014; 
Zajac & Cannan, 2009). 
                                                          
2 Chapter 3 reproduces the text of an article in press at Applied Cognitive Psychology 
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Research demonstrates that children as young as 5 can be responsive (Marchant, 
2013) and accurate (Jack, Leov, & Zajac, 2014), provided lawyers question them in 
developmentally appropriate ways. Children are highly responsive when questioned in court 
(Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss et al., 2014; Zajac & Cannan, 2009), although younger 
children may be less productive in response to free-recall questions than older children 
(Goodman, Jones, & McLeod, 2017). Children are particularly vulnerable to risky types of 
questions because they forget more rapidly than adults (Brainerd et al., 1990), degrading the 
quality of their memories and making them more susceptible to suggestion (Bruck & Ceci, 
1999; Flin et al., 1992) while older children may also have unique developmental 
vulnerabilities (i.e., a developmental reversal; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & 
Raymaekers, 2013). Thus, suggestive questions should be avoided with children of all ages. It 
is unclear whether lawyers accommodate children’s developmental capabilities when 
questioning them in court (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014; Zajac et al., 
2003); therefore, research is still needed to identify the effect of children’s age on lawyers’ 
questioning strategies and, subsequently, on children’s responses.    
To help lawyers avoid problematic questioning strategies in court, as noted above, 
GRHs are held to encourage developmentally appropriate questioning and restrict the use of  
questions that hinder children’s comprehension and communication (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 
2012). Discussions in GRHs may address the length and content of questioning, and the 
relevant Criminal Practice Directions specifically state that lawyers can be prevented from 
‘putting their case’ (Criminal Practice Directions, 2015). Judges may request a written draft 
of proposed questions to approve before the subsequent courtroom questioning (Criminal 
Practice Directions, 2015). GRHs are considered good practice for all cases involving 
vulnerable witnesses (Criminal Practice Directions, 2013) and were made mandatory in the 
Section 28 pilot study.  
The study described in Chapter 3 was the first to quantitatively examine the effects of 
Section 28 on lawyers’ questioning strategies. Research demonstrates that close-ended 
questions, and in particular suggestive questions, elicit less accurate responses and increase 
the likelihood of contaminated evidence, so it was hypothesised that (1) lawyers in the 
Section 28 condition would ask more open-ended and fewer closed-ended questions than 
lawyers in the Non-Section 28 condition. Research also shows that younger children have 
less memory and communicable capabilities than older children, and may be more 
susceptible to suggestion, so it was further hypothesized that (2) Section 28 lawyers would 
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make more accommodations for children’s ages by asking younger children fewer suggestive 
questions; and (3) older children would be more responsive than younger children, regardless 
of trial condition. 
The results revealed that Section 28, and in particular the GRHs, positively affected 
the way children were questioned. Defence lawyers asked fewer suggestive questions in the 
Section 28 condition and asked more directive questions and fewer suggestive questions 
when a GRH occurred. However, the majority of questions posed by both prosecutors and 
defence lawyers were still option-posing, thereby restricting children’s informativeness. As 
well, although younger children appeared to be more vulnerable, lawyers failed to 
accommodate for children’s ages when questioning them.  
Chapter 4: The Discussion of Ground Rules Issues in Pre-trial Preparation for 
Vulnerable Witnesses in English Crown Courts3 
As noted earlier, Ground Rules Hearings were identified as good practice in all cases 
involving vulnerable witnesses in 2010 (Criminal Procedure Rules, 2010), and they were also 
made mandatory for cases involving intermediaries and cases implementing Section 28 
(Criminal Practice Directions, 2015).  The purpose of the GRHs was to anticipate potential 
problems and take steps to improve the quality of the testimony obtained from young and 
vulnerable witnesses.  
To facilitate the conduct of GRHs, practical ‘issues’ were identified and compiled into 
the ‘Ground Rules Hearing Checklist’ to facilitate effective discussions during GRHs 
(Cooper, Backen, & Marchant, 2015). The list addresses a number of issues, and in particular, 
ways to reduce children’s stress (e.g., judges and lawyers removing wigs and gowns, or 
meeting the child before questioning) and encourage developmentally appropriate 
questioning (e.g., the judge may request a draft of proposed questions; Cooper et al., 2015). 
The accommodations made during GRHs were expected to improve the quantity and quality 
of details elicited whilst also protecting children’s welfare.  
As mentioned earlier, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act introduced a 
number of special measures intended to improve the treatment of vulnerable witnesses in 
English courts. One such special measure, Section 29, introduced intermediaries — i.e., 
court-appointed specialists responsible for facilitating communication between witnesses and 
                                                          
3 Chapter 4 reproduces the text of an article under review at Criminal Law Review 
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lawyers (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999, s.29). Intermediaries have been 
found to facilitate communication prior to and at trial, increase access to justice by ensuring 
that cases with vulnerable witnesses reach trial, and perhaps save time and money by 
identifying prosecutable cases (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2007).  Because one of their main 
roles is to foster better communication, intermediaries were taught to recommend ‘ground 
rules’ regarding how to appropriately question vulnerable witnesses, which would be 
discussed in ‘GRHs’ prior to trial (Cooper & Wurtzel, 2014). 
 The study described in Chapter 4 was the first to quantitatively investigate the 
contributions made by GRHs and intermediaries in both the Section 28 and Non-Section 28 
pre-trial preparations. Both an increase in the use of issues noted in the ‘GRH Checklist’ and 
a decrease in the risky questions asked in court would elicit better quality testimony from 
child witnesses. It was hypothesised that more issues from the ‘GRH Checklist’ (Cooper et 
al., 2015) would be mentioned in cases involving GRHs. It was further hypothesised that the 
discussion of more Ground Rules issues would be associated with fewer risky questions 
being asked during the cross-examinations.   
 Trial logs containing court reporters’ notes throughout the entirety of the proceedings 
were scoured for references to 22 issues on the Checklist (Cooper et al., 2015). Coders also 
characterised the types of questions (i.e., directive, option-posing, and suggestive prompts) 
asked during the trials. Analyses revealed that more Ground Rules issues were discussed and 
that questioning strategies were discussed for longer in Section 28 cases than in Non-Section 
28 cases; the same differences were evident when cases involving intermediaries were 
compared with cases without intermediaries. Section 28 cases were also associated with 
fewer suggestive questions and more option-posing questions; however, intermediary 
presence and the number of Ground Rules issues were not significantly associated with the 
proportion of questions that were risky.  The age of the child was positively associated with 
the number of Ground Rules issues mentioned in pre-trial preparation.  
 These results suggested that the Section 28 special measures and the use of 
intermediaries improved pre-trial preparation, although further improvement is needed to 
make certain that children are indeed questioned appropriately. Even in these cases, fewer 
than a half and sometimes fewer than a quarter of the defined Ground Rules issues were 
discussed in pre-trial preparation, demonstrating the need for more thorough pre-trial 
preparation to ensure that vulnerable witnesses are sufficiently accommodated.  
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Chapter 5: Does Implementation of Reforms Authorised in Section 28 of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act Affect the Complexity of the Questions Asked of 
Young Alleged Victims in Court?4    
 As mentioned earlier, children are frequently asked close-ended and suggestive 
questions (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Zajac, Westera, & Kaladelfos, 2017) even though they 
elicit less accurate and informative responses and are more likely to elicit self-contradictions 
(Andrews & Lamb, 2016). In addition, children are often asked questions that exceed their 
developmental capabilities (Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Hanna et al., 2012; Zajac et al., 2003), 
further reducing their ability to provide accurate and complete witness accounts. Particularly 
difficult concepts for children to grasp include grammatically and linguistically complex 
sentences (Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers, & Rotherham, 2010), the terms ‘before’ and 
‘after’ (Lamb et al., 2015; Olds, 1968), references to temporal (e.g., duration, frequency) and 
numeric (e.g., height, distance) attributes (Lyon & Saywitz, 2006; Olds, 1968; Orbach & 
Lamb, 2007; Walker, 1999), complex negation (Olds, 1968; Walker, 1999), ‘why’ questions 
inviting speculation about other’s internal processes (Perry et al., 1995; Walker, 1999), and 
passive voice (Slobin, 1966; Walker, 1999). Concerningly, children may not realise that they 
don’t understand a question (Perry et al., 1995; Walker, 1999), and if they do realise, they are 
often reluctant to seek clarification (Walker, 1999; Zajac et al., 2003). 
Despite this, only a handful of studies have examined the complexity of lawyers’ 
questions. Hanna et al. (2012) found that defence lawyers used more double negatives and 
questions with 2 or more subordinate clauses than prosecutors, while prosecutors used more 
questions containing passive voice. Other studies found that defence lawyers asked more 
complex questions than prosecutors (Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Zajac et al., 2003). And while 
several studies found that defence lawyers did not make accommodations for children’s age 
(Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Hanna et al., 2012; Zajac et al., 2003), Zajac et al. (2017) found 
that younger children were asked less complex questions by defence lawyers. Thus, 
additional research is needed not only to clarify what specific complex elements make 
lawyers’ questions difficult for children, but also to further determine whether lawyers do 
adapt questioning to match children’s capabilities.  
The study reported in Chapter 5 was the first to examine the complexity of the 
questions asked by lawyers in the Section 28 cases. Because children have fewer linguistic 
                                                          
4 Chapter 5 reproduces the text of an article in press at Applied Cognitive Psychology 
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and grammatical capabilities than adults, developmentally appropriate questions would elicit 
the most reliable testimony. Research also demonstrates that children seldom seek 
clarification, and oftentimes fail to recognise incomprehension, further emphasizing the 
necessity to adapt questioning to children’s developmental ability.  It was hypothesised that 
prosecutors would ask less complex questions than defence lawyers, Section 28 lawyers 
would ask less complex questions than Non-Section 28 lawyers, particularly to younger 
children, and that suggestive questions would be more complex than directive or option-
posing prompts.  
Complexity was measured using 8 variables: word count, clause count, false starts, 
multiple negatives, ‘why’ questions, temporal and numeric attributes, ‘before/after’, and 
passive voice. The study showed that prosecutors asked questions containing more words, 
clauses, and passive voice than defence lawyers, while defence lawyers asked more ‘why’ 
questions. Section 28 defence lawyers asked questions containing fewer words, clauses, false 
starts, multiple negatives, and temporal and numeric attributes than Non-Section 28 defence 
lawyers. Regardless of condition, lawyers asked younger children questions with fewer 
words, clauses, uses of ‘before/after’, and passive voice.  
 The implementation of Section 28 thus reduced the complexity of the lawyers’ 
questions and showed that that English lawyers may be altering question complexity to match 
children’s capabilities. The results also shed a much-needed light on what makes specific 
types of questions complex. It is particularly promising that lawyers in both Section 28 and 
Non-Section 28 conditions asked younger children less complex questions, again highlighting 
the significant and effective training and educational outreach for English legal practitioners 
(“The Advocate’s Gateway, 2016). Judges, intermediaries, and lawyers alike appear to be 
making significant strides in adapting question complexity to match children’s cognitive 
abilities, and if these efforts continue, children may finally be enabled to give their best 
evidence in trial.
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Chapter 2: Pre-Recording Children’s Testimony: Effects on Case Progression1 
“The waiting is so hard because you don’t feel secure—I 
think because the courts have made you feel like it is never 
going to be over and done with…they just don’t understand 
the pain that you go through. It’s really hard…” 
- (Child witness, 14 years)2 
 
Currently, over 90,000 children in the United Kingdom have been removed from 
homes in which they were at risk of suffering from physical, emotional, or sexual abuse and 
neglect.3  Many of those children have been or will be forensically interviewed by police 
officers in “Achieving Best Evidence” interviews,4 recordings of which routinely function as 
the evidence-in-chief if criminal charges result and the alleged victim is called as a witness.5 
However, vulnerable witnesses are still required to return to court months or years after their 
initial reports to be cross-examined, even when recordings of their interviews are admitted as 
evidence.6 There is considerable evidence that child witnesses are adversely affected 
mentally, physically, and psychologically by these delays7 and as a result, many efforts have 
been made to implement reforms that would reduce the length of delay.  One set of reforms, 
suggested by the Pigot Committee in 1989, involved pre-recording children’s direct 
testimony (hence the admissibility of ABE interviews) and cross-examination, so that their 
involvement could be completed before the actual trial.8  Although the first suggested reform 
                                                          
1 Because this paper was published in the Criminal Law Review, the footnotes are in accordance with the 
journal’s formatting requirements. Footnote references are included in the final reference list.  
2 C. Eastwood and W. Patton, The experiences of child complainants of sexual abuse in the criminal justice 
system (Unpublished manuscript, 2002), p. 3. 
3 “Statistics” (National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 2015). NSPCC, 
https://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-protection-system/ [Accessed March 31, 2015] 
4 Home Office, Achieving the best evidence in criminal proceedings: Guidance on interviewing victims and 
witnesses, and guidance on using special measures (Home Office, 2011) 
5 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA 1999) s.27 
6 J. Spencer, “Evidence and Cross-Examination”, In Children's Testimony, 2nd edn, edited by D. La Rooy, L. C. 
Malloy, C. Katz and M. E. Lamb (Chichester: Wiley, 2011), pp. 285-307); Children and cross-examination: 
Time to change the rules? edited by J. R. Spencer and M.E. Lamb (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2012). 
7 C. Eastwood and W. Patton, The experiences of child complainants of sexual abuse in the criminal justice 
system (2002); G. S. Goodman, E. P. Taub, D. P. Jones, P. England, L. K. Port, L. Rudy, ... and G. B. Melton, 
“Testifying in criminal court: Emotional effects on child sexual assault victims” (Monographs of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, 1992); J. Plotnikoff and R. Woolfson, “Measuring up?” In Evaluating 
Implementation of. (2009); Children and cross-examination: Time to change the rules (2012) 
8 T. Pigot, Report of the advisory group on video-recorded evidence (London: Home Office, 1989)   
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was successfully implemented in 1992,9 the second was only embraced recently.10  This 
article describes a study designed to evaluate whether or not this reform has had the desired 
effects on young witnesses.  
Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
In 1989, an advisory group often referred to as “the Pigot Committee” was asked to 
assess the desirability of ‘special measures’ for child witnesses, such as allowing video-
recorded evidence to be admitted as evidence in criminal trials. The committee recommended 
that “radical changes are now required if the courts are to treat children in a humane and 
acceptable way”11 and thus proposed that child witnesses be offered the right “to be examined 
and cross-examined at an out-of-court hearing which would be itself video-recorded and later 
shown to the trial jury”.12   
However, in 1990, the government adopted the “half-Pigot” scheme, which permitted 
the pre-recording of the evidence-in-chief but not the cross-examination. Forensic interviews 
were to be conducted in accordance with detailed guidance laid out in the Memorandum of 
Good Practice for Video-recorded Interviews,13 which was later replaced by the Achieving 
Best Evidence (ABE) Guidance.14  These video-recordings were to be played as the 
evidence-in-chief if trials ensued, but children were still required to appear at trial to be 
cross-examined. Parliament later authorised pre-trial cross-examination as a special measure 
in Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act in 1999, but implementation 
was suspended due to concerns regarding the required procedural changes, the available 
technology, the cost, the rights of the defendant, and the possible need to recall child 
witnesses when further information became available.15  After a consultation in 2007 
revealed widespread support for the implementation of Section 28, the special measure was 
finally pilot-tested in Crown Courts in Liverpool, Leeds, and Kingston in 2015-2016.16   
                                                          
9 Home Office and Department of Health, Memorandum of Good Practice on Video Recorded Interviews for 
Child Witnesses for Criminal Proceedings (The Stationery Office, 1992); (YJCEA 1999) s.27 
10 Ministry of Justice, Transforming the CJS: A strategy and action plan to reform the criminal justice system 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013)  
11 T. Pigot, Report of the advisory group on video-recorded evidence, 2.14 
12 T. Pigot, Report of the advisory group on video-recorded evidence, 2.25 
13 Home Office and Department of Health, Memorandum of Good Practice on Video Recorded Interviews for 
Child Witnesses for Criminal Proceedings 
14 Home Office, Achieving the best evidence in criminal proceedings: Guidance on interviewing victims and 
witnesses, and guidance on using special measures  
15 J. Spencer, “Evidence and Cross-Examination” (2011); Children and cross-examination: Time to change the 
rules (2012). 
16 Ministry of Justice, Transforming the CJS: A strategy and action plan to reform the criminal justice system 
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 The Section 28 pilot study focused on two changes that might help combat these 
adverse effects. Firstly, Ground Rules Hearings (GRHs) were held prior to the pre-recorded 
cross-examination to establish rules for how vulnerable witnesses in the case would be 
questioned.17  At GRHs, judges admonish advocates to ask straightforward, developmentally 
appropriate questions not intended to bully or intimidate witnesses.  Specifically, “The 
ground rules hearings should cover, amongst other matters, the general care of the witness, if, 
when and where the witness is to be shown their video interview, when, where and how the 
parties (and the judge if identified) intend to introduce themselves to the witness, the length 
of questioning and frequency of breaks and the nature of the questions to be asked”.18  
Secondly, after all parties have had sufficient time to prepare in accordance with the Ground 
Rules, the pre-recorded cross-examination takes place at the courthouse under the supervision 
of the same judge who presided at the Ground Rules Hearing.19 Together, these changes are 
designed not only to improve the quality of evidence, but also to minimise the psychological 
burden on child witnesses.20  
Existing Delays in the System21  
A study conducted for the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
in 2009 interviewed 182 child witnesses (138 victims) about the impact of involvement as 
witnesses on their health, welfare, and education. The child informants were recruited from 
30 Crown Courts, 26 magistrates’ courts, and 23 youth courts from 67 locations in England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. The results highlighted problematic delays in 3 crucial areas: 
(1) between reporting the offense (forensic interview) and trial, (2) while the child was 
testifying at court, and (3) with respect to the time of day they were called to give evidence. 
For Crown Court cases, the average delay between reporting offenses (i.e., forensic 
interview) and trial was 13 months, with delays ranging from 6 to 67 months. A third of the 
trials (59 children) were rescheduled one or more times. The average waiting time at court 
was 5.8 hours, with delays ranging from 20 minutes to 31 hours. The waiting time at court 
for vulnerable victims, in particular, was no shorter than for non-victim witnesses despite 
                                                          
17 Ministry of Justice, Transforming the CJS: A strategy and action plan to reform the criminal justice system; 
Criminal Practice Directions 2013 (CPD 2013)  
18 R v Cokesix Lubemba, R v JP [2014] EWCA CRIM 2064 
19 Ministry of Justice, Transforming the CJS: A strategy and action plan to reform the criminal justice system; 
CPD 2013 
20 J. Plotnikoff and R. Woolfson, “Worth waiting for: The benefits of section 28 pre-trial cross-examination,” 
(Archbold Review, 2016)  
21 J. Plotnikoff and R. Woolfson, “Measuring up?” 
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court instructions to the contrary. Lastly, only 51 per cent of children in England and Wales 
and 8 per cent of children in Northern Ireland gave their evidence in the morning, “while 
[children] are fresh.”22  
Effects of Delay 
Delays may have adverse effects on children and their testimony in a number of ways.  
Firstly, like adults, children do not encode and store all details about experienced events in 
long term memory.23 In addition, children forget more rapidly than adults do24 and are more 
likely to confuse memories from similar sources (i.e., source monitoring).25 This means that 
child witnesses become less informative sources of information over time, with the process of 
forgetting ensuring that they not only remember less but are also more susceptible to 
suggestion and source monitoring confusion due to hazier memories.26 Children are also 
more willing to guess when memory has deteriorated.27 Together, these factors make it easier 
for questioners (e.g., in cross-examination) to discredit witnesses by making them appear 
inconsistent or suggestible as events recede in memory.28   
Secondly, the stress resulting from delay is also problematic because it negatively 
affects the child’s welfare while awaiting trial29.  Half of the children in Plotnikoff and 
Woolfson’s (2009) study exhibited symptoms of stress, such as depression, anxiety, self-
                                                          
22 ibid, p. 163 
23 D. Berntsen, Involuntary autobiographical memories: An introduction to the unbidden past (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 2009); M. Erdelyi, “The ups and downs of memory” (American 
Psychologist, 2010); M. L. Howe, The nature of early memory: An adaptive theory of the genesis and 
development of memory (Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 2011); M. E. Lamb, L. C. Malloy, I. 
Hershkowitz, and D. La Rooy, “Children and the law”, In Handbook of child psychology and developmental 
science (7th ed.), Volume 3, Social, emotional and personality development. edited by R. M. Lerner and M. E. 
Lamb (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015).  
24 C. J. Brainerd, V. F. Reyna, M. L. Howe, and J. Kingma, “The development 
of forgetting and reminiscence” (Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 1990); R. Flin, 
J. Boon, A. Knox, and R. Bull, “The effect of a five-month delay on children's and adults' eyewitness memory” 
(British Journal of Psychology, 1992) 
25 S. Lindsay, M. K. Johnson, and P. Kwon, “Developmental changes in memory source monitoring” (Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 1991).  
26 R. Flin, J. Boon, A. Knox, and R. Bull, “The effect of a five-month delay on children's and adults' eyewitness 
memory”; M. E. Lamb, L. C. Malloy, I. Hershkowitz, and D. La Rooy, “Children and the law”, 2015. 
27 A.H. Waterman and M. Blades, “The effect of delay and individual differences on children's tendency to 
guess” (Developmental Psychology, 2013).  
28 M. Bruck and S. J. Ceci, “The suggestibility of children's memory” (Annual Review of Psychology, 1999); R. 
Flin, J. Boon, A. Knox, and R. Bull, “The effect of a five-month delay on children's and adults' eyewitness 
memory; M. E. Lamb, L. C. Malloy, I. Hershkowitz, and D. La Rooy, “Children and the law,”; Children and 
cross-examination: Time to change the rules (2012) 
29 M. L. Howe, The nature of early memory, 2011; A. Hupbach and J. M. Dorskind, “Stress selectively affects 
the reactivated components of a declarative memory” (Behavioral Neuroscience, 2014); J. Plotnikoff and R. 
Woolfson, “Measuring up?”; H. Selye, Stress in health and disease. (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2013); 
Children and cross-examination: Time to change the rules (2012) 
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harm, bedwetting, and panic attacks, while awaiting trial. As Henderson observed, “There is 
an irony to the fact that the longest delays are suffered by those least able to withstand 
them”.30  
Thirdly, stressful delays adversely affect children’s cognitive capabilities, inhibiting 
their ability to recall details and to communicate these details while they are testifying.31 
Because children devote some of their cognitive resources to coping with their emotions, 
stress interferes with attention and memory retrieval.32   
Additional Problems with Court Procedure 
Once children are called to court for cross-examination, the process can still be 
problematic. Further delays commonly result from technical difficulties, attorney 
interruptions, and poor scheduling (e.g., the child arrives at court before lunch and must wait 
until after lunch to give evidence). For example, in one study, 40% of child witnesses 
reported problems with either the video-playing procedure or the ‘live links.’33  
Further, giving evidence at non-optimal times of day may diminish children’s 
alertness, therefore affecting the quality of evidence elicited.34 Thus, if pre-recording hearings 
were scheduled for mornings, children should be more alert, and thus able to provide their 
best evidence. Additionally, scheduling a child’s evidence in the morning increases the 
likelihood that the child’s involvement will be completed in one day, without him/her having 
to return to court.  
The Present Study 
                                                          
30 Children and cross-examination: Time to change the rules (2012) p. 45 
31 A. Hupbach and J. M. Dorskind, “Stress selectively affects the reactivated components of a declarative 
memory; M. E. Lamb, L. C. Malloy, I. Hershkowitz, and D. La Rooy, “Children and the law,”; R. Nathanson 
and K. J.  Saywitz, “The effects of the courtroom context on children's memory and anxiety” (The Journal of 
Psychiatry and Law, 2003); J. A. Quas and H. C. Lench, “Arousal at encoding, arousal at retrieval, interviewer 
support, and children's memory for a mild stressor” (Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2007); T. Smeets, H. 
Otgaar, I. Candel, and O. T. Wolf, “True or false? Memory is differentially affected by stress-induced cortisol 
elevations and sympathetic activity at consolidation and retrieval” (Psychoneuroendocrinology, 2008).  
32 E. F. Maldonado, F. J. Fernandez, M. V. Trianes, K. Wesnes, O. Petrini, A. Zangara, ... and L. Ambrosetti, 
“Cognitive performance and morning levels of salivary cortisol and [alpha]-amylase in children reporting high 
vs. low daily stress perception” (The Spanish journal of psychology, 2008); J. A. Quas, A. Bauer, and W. T. 
Boyce, “Physiological reactivity, social support, and memory in early childhood” (Child Development, 2004).  
33 J. Plotnikoff and R. Woolfson, “Measuring up?” 
34 H. Bearpark and P. Michie, “Changes in morningness-eveningness scores during adolescence and their 
relationship to sleep/wake disturbances” (Chronobiologia, 1987); M. A. Carskadon, C. Vieira, and C. Acebo, 
“Association between puberty and delayed phase preference” (Sleep, 1993); S. Kim, G. L. Dueker, L. Hasher, 
and D. Goldstein, “Children's time of day preference: age, gender and ethnic differences” (Personality and 
Individual Differences, 2002).  
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Accordingly, we sought to examine whether implementation of the Section 28 
procedures reduced unnecessary delays, both between first report and cross-examination, as 
well as on the day that they testified. It was hypothesised that children in the Section 28 pilot 
cases would be cross-examined (and thus end their involvement in the court process) after 
shorter delays and be examined in court for shorter periods of time than children who were 
not able to benefit from the Section 28 special measure. We also expected that they would 
give evidence significantly earlier in the day.  
Methods 
Sample 
 The Ministry of Justice HM Courts and Tribunals Service identified 138 Non-
Section 28 (hereinafter NS28) cases and 84 Section 28 (hereinafter S28) cases that took place 
between 2012 and 2016. Attempts were made to obtain records for all S28 cases that had 
taken place by the time of the study in the three courts that were participating in the pilot 
study (Leeds, Liverpool, and Kingston).  Cases for the NS28 group came from Bradford, 
Durham, Hull, Luton, Newcastle, Norwich, and Oxford.  Of the 222 cases, 52 NS28 cases 
and 46 S28 cases involved children aged 15 and under testifying as alleged victims of sexual 
assault.  Recordings of the relevant court proceedings were transcribed and anonymised. 
Transcripts of the Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) interviews, which served as evidence-in-
chief, and supplementary trial logs, which provided detailed information regarding the entire 
trial process, were collected and were scoured for relevant details as well. The S28 and NS28 
cases were matched with respect to gender of child, age at ABE, age at trial, frequency of 
abuse, severity of abuse, child-suspect relationship, and verdict. 
Coding 
A rater extracted and recorded details about 1) the alleged victim’s age at the time of 
the ABE interview, 2) age at trial or S28 hearing, 3) gender, 4) relationship to the defendant, 
5) verdict, 6) frequency of alleged abuse and 7) severity of alleged abuse from the ABE 
interviews and trial logs. The length of delay was calculated using trial logs in terms of the 
number of days between the ABE interview and cross-examination dates. If there were 
multiple ABE interviews, the date of the first ABE interview was used to calculate delay. If 
there was a retrial, the date of the cross-examination in the second trial was used. The time of 
day at which the child began testifying was coded in a 24-hour format and the number of 
days on which the child gave evidence was determined.  
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 The duration of total courtroom participation was calculated in minutes. In addition 
to measuring the total amount of time involved, which included time spent watching the ABE 
interview, the coder calculated the amounts of time involved in each of the direct, cross, 
redirect, and recross-examination phases of the trial, as well as the length of all breaks and 
interruptions. Time spent viewing the ABE interview was not included in the direct 
examination time. In-court direct examination occurred in 27 cases (the other 71 children 
watched the ABE interview without further substantive questioning). Cross-examinations 
took place in all of the cases (n = 98), redirect examinations occurred in 49 cases, and re-
cross-examinations took place in only 3 cases. The total amount of time associated with 
breaks was included when calculating the duration of courtroom participation. Nearly half (n 
= 43) of the cases involved breaks that affected the children.  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Only 4 children returned to court for a second day (all in the NS28 condition) so this 
variable was not considered further. Similarly, because all 3 recross-examinations took place 
in NS28 cases, no further analysis of these data was attempted.  The average length of the 
ABE interviews in the two conditions (NS28 = 49 mins, SD = 23; S28 = 47 mins, SD = 18) 
did not differ significantly.35 
Delay between ABE interview and Cross Examination 
There were no significant effects of gender, age at trial, frequency of abuse, severity 
of abuse, or relationship to defendant on the delay between ABE interview and cross-
examination. However, preliminary analyses found that longer delays were significantly more 
likely to result in not guilty verdicts.36 It was also found that there were significantly longer 
delays for younger children.37 As a result, verdict and age at ABE interview were included in 
some of the analyses reported below.  
Total Length of Court Involvement 
The child’s gender, age at ABE, age at trial, verdict, severity of abuse, and 
relationship to defendant were not related to any of the trial testimony duration measures. 
                                                          
35 F(1, 92) = .235, p = .629 
36 c2(1, N = 95) = 4.264, p = .039. 
37 F(10, 93) = 3.821, p < .001 
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However, the frequency of abuse was significantly correlated with the total duration of court 
involvement38 and the duration of cross examination.39 Therefore, frequency of abuse was 
included in analyses regarding the durations of court involvement and cross-examination.  
Time of Day Children Testified 
The child’s gender, age at ABE, age at trial, verdict, frequency of abuse, severity of 
abuse, and relationship to defendant were not associated with the time of day children 
testified.  
Delay between ABE Interview and Cross-Examination 
 Children in the NS28 condition waited significantly longer (M = 423 days, SD = 297) 
than children in the S28 condition (M = 291 days, SD = 189) (See Table 1).40 The same effect 
was evident when four outliers were excluded (2 NS28 with delays of 1045 days or greater, 
and 2 S28 cases with delays of 958 days or greater).41  
Length of Court Participation42 
The duration of total court participation,43 cross-examination time,44 and break time45 
were significantly shorter for S28 cases, while direct examination time,46 and redirect 
examination time47 were non-significantly shorter for S28 cases (See Table 1).  
When outliers were excluded from the analyses, the duration of total court 
participation,48 the length of cross-examination,49 the length of breaks,50 and the duration of 
                                                          
38 F(1, 90) = 4.201, p = .043 
39F(1, 90) = 3.999, p = .049.  
40 A one-way univariate analysis of variance assessing the effects of trial condition (S28, NS28) on delay (in 
days) yielded a significant effect, F(1, 93) = 8.55, p = .005.  
41 F(1, 89) = 11.584, p = .001 
42 Because the sample size was insufficient (i.e., only 14 cases involved a direct examination, cross-
examination, redirect examination, and a break), a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) could 
not be performed. Instead, one-way (group: S28, NS28) univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) examined 
the (1) duration of total court participation, (2) length of direct examination, (3) length of cross-examination, (4) 
length of redirect examination, and (5) length of breaks. 
43 F(1, 97) = 28.915, p< .001 
44 F(1, 97) = 19.206, p< .001 
45 F(1, 42) = 6.935, p = .012 
46 F(1, 26) = .756, p = .393 
47 F(1, 48) = .478, p = .493 
48 F(1, 93) = 41.662, p< .001 
49 F(1, 96) = 25.206, p < .001 
50 F(1, 41) = 6.438, p = .015 
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redirect examination51  were significantly shorter for S28 cases. However, there was no 
significant difference between the length of the S28 and NS28 direct examinations.52  
Table 1  
Delay Durations 
Duration Type Non-Section 28 Section 28 
 M SD N M SD N 
ABE to Trial ** 423 days 297 days 50 291 days 189 days 45 
Total Court participation *** 79 min 72 min 52 21 min 14 min  46 
Direct Examination 8.5 min  13 min 24 2 min 1.3 min 3 
Cross Examination *** 30 min 17 min 52 17 min 12 min 46 
Redirect Examination 4 min 3 min 35 3.5 min 5 min 14 
Breaks *** 56 min 44 min 37 6 min 7 min 6 
Time of Day*** 12.31 pm 97 min 52 10.52 am 98 min 46 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Time of Day53 
On average, children in the NS28 condition began testifying at 12.31 (SD = 97 
minutes) whereas children in the S28 condition began testifying at 10.52 (SD = 98 minutes)54 
(See Table 1).  When outliers were excluded (6 children in the S28 condition who began 
testifying at or after 12.57 pm), the difference was still significant.55 
Miscellaneous Analyses 
Effects of Age at ABE Interview on Duration between ABE interview and Cross-
Examination56 
                                                          
51 F(1, 45) = 6.956, p = .012 
52 F(1, 22) = .931, p =  .346 
53 A one-way univariate ANOVA was run to assess the effect of trial condition on the time of day (24 hour 
scale) children’s testimony. 
54 F(1, 97) = 24.972, p< .001   
55 F(1, 91) = 67.743, p< .001 
56 A one-way univariate analysis of variance was run to compare the effect of age at the time of ABE interview 
(4-15 years old) on the length of delay from ABE interview to cross-examination (in days). 
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There was a significant association between age at ABE interview and the length of 
time between the ABE interview and cross-examination,57 indicating that younger children 
experienced longer delays, regardless of trial condition (S28 or NS28).58 When outliers were 
excluded, the association between age at ABE interview and the length of delay was still 
significant.59  
Association between Delay and Verdict60 
On average, trials in which defendants were found not guilty began 423 (SD = 321) 
days after the forensic interview, whereas trials that led to convictions began 315 (SD = 192) 
days after the forensic interview. When the cases with excessively long durations were 
excluded, the effect of delay was no longer significant, although not guilty verdicts came 
after longer delays (M = 353 days, SD = 167) than guilty verdicts (M = 302 days, SD = 166).   
Associations Between Frequency of Abuse and Duration of Children’s Court Participation61  
Children in the NS28 condition had significantly longer periods of court involvement 
when they alleged multiple (M = 98 min, SD = 80) as opposed to single (M = 49 min, SD = 
46) incidents of abuse,62 but there were not such differences for children in the S28 
condition63 (See Table 2). In addition, children in the NS28 condition had significantly longer 
periods of cross examination when they alleged multiple (M = 35 min, SD = 18) as opposed 
to single (M = 22 min, SD = 9) incidents of abuse64 but again there were not such differences 
for children in the S28 condition65 (See Table 2).  
 
                                                          
57 F(10, 93) = 3.706, p< .001 
58 F(8, 93) = .456, p = .883 
59 F(1, 9) = 2.752, p = .008 
60 A binary logistic regression showed that the length of delay between the ABE interview and completion of the 
children’s testimony significantly predicted verdict (guilty, not guilty), c2(1, N = 95) = 4.264, p = .039. 
61 A two-way [frequency of abuse (single, multiple) and trial condition (S28, NS28)] between-subjects 
MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate main effect for condition, Wilks’ λ = .788, F (2, 86) = 11.599, p < 
.001, and a significant interaction between condition and frequency, Wilks’ λ = .928, F (2, 86) = 3.36, p = .040, 
on the total duration of children’s participation in court and the duration of children’s cross-examination. Two-
way ANOVAs explored effects on each of the dependent variables with outliers excluded. There was a main 
effect of frequency of abuse, F(1, 90) = 4.201, p = .030, and an interaction between frequency and trial 
condition, F(1, 90) = 4.895, p = .030, on the total duration of children’s participation in court. The effect of 
frequency on the length of cross-examination was not significant, F(1, 89) = 2.906, p = .092, but the interaction 
between frequency and trial condition remained significant, F(1, 89) = 8.466, p = .005.  
62 t(50) = -2.474, p = .017 
63 t(37) = .398, p = .693 
64 t(50) = -2.973, p = .005 
65 t(37) = .247, p = .807 
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Table 2  
Total and Cross-Examination Durations Associated with Frequency of Alleged Abuse 
Frequency Condition Total Testimony Duration Cross Examination Duration 
  M SD N M SD N 
Single Non-S.28 49 min 46 min 20 22 min 9 min 20 
 Section 28 22 min 15 min 18 18 min 11 min 18 
 Total 36 min 37 min 38 20 min 12 min 38 
Multiple Non-S.28 98 min* 80 min 32 35 min** 18 min 32 
 Section 28 20 min 14 min 21 17 min 13 min 21 
 Total 67 min* 73 min 53 24 min* 16 min 53 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Discussion 
These results clearly demonstrate that the implementation of the Section 28 special 
measure significantly improved legal proceedings for trials involving vulnerable witnesses in 
three important ways. Firstly, children in the S28 condition gave their evidence over 4 
months earlier than those not accorded the opportunity to provide a recorded cross-
examination, demonstrating that pre-recording reduced the length of time that children 
waited to conclude their involvement in legal proceedings. Secondly, children in the S28 
condition spent nearly an hour less time in the courthouse, indicating that the Section 28 
procedures and Ground Rules Hearings significantly reduced both the length of questioning 
and the number of unnecessary delays during the proceedings. Thirdly, children in the S28 
condition began giving evidence an hour and 13 minutes earlier in the day than children in 
the NS28 condition.  
Children in the S28 condition gave their evidence 132 days earlier than similarly 
placed children in the NS28 condition. The reduced delays may be beneficial not only for the 
children but for the legal system as a whole. Children’s involvement –and the accompanying 
stress associated with waiting—was resolved an average of 4 months earlier, allowing their 
memories to be more detailed and more reliable at the time that they completed their 
testimony.66 Because age is a major determinant of the accuracy and richness of 
                                                          
66 M. L. Howe, The nature of early memory, 2011; W. Schneider and M. Pressley, Memory development 
between two and twenty, 2013. 
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autobiographical episodic memories,67 allowing children to give their evidence as early as 
possible reduces the risk of forgetting or contamination.  Even worse, longer delays between 
the first formal (ABE) interview and trial increase the risk of further forgetting and 
contamination, resulting in uncertain and inconsistent performance during cross examinations 
which may adversely affect the child’s credibility.68 Thus, as the Pigot Commission reasoned 
when they recommended pre-recording the cross-examinations of children,69 reducing delay 
should improve the quality of evidence obtained, thereby increasing the likelihood that just 
verdicts will be reached. 
Unexpectedly, younger children were significantly more likely to experience longer 
delays than older children, regardless of condition. Because younger children forget their 
experiences more quickly than older children,70 extended delays are especially problematic 
for them. Research should further investigate the cause of these delays and identify ways in 
which lengthy delays could be reduced. It may be that younger children are accorded more 
special measures (e.g., intermediary assistance) and that coordinating and scheduling these 
additional provisions inadvertently extends pre-trial delays.71  
Length of delay was also significantly associated with verdict, with not guilty verdicts 
being more common when delays were longer. This could reflect the predicted declines in the 
quality of children’s evidence as their memories fade, but the finding underlines the need to 
reduce delays wherever possible, so that courts can consider evidence of the highest quality.  
In this context, the reductions in delay evident in the S28 cases suggests that extension of the 
pilot program nationwide could have positive effects on the still excessive delays we 
identified.  
Children in the S28 condition also spent less time in the courthouses than children in 
the comparison group.  On average, children in the S28 condition spent 57 minutes less in 
total, 13 minutes less being cross examined, and 50 minutes less on breaks. Unfortunately, it 
is not possible to determine whether these reductions were attributable to the fact that the 
                                                          
67 R. Flin, J. Boon, A. Knox, and R. Bull, “The effect of a five-month delay on children's and adults' eyewitness 
memory; W. Schneider and M. Pressley, Memory development between two and twenty, 2013. 
68 M. Bruck and S. J. Ceci, “The suggestibility of children's memory”; M. E. Lamb, L. C. Malloy, I. 
Hershkowitz, and D. La Rooy, “Children and the law” 
69 T. Pigot, Report of the advisory group on video-recorded evidence; Spencer, “Evidence and Cross-
Examination” (2011); Children and cross-examination: Time to change the rules (2012). 
70 R. Flin, J. Boon, A. Knox, and R. Bull, “The effect of a five-month delay on children's and adults' eyewitness 
memory; M. L. Howe, The nature of early memory, 2011; W. Schneider and M. Pressley, Memory development 
between two and twenty, 2013. 
71 J. Plotnikoff and R. Woolfson, “Measuring up?” 
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children were being interviewed after shorter delays, and were thus better able to remember 
their experiences, or to the fact that they benefitted from the Ground Rules Hearings 
conducted in advance of the testimonial hearings.  Trials involving children in the 
comparison group may not have involved Ground Rules Hearings, at which the judges, 
sometimes informed by professional intermediaries, had the opportunity to specify which 
sorts of questions could be asked and which challenges to the children’s credibility were 
permissible. Changes in the lengths of children’s participation, and reductions in the amount 
of time they spent waiting to be questioned, are likely to have made the experience less 
stressful for them. Reductions in stress may allow them to concentrate better on the task at 
hand and provide more complete and coherent testimonial accounts.72  
Children in the S28 condition completed their courthouse participation more quickly 
than children in the comparison group, but the number of reported incidents of abuse was not 
associated with differences in the length of court participation, whereas this was the case for 
children in the comparison group. Although it seems reasonable to interview children longer 
about multiple than about unique incidents, this can have adverse effects on the accuracy and 
reliability of children’s testimony because there are developmental differences in the ability 
to distinguish between components of discrete incidents, and these difficulties are likely to be 
further enhanced when there are extended delays,73 as was the case for many of the children 
in this study. This raises the possibility that children in the NS28 group were questioned 
longer in an effort to elicit inconsistent or confused responses.  
Children were also called to testify significantly earlier in the day in the S28 
condition (10:52) than in the N28 condition (12:31). Practitioners have long argued that 
children should testify or be interviewed in the morning, both because they are likely to be 
freshest and most attentive at that time, and because it increases the likelihood that their 
involvement will be completed on one day, without the need for further trips to court.74 In 
                                                          
72 A. Hupbach and J. M. Dorskind, “Stress selectively affects the reactivated components of a declarative 
memory”; M. E. Lamb, L. C. Malloy, I. Hershkowitz, and D. La Rooy, “Children and the law”; E. F. 
Maldonado, F. J. Fernandez, M. V. Trianes, K. Wesnes, O. Petrini, A. Zangara, ... and L. Ambrosetti, 
“Cognitive performance and morning levels of salivary cortisol and [alpha]-amylase in children reporting high 
vs. low daily stress perception”; R. Nathanson and K. J.  Saywitz, “The effects of the courtroom context on 
children's memory and anxiety”; J. A. Quas, A. Bauer, and W. T. Boyce, “Physiological reactivity, social 
support, and memory in early childhood”; J. A. Quas and H. C. Lench, “Arousal at encoding, arousal at 
retrieval, interviewer support, and children's memory for a mild stressor”; T. Smeets, H. Otgaar, I. Candel, and 
O. T. Wolf, “True or false? Memory is differentially affected by stress-induced cortisol elevations and 
sympathetic activity at consolidation and retrieval” 
73 D. S. Lindsay, M. K. Johnson, and P. Kwon, “Developmental changes in memory source monitoring” 
74 H. Bearpark and P. Michie, “Changes in morningness-eveningness scores during adolescence and their 
relationship to sleep/wake disturbances”; M. A. Carskadon, C. Vieira, and C. Acebo, “Association between 
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this respect, the significant change in the times at which children began their courtroom 
participation represents another desirable consequence of the implementation of Section 28, 
as greater alertness should enhance the quality of the children’s testimony. Additional 
research might more thoroughly investigate individual differences in children’s preferences, 
so accommodations can be made, especially perhaps for adolescents who would prefer later 
start times.  
In all, the trial implementation of Section 28 showed that this special measure had 
several beneficial effects: it reduced the delay in processing cases involving young alleged 
victims, it streamlined the presentation of their evidence, and it was conducted in 
circumstances that might be expected to enhance the quality of their testimony. Of course, it 
will be critically important to ensure that these benefits are achieved when a larger number of 
courts, judges, and barristers are involved, so further evaluation after the national rollout will 
be essential.  Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Section 28 
will yield benefits for alleged victims, for defendants (who are tried sooner), and for the 
pursuit of just outcomes when criminal misbehaviour has been alleged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
puberty and delayed phase preference”; S. Kim, G. L. Dueker, L. Hasher, and D. Goldstein, “Children's time of 
day preference: age, gender and ethnic differences”  
 34 
 
Chapter 3: Examining children in English High Courts with and without implementation of 
reforms authorised in Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (1999) 
In 2014, several special measures linked to Section 28 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act (1999) were pilot-tested by the government in three courthouses in 
England (Ministry of Justice, 2013). In an effort to improve the quality of evidence elicited 
from vulnerable child witnesses, the reforms involved mandatory pre-trial Ground Rules 
Hearings (GRHs) followed by pre-recorded cross-examinations. In the GRHs, restrictions 
could be imposed on traditional cross-examination practices in an effort to reduce the use of 
risky questions (Criminal Practice Directions, 2015; Ministry of Justice, 2013). Meanwhile, 
pre-recorded cross-examinations were introduced to expedite children’s evidence, thereby 
swiftly resolving children’s involvement and reducing the detrimental delays between 
forensic interviews and cross-examination (Criminal Practice Directions, 2015; Henderson & 
Lamb, 2017). The intention was to implement Section 28 nationally following this pilot study 
(Criminal Practice Directions, Amendment 5, 2017). 
The current study was the first to examine whether implementation of these special 
measures improved lawyers’ questioning strategies. Children's participation in the legal 
system continues to increase (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 
2017), and there is substantial and growing evidence that children's vulnerabilities are often 
exploited during courtroom questioning (Andrews & Lamb, 2016, 2018; Marchant, 2013; 
Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009). Therefore, it is crucially important to identify, adopt, and 
embrace changes that may result in a fairer system for all involved.  
Pitfalls of Courtroom Examinations  
 International legal systems vary drastically in terms of basic legal philosophies and 
cultures (Bussey, 2009). Common law countries (e.g., England, Scotland, New Zealand, 
Australia, and the United States) employ an adversarial approach, whilst civil law countries 
(e.g., France, Germany, Austria, and Norway) employ an inquisitorial approach (Spencer & 
Lamb, 2012). While inquisitorial and adversarial systems both seek reliable evidence and 
must assess veracity, children in inquisitorial jurisdictions rarely testify in court or confront 
the defendants (Bussey, 2009). As the current study focused on the courtroom examinations 
of child witnesses in England, the adversarial system is considered below in greater detail.  
 In common law countries, the adversarial system involves prosecutors and defence 
lawyers who present evidence to impartial judges or jurors in several ways. Firstly, the direct-
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examination gives lawyers the opportunity to elicit evidence favourable to their case (Martin, 
2009). This typically involves witnesses recounting details on the stand, in court, before the 
judge and jury. In response to a number of concerns, including the potential trauma of 
recounting distressing experiences on the stand (Quas et al., 2005), and threats to the 
witness’s reliability due to deteriorated memory (Malloy & Quas, 2009), special measures 
have been adopted in some jurisdictions to modify the direct-examination of vulnerable 
witnesses. In particular, Section 27 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (1999) 
has permitted video-recorded Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) investigative interviews to be 
used as the direct-examination should trials occur (Home Office, 2011). As a result of Section 
27, the ABE interview constitutes almost all of the relevant direct-examination in many 
contemporary English cases (Henderson & Lamb, 2017). Similarly, Australia (Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Australian Federal Police, 2005) and New Zealand 
(Evidence Act, 2005) allow recorded forensic interviews to be shown in place of the direct 
examination. However, all witnesses, including vulnerable witnesses, have to return to court 
months or even years after the initial reports to be cross-examined, which can be via a live 
TV link in England (Henderson & Lamb, 2017; Home Office, 2011).  
The cross-examination, the opportunity to confront an opposing party is fundamental 
to the adversarial approach (Spencer & Lamb, 2012) and is often deemed an inherent human 
right (Browne v Dunn, 1894; European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 [3d]). 
However, interpretations of what the ‘right to confront’ entails are often debated. The US 
Supreme Court has “never doubted that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a 
face to face meeting with the witnesses” (Coy v Iowa, 1988). In contrast, English law and 
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights do not guarantee face-to-face 
confrontation (Dennis, 2010). The United States places significant emphasis on the rights of 
the defendant, as protected by the 6th Amendment of the US Constitution, whereas the United 
Nations Convention of the Rights of Children (1990, Article 3) states that “the best interests 
of the child shall be a primary consideration” in all matters, including courts of law. 
Therefore, while common-law countries share a basic philosophical approach, they may 
differ significantly in their legal cultures (Bussey, 2009) and willingness to adapt legal 
proceedings (Spencer & Lamb, 2012). 
The cross-examination differs from the direct-examination in that, while the law of 
evidence generally forbids leading questions in direct-examination, lawyers are permitted, 
and in some cultures, encouraged, to use leading questions in cross-examinations (Criminal 
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Procedure Rules, 2015; US Federal Rules of Evidence, 2015; see E. Henderson, 2002, 2015; 
Westcott & Page, 2002; Younger, 1988). Furthermore, whilst the right to cross-examination 
is regarded as fundamental, jurisdictions and professions differ regarding the restrictions and 
limitations that should be placed on cross-examination (Criminal Procedure Rules, 2015; 
Dennis, 2010). For example, one third of English lawyers believe it is ‘legitimate to use some 
suggestive questions to obtain or obstruct information’ (Henderson, 2015, p. 5). On the other 
hand, English academics write, “Although there is a right to cross-examination, there is no, 
and has never been, a right to lead” (Wheatcroft, Caruso, & Krumrey-Quinn, 2015, p. 8).  
Internationally, legal reforms have begun to grant accommodations for vulnerable 
witnesses during questioning in both the direct and cross-examination (Office of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions and Australian Federal Police, 2005; Spencer & Lamb, 2012; Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999) but the granting of these accommodations does not 
guarantee that the relevant special measures have been effectively implemented. Training 
initiatives, educational outreach, and developments in legal culture may drastically affect the 
treatment of child witnesses and the effectiveness of legal reforms (Bussey, 2009).   
Ground Rules Hearings to Combat Risky Questioning 
To improve the treatment of vulnerable witnesses in England, Ground Rules Hearings 
(GRHs) were introduced to 1) restrict questioning that hinders children’s comprehension and 
communication and instead 2) encourage questioning that increases the quality of children’s 
testimony (Criminal Practice Directions, 2015; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2012). GRHs are 
attended before trial by the judge, prosecutor(s), defence lawyer(s), and if necessary, an 
intermediary (i.e., a court-appointed specialist responsible for facilitating communication 
between witnesses and lawyers).  
During the GRHs, many pre-trial matters are discussed, particularly the length of the 
questioning and the content of questions to be asked (R v Cokesix Lubemba, R v JP, 2014; 
Criminal Practice Directions, 2015). The relevant Criminal Practice Directions specifically 
state that “over-rigorous or repetitive cross-examination of a child or vulnerable witness 
should be stopped…” and that “… when the witness is young or otherwise vulnerable, the 
court may dispense with the normal practice and impose restrictions on the advocate ‘putting 
his case’ where there is risk of a young or otherwise vulnerable witness failing to understand, 
becoming distressed, or acquiescing to leading questions” (see Criminal Practice Directions, 
2015 I General Matters, 3E.1- 6). Judges may go so far as to review lawyers’ drafts of 
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proposed questions and their specification of topics that they may wish to explore when 
putting their case to witnesses.  
In the Section 28 pilot study, GRHs were made mandatory and took place before the 
pre-recorded cross-examinations. Henderson and Lamb (2017) found that, in the Section 28 
pilot study, children spent nearly an hour less giving evidence under oath than child 
witnesses in comparable cases. They also found that, whether or not the Section 28 reforms 
were implemented, the bulk of children’s evidence came from the ABE forensic interviews 
and the cross-examinations, with little to no time spent directly examining the children (see 
Table 1; Henderson & Lamb, 2017). These findings suggest that GRHs and the 
implementation of video-recorded evidence may spare children from unnecessary 
involvement in the legal system and protect them from risky questioning by identifying key 
issues prior to trial, streamlining questioning, and scheduling the children’s examinations 
more effectively.   
Table 1c 
Breakdown of Courtroom Hearings and Examinations by Trial Condition  
 Non-Section 28 Section 28 
 N M (min) SD (min) N M (min) SD (min) 
ABE Video-interview 41 46.68 22.35 43 46.58 18.41 
Ground Rules Hearing  6 23.67 22.67 43 29.12 39.90 
Additional Direct-examination a 19 9.75 14.40 3 1.80 1.30 
Cross-examination 44 27.76 15.47 43 16.30 12.03 
Redirect-examination 29 4.51 3.40 14 3.51 4.85 
Recross-examination 2 1.23 0.78 0 - - 
Total Evidence b 44 89.93 56.40 43 68.19 36.59 
a “Additional Direct-examination” determined from case trial logs (see Henderson & Lamb, 2017). 
b “Total Evidence” includes all variables except the Ground Rules Hearing.  
c This table differs from Table 1 in Chapter 2 because several cases were excluded when forensic interview 
transcripts were missing or incomplete, making those cases ineligible for this study (see ‘N’). 
 
As of 2015 (Criminal Practice Directions, 2015, 3E.2), GRHs are now recommended 
in all cases involving vulnerable witnesses and are mandatory in cases using pre-recorded 
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cross-examinations and/or cases that involve the assistance of intermediaries. Thus, whether 
or not the cross-examination is pre-recorded, GRHs can be used to facilitate children’s (or 
other vulnerable witness’s) best evidence. Ultimately, by imposing restrictions on the length 
and nature of questioning, it is hoped that harmful techniques can be reduced, if not 
eliminated entirely, from cross-examinations. 
Research on Question Types 
Researchers have demonstrated that the questioning strategies commonly employed in 
court, particularly during cross-examinations, reduce the productivity (Lamb, Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007) and accuracy (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Lamb & 
Fauchier, 2001) of children’s testimonies. Two detrimental forms of prompts are closed-
ended option-posing questions (e.g., “Did it hurt when he touched you?” when the child has 
previously disclosed being touched) and suggestive questions (e.g., “It hurt when he touched 
you, right?”) (see Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, 2015; Melton, Ben-Arieh, 
Cashmore, Goodman, & Worley, 2014 for reviews; see Table 2). Closed-ended prompts have 
the potential to contaminate children’s evidence (Lamb et al., 2007; Melton et al., 2014) 
because they involve the introduction of information by the questioner. Children provide less 
information in response to option-posing questions (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Lamb et al., 
2007), and children more commonly contradict themselves when prompted using option-
posing questions (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Lamb & Fauchier, 2001). Suggestive prompts 
communicate the expected response and elicit more self-contradictions than any other prompt 
(Andrews & Lamb, 2016); thus, they are particularly discouraged by experts, as they further 
reduce the credibility of children’s testimony (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Home Office, 2011; 
Lamb & Fauchier, 2001).  
Researchers instead encourage the use of open-ended prompts such as free recall 
invitations (e.g., “Tell me what happened”) and directive prompts (e.g., “What did he do after 
your mum left?” when the child has previously disclosed that he did something after the 
mother left; see Lamb et al., 2015; Melton et al., 2014 for reviews; see Table 2), which tend 
to elicit more accurate (Dent, 1982, 1986; Jack, Leov, & Zajac, 2014; Lamb et al., 2007) and 
more detailed (e.g., Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Lamb et al., 2007; Sternberg, Lamb, Davies, & 
Westcott, 2001) responses. Furthermore, field studies have shown that few, if any, self-
contradictions are elicited using open-ended invitations and directives (Andrews & Lamb, 
2016; Fogliati & Bussey, 2014; Lamb & Fauchier, 2001). Despite these findings, lawyers 
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predominantly use ‘risky’ option-posing and suggestive prompts when questioning children 
in court (e.g., Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss, Quas, & Lyon, 2014; Zajac et al., 2017). 
Research from Scotland, the United States, and New Zealand has consistently shown 
that defence lawyers ask fewer invitations and directives and more suggestive questions than 
prosecutors (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss et al., 2014; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014; 
Zajac & Cannan, 2009; but see Flin, Bull, Boon, & Knox, 1993). Prosecutors’ questioning 
strategies also appear to be problematic. Both types of lawyers use option-posing ‘yes/no’ 
prompts most often (Hanna, Davies, Crothers, & Henderson et al., 2012; Klemfuss et al., 
2014; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). One study found that nearly all prosecutors (86%) elicited at 
least one self-contradiction from child witnesses (Andrews, Lamb, & Lyon, 2015). This 
underscores the need for significant improvements in the ways that children are questioned 
by both prosecutors and defence lawyers.  
Although Andrews and Lamb (2016) and Flin et al. (1993) investigated cross-
examinations of child witnesses in UK courts (Scotland), there has been no prior systematic 
research looking specifically at cross-examinations in England. However, there is evidence 
that – like their Scottish (Andrews & Lamb, 2016), American (e.g., Klemfuss et al., 2014), 
and New Zealander (e.g., Zajac & Cannan, 2009) counterparts - English lawyers question 
child witnesses inappropriately. Plotnikoff and Woolfson (2009) conducted a survey of 
mostly English child witnesses (89%, n = 162) which found that most children (91%) 
described the prosecutors as ‘polite’ whereas only 49% of the children described the defence 
lawyers as ‘polite.’ In addition, over half (58%) of the children said that the defence lawyers 
tried to make them say something they did not mean. It may therefore be that lawyers in 
England, and in particular defence lawyers, appear ‘impolite’ to children because they are 
using close-ended prompts that restrict children’s productivity and/or imply expected 
responses.  
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Table 2 
Question Types, Definitions, and Examples 
 
 
Definition Example 
Invitation An open-ended request that the child recall 
information about the incident. Can be 
formulated as a statement, question, or 
imperative. 
 
“Tell me everything that happened” 
Directive A cued-recall prompt that focuses the child’s 
attention on information already mentioned and 
requests additional specific information, typically 
using wh-questions (who, what, when, where, 
how). 
 
“What colour was the shirt?” (When the 
shirt had been mentioned) 
Option- posing Closed-ended questions that refocus the child’s 
attention on details of the allegation that they 
have not previously mentioned, without implying 
an expected response. 
 
“Did it hurt?” 
“Were your clothes on or off when it 
happened?” 
 
Suggestive An utterance that assumes information not 
disclosed by the child or implies that a particular 
response is expected. 
“Did it hurt when he put his finger in 
you?” (When the child has not 
mentioned digital penetration). 
“He wanted you to kiss him, didn’t he?” 
 
Responsive Verbal and action responses related to the 
lawyer’s previous utterance, even if the response 
did not contain new 
informative details, or when its meaning was 
unclear. 
 
Lawyer: “Did he take your trousers 
off?” 
Child: “Yes” [responsive] 
Lawyer: “What did he do next?” 
Child: “I don’t know” [responsive] 
Unresponsive Responses that do not relate to the question asked 
in the previous utterance but provide incident-
related information. These include instances 
when children misunderstood the lawyers’ 
questions. 
 
Lawyer: “What did he say?” 
Child: “I said stop!” [unresponsive] 
Compliance Children’s responses that acquiesce to the 
suggested confrontation, 
supposition, or input. 
Lawyer: “It hurt when he touched you, 
didn’t it?” (when the child has not 
mentioned being hurt by the touch) 
Child: “Yeah” 
 
Resistance Children’s responses that resist the suggested 
confrontation, supposition, or input. 
 
Lawyer: “You’re lying, aren’t you?” 
Child: “No I’m not.” 
 Note. Adapted from Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Lamb, et al., 2007. 
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Children’s Responsiveness and Compliance with Suggestive Questions  
Although cross-examination is an intimidating and confusing process, even for 
experts (Flin, 1993), children are particularly disadvantaged in the legal system. Age 
significantly affects the quantity and quality of details encoded into memory (Flin, Boon, 
Knox, & Bull, 1992; Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2011), children’s resistance 
to suggestion (Melnyk, Crossman, & Scullin, 2007), and children’s communicative 
capabilities (Saywitz, 2002). Consequently, children may struggle to understand what 
information is being requested, access their memory for specific events, and then respond 
appropriately (Jack et al., 2014; Lamb, Orbach, Warren, Esplin, & Hershkowitz, 2007b).   
Field research in Scotland and the United States has found that children are highly 
responsive in court (i.e., their responses relate to the lawyers’ previous utterances, see Table 
2; Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss et al., 2014). Younger children provide less 
information in response to free-recall questions, but they also answer specific questions less 
accurately than older children do (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Goodman, Jones, & McLeod, 
2017). Thus, best-practice guidelines encourage maximum reliance on free-recall prompts, 
advise against the use of close-ended ‘yes/no’ prompts, and strongly discourage the use of 
suggestive prompts (Home Office, 2011; Lamb et al., 2015).  
 In spite of these guidelines, lawyers are permitted to ask children suggestive 
questions in cross-examinations (Criminal Procedure Rules, 2015). Research has consistently 
shown that children acquiesce more often to suggestions and are more malleable than adults 
(Jack et al., 2014; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2016; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001; Volpini, 
Melis, Petralia, & Roseberg, 2016). Younger children make more errors in response to 
suggestive questions than older children do but even very young children are able to maintain 
considerable accuracy (Goodman et al., 2017). Younger children may need more ‘memory 
cues’ than older children so interviewers may ask them leading questions, and, as a result, 
may elicit more erroneous information (Goodman, Ogle, McWilliams, Narr, & Paz-Alonso, 
2014). Thus, experts recommend that even young children should be asked open-ended 
questions because they increase accuracy and informativeness and also enhance perceived 
credibility in legal contexts (Goodman et al., 2017).   
Although previous research had generally focused on young children’s vulnerabilities 
(Melnyk et al., 2007), research has also shown that adolescents are susceptible to suggestion 
(Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci, & Meyer, 2006) and that adolescents are 
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more likely than adults to comply with authority figures (Gudjonsson, 2003; Monahan, 
Steinberg, & Piquero, 2015). A study by Redlich and Goodman (2003) showed that 78% of 
12- and 13-year-olds, 72% of 15- and 16-year olds, and 59% of young adults all complied 
with interviewers by signing false confessions, likely due to the tendency to obey authority. 
In some instances, however, older children may provide less reliable accounts than young 
children due to the developmental reversal effect (i.e., because age is positively associated 
with greater reliance on ‘gist traces,’ older children may be at increased risks of experiencing 
spontaneous false memories; see Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & Raymaekers, 2013). 
Regardless of age, individuals may differ in regard to their suggestibility (i.e., ‘the tendency 
for an individual’s account to be altered by misleading information and interpersonal 
pressure’; Singh & Gudjonsson, 1992, p. 155). Thus, children of all ages may be vulnerable 
to suggestive questioning, and hence, such questioning should be avoided in legal contexts.   
Despite the evidence regarding children’s susceptibility to suggestion (Gudjonsson, 
2003; Lamb et al., 2007b; Melnyk et al., 2007), it is not clear from previous field research 
whether or not lawyers adapt their questioning styles for children of different ages, and if so, 
whether this affects children’s responses. Klemfuss et al. (2014) found that American 
prosecutors and defence lawyers asked older children significantly fewer option-posing 
questions and significantly more suggestive questions, while Stolzenberg and Lyon (2014) 
found that American lawyers were slightly more likely to ask younger children option-posing 
questions. Andrews and Lamb (2016) found that Scottish defence lawyers were most likely 
and Scottish prosecutors least likely to ask the youngest children option-posing questions. 
However, in New Zealand, Zajac, Gross, and Hayne (2003) found no significant associations 
between children’s ages and the types of questions asked by prosecutors or defence lawyers. 
Regardless, children consistently respond to almost all the questions they are asked in court 
and are more responsive to prosecutors than defence lawyers (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; 
Klemfuss et al., 2014; Zajac et al., 2003). Although Melynk et al. (2007) found that younger 
children complied more often with suggestive utterances, Andrews and Lamb (2016) found 
no such age differences. Thus, it is not clear whether lawyers generally adjust their 
questioning in relation to the age of the children or whether children of different ages are 
differentially responsive and compliant.   
Current Study 
No previous study has systematically investigated the questioning strategies 
employed in the Section 28 pilot study. This study investigated whether the implementation 
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of GRHs and pre-recorded cross-examinations resulted in prosecutors and defence lawyers 
altering the types of questions they asked. It was predicted that: (i) Prosecutors and defence 
lawyers in the Section 28 condition would question children more appropriately, (i.e., by 
asking more free-recall invitations and directive prompts as well as fewer option-posing and 
suggestive prompts), (ii) Younger children would be more compliant with lawyers’ 
suggestive questions than older children, regardless of condition, and (iii) The occurrence of 
a GRH alone would improve lawyers’ questioning strategies, regardless of whether or not the 
cases were involved in the Section 28 pilot study.  
Methods 
Sample 
Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service searched for trials that took place in 
England between 2012 and 2016 involving children under the age of 16 who were alleged 
victims of sexual abuse. They identified 138 Non-Section 28 (hereafter, NS28) cases in 7 
different Crown Courts and 84 Section 28 (hereafter, S28) cases in 3 different Crown Courts. 
Researchers made every effort to obtain all available S28 cases for the current study. Of the 
222 cases, 44 NS28 and 43 S28 cases met all the necessary research criteria in that they 
included complete transcripts of the ABE interviews and involved children under the age of 
16 testifying as alleged victims of sexual abuse. The 44 NS28 cases came from Bradford (n = 
6), Durham (n = 6), Hull (n = 7), Luton (n = 6), Newcastle (n = 12), Norwich (n = 5), and 
Oxford (n = 2), whilst the 43 S28 cases came from Kingston (n = 1), Leeds (n = 16), and 
Liverpool (n = 26). Recordings of the relevant court proceedings were transcribed and 
anonymised at the Ministry of Justice in London, and corresponding trial logs and ABE 
transcripts were also obtained. In all but 3 cases (all in the NS28 condition), the ABE 
interviews served as the majority of the direct-examinations at trial; in those 3 cases, there 
were no ABE interviews, but the alleged victims were interviewed by police officers, who 
then produced written statements.  
Information regarding case characteristics is provided in Table 3. The sample included 
69 girls and 18 boys between the ages of 6 and 15 years (M = 12.02, SD = 2.43), categorised 
into two age groups at the time of trial: 6- to 12-year-olds and 13- to 15-year-olds. These 
categories were chosen because they accord with the Sexual Offences Act (2003); 16 years is 
the age of sexual consent, but a person aged 16 or over can claim to be innocent of the charge 
of committing sexual offences with a child aged between 13 and 16 years if that person 
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‘reasonably believed’ that the child was over the age of 16. However, this reasonable belief 
provision does not apply if the offence involved a child under the age of 13. There were 
insufficient numbers of young children to create three groups, so the youngest children (6- to 
9-year-olds; n = 10 in NS28, n = 7 in S28) were not distinguished from the pre-teens (10-to 12-
year-olds; n = 14 in NS28, n = 15 in S28).  Children in the selected cases reported single (n = 
36) or multiple (n = 44) incidents of abuse (in 7 cases, the number of alleged incidents was 
unclear). Intermediaries assisted a minority of children (n = 14) during trial. GRHs are 
permitted in all cases with vulnerable witnesses, in the NS28 condition, 6 cases involved 
GRHs. In the S28 sample, all 43 cases had GRHs (see Table 3).  
The alleged offenses were categorised based on the most severe offense as defined in 
the Crown Prosecution Services Sexual Offense Legislation documentation (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2003). The sample included charges of rape (i.e., the intentional 
penetration of the child’s mouth, vagina, or anus with the penis), penetration (i.e., the 
intentional penetration of the vagina or anus with a part of the body or anything else), sexual 
assault (i.e., intentionally touching the child in a sexual way), sexual activity (i.e., intentionally 
causing the child to engage in sexual acts that may or may not involve the defendant; e.g., 
forcing the child to masturbate, forcing the child to engage in sexual activity with a third party), 
incitement to engage in sexual activity (i.e., encouraging the child to engage in a sexual act 
that did not take place), and grooming (i.e., communicating and arranging to meet with a child 
with the intention of committing a sexual offense against him or her) (see Table 3). 
All defendants were male and were categorised as “father figures” (i.e., biological 
fathers, stepfathers, or mother’s boyfriends), “family members” (i.e., brothers, grandfathers, 
cousins, uncles, or more distant relatives), “friends/acquaintances,” or “strangers.” In five 
cases, the victim-defendant relationships could not be determined. At trial, over half (n = 49) 
of the defendants were found guilty while 38 were acquitted (see Table 3).  
A binary logistic regression confirmed that the NS28 and S28 groups did not 
significantly differ with respect to key case facts, including the children’s ages, gender, 
frequency of alleged abuse, severity of alleged abuse, child-perpetrator relationship, verdict, 
and intermediary presence (see Table 3 for p values). The groups significantly differed only 
with regard to whether a GRH took place (see Table 3), because GRHs were mandatory in the 
S28 cases.  
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Table 3   
Characteristics of Cases in the NS28 and S28 Conditions  
Variables a  NS28 
(44) 
S28 
(43) 
  pb 
Gender Male 
Female 
 
11 
33 
7 
36 
0.32 
Age  6-12 years old 
13-15 years old 
 
24 
20 
22 
21 
0.76 
Frequency Single 
Multiple 
Unknown 
 
20 
23 
1 
16 
21 
6 
0.14 
Intermediary Yes 
No 
 
6 
38 
8 
35 
0.53 
GRH  
 
Yes 
No 
 
6 
38 
43 
0 
 0 .00* 
Severity Rape 
Penetration 
Sexual Assault 
Sexual Activity 
Inciting to Engage 
Grooming 
 
16 
3 
14 
7 
4 
0 
16 
3 
13 
10 
0 
1 
0.85 
Relationship 
to Child 
 
Father Figure 
Family Member 
Friend/Acquaintance 
Stranger 
Unable to determine 
 
10 
12 
21 
0 
1 
12 
10 
13 
4 
4 
0.37 
Verdict Guilty 
Not Guilty 
 
24 
20 
25 
18 
0.74 
a Variables adapted from Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss, Quas, & Lyon, 2014. 
b Binary logistic regression was run to identify any significant differences between the conditions. 
 
Coding of Transcripts 
The transcripts could have included direct-examinations, cross-examinations, redirect-
examinations, and recross-examinations (see Table 2). The substantive and non-substantive 
utterances of prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, and intermediaries were coded. Only 
“question-response pairs” were included in these analyses.  
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Substantive prompts.   
Substantive prompts were defined as prompts that elicited details about events 
preceding, during, and after the alleged incident(s). Substantive questions were categorised as 
one of 4 types (i.e., invitations, directives, option-posing prompts, and suggestive prompts; 
see Table 2 for definitions and examples).  
Non-substantive prompts.   
Non-substantive prompts were defined as prompts that did not elicit details about the 
alleged incident(s), and were coded as procedural, facilitative, or inaudible. Non-substantive 
prompts were only included in the initial descriptive analyses.   
Children’s responses.  
Children’s responses were coded as either responsive or unresponsive. Children’s 
responses to suggestive prompts were further coded as compliant or resistant (adapted from 
Andrews & Lamb, 2016) (see Table 2). Inaudible responses were excluded from analyses.   
Only “question-response pairs” were coded.   
Inter-rater Reliability  
A second rater independently recoded a random selection of the transcripts (20%; n 
= 18), half in each trial condition. The inter-rater reliability coefficients for all variables were 
high, Kappa (K) > .90, including agreement regarding the classification of substantive and 
non-substantive prompts, K = .97 (SE = .01), 95% CI [.95, .99]; of specific utterances, K = 
.95 (SE = .01), 95% CI [.93, .97]; of children’s responsiveness, K = .93 (SE = .02), 95% CI 
[.89, .97]; and of compliant and resistant responses to suggestive utterances, K = .92 
(SE = .01), 95% CI [.90, .94]. The second rater coded at the same time as the principal 
researcher’s coding, and the two raters resolved any disagreements through discussion.  
Analytical Plan 
Descriptive results are first provided for prosecutors’, defence lawyers’, judges’, and 
intermediaries’ substantive and non-substantive utterances. This was followed by preliminary 
analyses to determine whether any case facts were significantly associated with variations in 
the lawyers’ questioning strategies. Afterwards, parametric analyses were used to compare 
the questioning strategies adopted by prosecutors’ and defence lawyers’ and measures of the 
children’s responses (i.e., responsiveness and compliance) in the two types of trials (NS28, 
S28) in relation to children of different ages (6-12 years old, 13-15 years old).   
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All within-group variables were converted into proportional scores by dividing the 
cell count of interest (e.g., number of defence lawyer’s suggestive prompts) by the 
appropriate grouping total (e.g., total number of defence lawyers’ substantive prompts) to 
control for the number of questions asked by each lawyer. In analyses where Mauchly’s test 
of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates were used to correct results. Power 
analyses confirmed that all inferential tests had enough power (set at 0.8) to detect small to 
medium effect sizes.  
Results 
Descriptive Information 
Table 4 describes the average, maximum, and minimum numbers of substantive and 
non-substantive utterances asked by prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, and intermediaries 
in both trial conditions. Non-substantive utterances asked by prosecutors and defence 
lawyers, and all utterances asked by judges and intermediaries were excluded from all 
analyses reported below. Invitations were so seldom used so they were also excluded from 
question type analyses. Table 5 reports the average proportions of directive, option-posing, 
and suggestive utterance types used by prosecutors and defence lawyers in each trial 
condition for both age categories.  
Table 4  
Non-Substantive and Substantive Questions Asked by Practitioners in S28 and NS28 
Conditions  
  Non-Section 28 Section 28 
  M SD Min Max n M SD Min Max n 
Prosecutor a Substantive b 42 57 1 261 29 11 17 2 72 17 
 Non-Substantive 6 11 1 59 31 3 1 1 5 16 
Defence Substantive b  128 84 4 350 44 73 55 11 328 43 
 Non-Substantive 10 9 1 50 43 5 4 1 16 42 
Judge Substantive b 7 8 1 35 24 3 1 1 6 14 
 Non-Substantive 12 8 1 37 44 9 7 1 28 43 
Intermediary a Substantive b 4 4 1 9 4 2 1 1 4 4 
 Non-Substantive 5 5 1 13 5 2 2 1 4 4 
a Prosecutors and intermediaries who did not ask any questions were excluded. 
b Substantive utterances included invitations, directive, option-posing, and suggestive prompts.  
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Preliminary Analyses 
Multiple regression analyses were computed to determine whether the proportion of 
directive, option-posing, and suggestive prompts asked by either type of lawyer were 
significantly associated with any case characteristics (i.e., severity and frequency of abuse, 
relationship to offender, verdict, intermediary presence, GRH occurrence). The results 
indicated that the occurrence of a GRH was significantly associated with the proportion of 
defence lawyers’ option-posing prompts, F(7,72) = 2.44, β = .39, p = .001) and suggestive 
prompts, F(7,72) = 3.56, β = -.46, p < .001). No other case facts were significantly associated 
with the dependent variables and so they were not considered in subsequent analyses.   
How Did Trial Condition Affect Lawyers’ Questioning Strategies? 
Prosecutors asked substantive prompts in 45 cases, while defence lawyers asked 
substantive prompts in all 87 cases. Prosecutors asked few, if any, questions in the majority 
of cases because the ABE interviews were used as the evidence-in-chief (see Table 4), so it 
was not possible to treat lawyer role as an independent variable in statistical analyses. 
Instead, the characteristics of prosecutors’ and defence lawyers’ questions were examined 
separately.  
To begin, paired sample t-tests (with Bonferroni corrections, p = .016) were 
conducted in cases in which prosecutors asked substantive prompts (n = 45) to compare the 
proportions of questions asked by prosecutors and defence lawyers that were directive, 
option-posing, and suggestive prompts. Results indicated that defence lawyers used 
proportionally fewer directive, t(44) = 2.66, p = .011, and option-posing, t(44) = 2.64, p = 
.011, prompts as well as more suggestive prompts, t(44) = -6.71, p < .001, than prosecutors.  
Prosecutors’ questions.  
A Repeated-Measures analysis (RM-ANOVA) conducted to compare the types of 
questions asked by prosecutors revealed a main effect for question type, F(1.04, 45.68) = 
150.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .77 Prosecutors asked proportionally more option-posing questions (M 
= .73, SD = .20) than directive (M = .26, SD = .19, p < .001) or suggestive questions (M = 
.02, SD = .03, p < .001) and more directive questions than suggestive questions (p < .001). 
Due to the small number of prosecutor utterances (see Table 4), there was not enough power 
to reasonably detect medium-sized effects of trial condition or children’s age, but the 
descriptive statistics are included in Table 5. 
 49 
 
Table 5 
Utterance Type Proportions by Trial Condition, Lawyer Role, and Children’s Age   
 
    Non-Section 28  Section 28 
 
    M SD Min Max  M SD Min Max 
6-12 years 
 
 
 
 
Prosecutor  Directive  .24  .18  .00  .59    .34  .14  .10  .43  
  Option-Posing  .75  .18  .40  1.00    .63  .17  .43  .90  
  Suggestive  .01  .02  .00  .08    .03  .06  .00  .14  
Defence  Directive  .15  .14  .00  .53    .17  .10  .01  .34  
  Option-Posing  .63  .17  .26  1.00    .76  .10  .54  .91  
 Suggestive  .22  .19  .00  .68    .07  .09  .00  .32  
13-15 years Prosecutor  Directive  .28  .15  .00  .50    .21  .27  .00  .75  
  Option-Posing  .69  .16  .50  1.00    .78  .28  .25  1.00  
  Suggestive  .02  .03  .00  .08    .01  .03  .00  .09  
Defence  Directive  .11  .08  .00  .26    .18  .11  .00  .39  
  Option-Posing  .57  .14  .27  .80    .70  .13  .38  .96  
  Suggestive  .33  .18  .20  .71    .13  .15  .00  .62  
Total Prosecutor  Directive  .26  .16  .00  .59    .25  .24  .00  .75  
  Option-Posing  .72  .17  .41  1.00    .74  .26  .25  1.00  
  Suggestive  .02  .03  .00  .08    .01  .04  .00  .14  
Defence  Directive  .13  .11  .00  .53    .18  .10  .00  .39  
  Option-Posing  .60  .15  .26  1.00    .73  .17  .38  .96  
  Suggestive  .27  .19  .00  .71    .10  .12  .00  .62  
 
Defence lawyers’ questions.  
An RM-ANOVA conducted to identify associations between trial condition and the 
types (proportion) of questions asked revealed a main effect for question type, F(1.72, 
142.69) = 256.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, with defence lawyers using option-posing prompts 
more frequently than any other type of question (directive, p < .001; suggestive, p < .001). In 
the NS28 condition, more suggestive prompts were used than directive prompts (p < .001) 
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while, in the S28 condition, there was no significant difference between the relative 
proportions of suggestive and directive prompts posed (see Table 5).   
There was also an interaction between trial condition and question type, F(1.72, 
142.69) = 19.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. In the S28 condition, more option-posing prompts (p < 
.001) and fewer suggestive prompts (p < .001) were used than in the NS28 condition. There 
was not enough power to reasonably detect medium-sized effects of children's age but the 
descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5. 
How were children’s responses affected by trial condition, children’s age, and 
lawyer role?   
Table 6 shows the responsiveness of children to the prosecutors’ and defence lawyers’ 
prompts in both trial conditions. There was not enough power to examine children’s 
responsiveness to different types of questions so univariate ANOVAs were used to examine 
the effects of trial condition, lawyer role, and children’s age on children’s overall 
responsiveness and children’s compliance with suggestive questions. However, there was 
only enough power to examine children’s responses to defence lawyers’ suggestive 
utterances.   
Children’s Responses to Defence Lawyers’ Suggestive Questions  
A univariate ANOVA examining associations between children’s age and the 
proportion of responses in which children complied with defence lawyers’ suggestions 
revealed a main effect for children’s age, F(1, 69) = 10.01, p = .002, ηp2 = .13, with older 
children complying less than younger children (Table 7). There was not enough power to 
examine the effect of trial condition.  
How did GRHs affect Defence Lawyers’ Utterances? 
An RM-ANOVA conducted to identify associations between the occurrence of GRHs 
and the types of questions asked by defence lawyers revealed a main effect for question type, 
F(1.68, 143.10) = 236.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .74: regardless of whether or not there was a GRH, 
defence lawyers asked more option-posing than directive (p < .001) or suggestive (p < .001) 
questions. Post hoc analyses showed that, when there was no GRH, more suggestive than 
directive prompts (p < .001) were used, whereas, for cases with GRHs, there was no 
significant difference between the relative prominence of suggestive and directive prompts 
(see Table 8).  
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There was also an interaction between the occurrence of a GRH and question type, 
F(1.68, 143.10) = 17.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. In cases with GRHs, defence lawyers used more 
directive (p = .03) and option-posing prompts (p < .001) and fewer suggestive prompts (p < 
.001) than defence lawyers in cases without GRHs (see Table 8).  
 
Table 6  
Responsiveness to different types of questions addressed to children in each age group by 
prosecutors and defence lawyers.   
   NS28  S28 
 
    M SD n  M SD n 
6-12 years 
 
 
 
 
Prosecutor  Directive  .88  .17 11   .92 .20 6  
  Option-Posing  .88 .15 14    .90 .22 5  
  Suggestive  1.0 .00 2    1.0 .00 2  
Defence  Directive  .84 .24 23    .88 .19 22  
  Option-Posing  .94 .05 24    .87 .20 22  
  Suggestive  .90 .08 19    .91 .20 14  
13-15 years Prosecutor  Directive  .87  .27  13    .72  .42 5  
  Option-Posing  .94  .11  15    .96 .13 11  
  Suggestive  1.0  0.0  8    1.0  - 1  
Defence  Directive  .89  .10 19    .94 .07 19  
  Option-Posing  .88  .20 20    .95 .04 21  
  Suggestive  .90  .10 20    .91 .17 18  
Total Prosecutor  Directive  .87 .23 24  .83 .32 11 
  Option-Posing  .91 .13 29  .94 .16 16 
  Suggestive  1.0 .00 10  1.0 .00 3 
Defence  Directive  .87 .19 42  .91 .15 41 
  Option-Posing  .92 .14 44  .91 .15 43 
  Suggestive  .90 .09 39  .91 .18 32 
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Table 7  
Compliance with Defence Lawyers’ Suggestive Utterances by Trial Condition and Children’s 
Age   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8  
Types of Questions Asked by Lawyers in Cases With and Without GRHs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of the present study demonstrate that implementation of the special 
measures outlined in S28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act were positively 
associated with the way child witnesses were questioned by significantly reducing the 
proportion of suggestive questions that were asked by defence lawyers. In addition, analyses 
revealed that, regardless of pre-recorded cross-examinations, GRHs were associated with 
improved questioning procedures, although suggestive questions were still asked with some 
 6 to 12 years old  13 to 15 years old 
 M SD Min Max  M SD Min Max 
Non-Section 28 .64 .20 .31 1.0  .55 .16 .29 .82 
Section 28 .69 .33 .00 1.00  .39 .27 .00 .89 
Total .66 .26 .00 1.0  .48 .23 .00 .89 
  No GRH  GRH 
  M SD N  M SD n 
Prosecutor Directive .26 .15 25  .25 .24 20 
 Option-Posing .72 .15 25  .73 .25 20 
 Suggestive .02 .03 25  .01 .04 20 
Defence Directive .12 .10 38  .18 .11 49 
 Option-Posing .60 .16 38  .71 .12 49 
 Suggestive .28 .19 38  .11 .13 49 
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frequency. Younger children were more compliant with defence lawyers’ suggestive 
questions, and, disconcertingly, risky suggestive questions were merely being replaced by 
risky option-posing questions in the S28 condition.    
Key Findings   
We hypothesised that prosecutors would question children more appropriately in the 
S28 condition than in the NS28 condition, but because the use of ABE interviews as evidence 
reduced the need for prosecutors to ask many questions, it was not possible to explore the 
effects of S28 on the prosecutors’ behaviour.  However, as in previous studies (Andrews & 
Lamb, 2016; Hanna et al., 2012; Klemfuss et al., 2014; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014; Zajac & 
Cannan, 2009), prosecutors in both trial conditions used virtually no invitations but used 
more directive and option-posing prompts and fewer suggestive prompts than defence 
lawyers. In Scottish direct-examinations in the absence of pre-recorded evidence, by contrast, 
prosecutors asked, on average, 252 (SD = 182) substantive questions (Andrews & Lamb, 
2016) whereas in the current sample, prosecutors asked 11 (SD = 17) substantive questions in 
the S28 condition and 42 (SD = 57) substantive questions in the NS28 condition. Similarly, in 
New Zealand, where pre-recorded evidence is also permitted, prosecutors asked an average of 
35 (SD = 6) substantive questions (Zajac & Cannan, 2003). Thus, although the small sample 
size limited the conclusions that could be drawn with regards to prosecutors’ questioning, the 
findings underline the importance of high-quality forensic interviews. Not only do ABE 
interviews play critical roles in fact-finding investigations, but they also constitute a 
significant proportion of the direct-examination in court, rendering their quality especially 
important.  
We also hypothesised that defence lawyers would question children more 
appropriately in the S28 than in the NS28 condition. Findings regarding defence lawyers’ 
questioning strategies were consistent with research in Scotland, New Zealand, and the 
United States (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Hanna et al., 2012; Klemfuss et al., 2014; 
Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). Defence lawyers in both trial conditions 
used virtually no invitations and asked significantly more option-posing than suggestive or 
directive questions. In the S28 condition, defence lawyers asked significantly more option-
posing questions and significantly fewer suggestive questions than their NS28 counterparts. 
Suggestive questions are significantly more likely than option-posing questions to 
contaminate evidence and elicit self-contradictions (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Zajac et al., 
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2003). Therefore, the reduction in the numbers of suggestive questions asked in the S28 
condition may help to ensure that more reliable evidence is obtained. However, while option-
posing prompts do not imply an expected response like suggestive prompts do, they are still 
problematic because they restrict productivity and are associated with increases in the 
numbers of incorrect details elicited (Lamb et al., 2015). Thus, while the reduction in the 
number of suggestive utterances used in S28 cases is commendable, it is problematic that the 
majority of questions asked during cross-examination were closed-ended option-posing 
prompts.  
Although risky prompts were not eliminated from children’s examinations, it is 
noteworthy that the defence lawyers in both the NS28 (M = .27, SD = .19) and S28 cases (M 
= .10, SD = .12) asked many fewer suggestive questions than counterparts studied in other 
countries. For example, in Scotland, the United States, and New Zealand, the comparable 
percentages were 48.6% (Andrews & Lamb, 2016), 42% (Andrews et al., 2015), and 56.5% 
(Hanna et al., 2012), respectively. This may reflect the impact of both relevant research and a 
number of educational and training programs in England for lawyers and the judiciary (see 
The Advocate’s Gateway, 2016), as well as interventions by intermediaries and judges 
(particularly in pre-trial GRHs).  
Regarding children’s responses, we hypothesised that younger children would be 
more compliant than older children. Results demonstrated that the quality of the children’s 
responses was very similar in the NS28 and S28 conditions. As in other field research 
(Andrews et al., 2015; Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss et al., 2014), children were highly 
responsive in the NS28 condition (> 90%), leaving little room for improvement in the S28 
condition. Interestingly, children in the younger age group (6-12 years old) did comply with 
defence lawyers’ suggestions more often than the 13- to 15-year-olds did, highlighting the 
need for lawyers, judges, and intermediaries (if involved) to fully discuss in the GRHs how 
younger children will be questioned, and specifically how risky questions can be avoided. In 
these circumstances, having questions drafted and approved by the judge and/or intermediary 
might significantly enhance the quality of questioning during the cross-examination, thereby 
eliciting more reliable testimony.  
 Finally, we hypothesised that GRHs alone would be associated with more appropriate 
questioning strategies. Analyses revealed that children involved in cases with GRHs, whether 
or not they benefitted from the Section 28 special measure, were asked fewer suggestive 
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questions and, crucially, more directive questions. Only a small number of cases that were 
not involved in the S28 pilot study held GRHs, so additional research is necessary to further 
elucidate the specific effects of GRHs on questioning although it is possible that judges and 
lawyers who were not implementing Section 28 still made accommodations for young 
witnesses. If the restrictions placed during GRHs continue to be appropriately adhered to, the 
use of GRHs may improve the ways in which children, as well as other vulnerable witnesses, 
are questioned. Critically, these hearings are already permitted in all cases involving 
vulnerable witnesses.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Several limitations of the current study should be noted. Firstly, most of the children’s 
examinations consisted of closed-ended, option-posing prompts asked by the defence 
lawyers. This again emphasises the importance of using ABE forensic interviews as evidence 
but does limit researchers’ abilities to explore the effects of the S28 reforms on how children 
are questioned in court, in part because many in-court examinations were so brief. As well, 
because of the limited number of young children in the sample, developmental differences in 
children’s responsiveness could not be fully investigated. The age categories employed in this 
study are common practice in field research (e.g., Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Stolzenberg & 
Lyon, 2014) but future researchers should investigate the effect of children’s age on 
courtroom questioning, especially when the children are very young. However, it should be 
noted that all relevant S28 cases were included in the study. Therefore, the results have high 
ecological validity and reliably reflect current practices in the English legal system.   
Secondly, the study did not explore the quality of questioning conducted during the 
ABE forensic interviews (as Lamb et al., 2009 and Sternberg et al., 2001, did). As shown in 
Table 2, the forensic interviews comprised most or all of the children’s direct examinations. 
Particularly in the English system, where the forensic interview is played as the child’s 
direct-examination, it is critical that interviewers elicit accurate, coherent, and complete 
accounts from alleged victims.   
Thirdly, we examined only question types in the current study; however, several other 
factors, such as question content, complexity, and repetition may affect children’s testimonial 
accuracy. Research has shown that many lawyers’ questions focus on peripheral details that 
are not directly relevant to the abusive action(s) (Andrews & Lamb, 2018) even though 
children typically respond more accurately to questions about central elements of the relevant 
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events (Candel, Merckelbach, Jelicic, Limpens, & Widdershoven, 2004). Furthermore, 
lawyers often fail to adjust the complexity of their questions depending on children’s ages 
(Andrews & Lamb, 2017a) even though children may not possess the necessary linguistic 
capabilities to effectively communicate in court (Hanna et al, 2012) and seldom ask for 
clarification when asked grammatically complex questions (Zajac et al., 2003). As well, 
lawyers commonly repeat questions, significantly increasing the likelihood that children will 
contradict themselves, particularly when the questions are suggestive (Andrews & Lamb, 
2017b). Future research should further investigate the many ways in which S28 and GRHs 
may be improving conditions for child witnesses in English courts. As well, researchers may 
wish to investigate potential associations between case facts (e.g., relationship to offender 
and verdict) and questioning strategies to better understand children’s experiences in legal 
proceedings.   
Finally, the judges in the S28 condition all volunteered to participate in the pilot 
study, and thus their willingness may have inflated the apparent benefits of the S28 reforms. 
Future research should investigate the effects that judges and intermediaries both may have 
on questioning strategies to fully elucidate the potentially benefits of GRHs and pre-recorded 
cross-examinations. However, it is promising that NS28 judges who did not volunteer also 
imposed constructive restrictions in their GRHs and/or effectively proscribed risky 
questioning.  
Conclusions  
In recent decades, psychological research has begun to inform public policy (e.g., 
Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Bull, 2010; Hanna et al., 2010; Lamb et al., 2007) contributing to 
significant international legal reforms. Several Australian states and territories now permit 
vulnerable witnesses to provide pre-recorded evidence (Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Australian Federal Police, 2005). In 2017, a High Court of Justiciary 
Practice Note was published in Scotland describing plans to improve the treatment of 
vulnerable witnesses by expanding the existing procedures for the taking of evidence by a 
commissioner (i.e., where a witness’ examination and cross-examination is recorded in 
advance of a trial; Dorrian, 2017). Furthermore, New Zealand has begun to consider the use 
of intermediaries as an additional special measure for children testifying in court (Hanna, 
Davies, Henderson, & Hand, 2013; Randell, 2017).  
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The trial implementation of the S28 reforms represented an important 
acknowledgement of the need to improve the treatment of vulnerable witnesses in English 
and Welsh courts. The present study reveals room for considerable further improvement. For 
example, although fewer suggestive questions were asked in the S28 condition (and in cases 
with GRHs), they were still asked with some frequency, and few invitations or directive 
questions were posed. Younger children were found to be more vulnerable to defence 
lawyers’ suggestive questions. It is particularly concerning that when suggestive questions 
were asked less often, the use of risky option-posing prompts increased. 
Nevertheless, as the Lord Chief Justice Sir John Thomas said, “[T]he real need [is] – 
not yet more initiatives and reforms, but the cultural change that is necessary to make the new 
framework a reality” (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009, pp. i-ii). The continuing implementation 
of legal reforms in many common-law countries such as England, Scotland, and Australia 
reflects a global recognition of the need for reform. With continued research, outreach, and 
education, we may contribute to the cultural shift needed to make these reforms a reality.  
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Chapter 4: The Discussion of Ground Rules Issues in Pre-trial Preparation for Vulnerable 
Witnesses in English Crown Courts1 
The treatment of vulnerable witnesses in criminal trials has been a matter of great 
concern in recent years. There have been a number of cases addressing this2 and Criminal 
Procedure Rules and Directions have been issued to deal with the management of these 
cases3.  In 1989, the Criminal Justice Act introduced a provision allowing video recordings of 
testimony from child witnesses (s.32a).4 Later that year, the Pigot Committee convened to 
consider the implementation of this provision, and they conclusively recommended that child 
witnesses should give their direct- and cross-examination testimony out of court. 5 They 
further recommended that “lawyers…[should]…understand how to speak to children and… 
appreciate the consequences of leading or oppressive questioning (7.9).”6 In 1990, Parliament 
authorised pre-recorded forensic interviews to replace the evidence-in-chief in court, and 
nearly a decade later, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YJCAE, 1999) permitted 
pre-recorded cross-examination (s.28),7 although this provision was not implemented at the 
time.  However, the provision was implemented in a pilot study in 2014 in Liverpool, Leeds, 
and Kingston Crown Courts.8  
 The Section 28 pilot study was intended to assess the appropriateness of full 
nationwide implementation of Section 28’s provisions and included mandatory Ground Rules 
Hearings (GRHs) during which advocates, the judge, and an intermediary (if applicable) 
would discuss how best to facilitate the participation of the child witness. Afterwards, 
children’s cross-examinations were to be pre-recorded and, months later, replayed in court for 
the jury.9 This study was the first to compare pre-trial preparation in the Section 28 pilot 
study cases and in a comparable sample of Non-Section 28 cases.  
                                                          
1 Because this paper was prepared for publication in the Criminal Law Review, the footnotes are in accordance 
with the journal’s formatting requirements. 
2 For example, see R v Barker [2010] EWCA Crim 4, R v E [2011] EWCA Crim 3028, R v Lubemba [2015] 1 
CR. App. R 12, R v Wills [2011] EWCA Crim 3028 
3 The Criminal Procedure Rules Part 3 (CPR) [2016]; Criminal Practice Directions (CPD) [2015] EWCA Crim 
1567 3D to G 
4 Criminal Justice Act 1989, s.32a (CJA, 1989) 
5 Pigot, Report of the advisory group on video-recorded evidence (Home Office, 1989).  
6 id (7.9) 
7 YJCEA, 1999 s.27-28 
8 Ministry of Justice, Transforming the CJS: A strategy and action plan to reform the criminal justice system 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
9 Henderson and Lamb, “Pre-Recording Children’s Testimony: Effects on Case Progression” (Criminal Law 
Review, 2017).  
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The Questioning and Effective Participation of Children and Vulnerable People in 
Criminal Trials 
In September of 2014, the government announced that all publicly funded advocates 
would have to undergo mandatory specialist training before being allowed to conduct serious 
sexual assault and rape cases.10 A multi-professional group headed by HHJ Peter Rook QC 
designed a course, “Advocacy and the Vulnerable,” which included research from 
developmental experts and psychologists as well as legal experts, practitioners, and the 
judiciary.11 This course is now being delivered to all advocates nationwide through the Inns 
of Court School of Law, the Bar Council, and The Law Society (see note).12 This course aims 
to teach advocates how to appropriately question vulnerable people, including children, in 
accordance with their cognitive and developmental requirements.13   
In addition, the Court of Criminal Appeal has repeatedly stated, in a growing body of 
case law, that advocates who question vulnerable witnesses must adhere to appropriate 
standards when questioning children and other vulnerable witnesses.14 Thus, the advocate 
must now adapt to the witness’s communication levels, not the other way around.  Rules of 
court and case law are intended to regulate advocacy and protect children and vulnerable 
witnesses from inappropriate treatment and questioning.  
The Section 28 Pilot Study 
 The Section 28 pilot study attempted to address two critical –and unresolved—
problems in the current legal system: systematic delay that adversely affects the quality of 
children’s memories, and inappropriate cross-examination strategies that manufacture false 
evidence rather than uncovering untruthful witnesses.15 The implementation of pre-recorded 
cross-examination was intended to reduce excessive delay,16 while the GRHs were intended 
                                                          
10 As of yet, no date has been set for this requirement. Ministry of Justice, Our commitment to victims: 
September 2014 (Ministry of Justice, 2014)  
11 ICCA, Advocacy and the Vulnerable, www.icca.ac.uk/advocacy-the-vulnerable 
12 https://www.icca.ac.uk/advocacy-the-vulnerable, https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media-centre/news-and-
press-releases/2016/november/bar-council-launches-vulnerable-witness-advocacy-training/, 
https://events.lawsociety.org.uk/default.aspx?tabid=633  
13 ICCA, Advocacy and the Vulnerable 
14 R v Barker [2010] EWCA Crim 4, R v E [2011] EWCA Crim 3028, R v Lubemba [2015] 1 CR. App. R 12, R 
v Wills [2011] EWCA Crim 3028 
15 Spencer & Lamb, (Eds.) “Children and cross-examination: Time to change the rules (2012) 
16 Henderson and Lamb, “Pre-Recording Children’s Testimony” (Criminal Law Review, 2017). 
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to reduce the incidence of risky and developmentally inappropriate questioning strategies 
(i.e., leading and suggestive questions) that are more likely to elicit unreliable evidence.17  
Systematic Delay 
A 2009 study conducted for the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children revealed problematic delays for child witnesses in the UK legal system. The 
average delay for children testifying in Crown Court cases was 13 months between reporting 
the offense (i.e., forensic interview) and testifying in trial. Children also spent, on average, 
5.8 hours waiting at court to give their evidence. 18 It was predicted that a pre-recorded cross-
examination would expedite children’s involvement in the proceedings.19 Henderson and 
Lamb’s later study revealed that children in the Section 28 pilot study indeed experienced 
significantly shorter delays between disclosure and cross-examination (291 days versus 423 
days), as well as in time spent at the courthouse (21 minutes versus 79 minutes), thereby 
demonstrating that the pre-recorded cross-examinations effectively reduced systematic delay, 
as intended.20  As the Section 28 procedure became more routine and established, it was 
hoped that even greater reductions in delay might be achieved. 
Cross-Examination  
 Cross-examination traditionally involves questioning designed to undermine the 
witness’ evidence and credibility, with advocates taught to do so by asking leading questions 
when cross-examining witnesses. More specifically, these leading questions often involve 
suggestive, frequently tagged, questions (i.e., close-ended utterances that assume 
unintroduced information and/or imply an expected response, e.g., “And then he touched 
you, right?”) or narrow option-posing questions (i.e., close-ended utterances that require a 
confirmation, negation, or selection of interviewer-given options, e.g., “Did he touch 
you?”)21 even though these risky questions elicit less information,22 are more likely to 
                                                          
17 Spencer and Lamb, (Eds.) “Children and cross-examination: Time to change the rules” (2012). 
18 Plotnikoff and Woolfson, “Measuring up?” In Evaluating Implementation of. (2009). 
19 Spencer and Lamb, “Children and cross-examination: Time to change the rules” (2012). 
20 Henderson and Lamb, “Pre-Recording Children’s Testimony” (Criminal Law Review, 2017). 
21 Andrews and Lamb, “How do lawyers examine and cross-examine children in Scotland?” (2017); Klemfuss, 
Quas, and Lyon, “Attorney’s questions and children’s productivity in child sexual abuse criminal trials” (2014); 
Stolzenberg and Lyon, “How attorneys question children about the dynamics of sexual abuse and disclosure in 
criminal trials” (2014).  
22 Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin, and Horowitz, “A structured forensic interview protocol improves the 
quality and informativeness of investigative interviews with children: A review of research using the NICHD 
Investigative Interview Protocol” (2007). 
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contaminate children’s evidence,23 and more often encourage self-contradictions than do less 
risky questions.24 Younger children are even more likely than older children to respond 
erroneously to leading and suggestive questions.25 Furthermore, because children forget more 
rapidly than adults do,26 extended pre-trial delays adversely affect children’s memories of the 
events, further degrading the accuracy of their reports and making them even more 
susceptible to suggestion.27 Lastly, the stress experienced while awaiting questioning and 
during cross-examination can interfere with memory and attention, thus inhibiting children’s 
abilities to recall details and to communicate these details effectively.28  
In cross-examination, there is also the issue of “putting the case” whereby the 
advocate challenges the witness by relaying the defendant’s version of the alleged events. 
Children can find this very upsetting and confusing and, as a result, the topic has been dealt 
with in numerous Court of Appeals authorities. For example, in the landmark case of R v 
Barker 29, the then Lord Chief Justice determined, “When the issue is whether the child is 
lying or mistaken… it should not be over-problematic for the advocate to formulate short, 
simple questions which put the essential elements of the defendant’s case to the witness.” It 
was later noted in R v Lubemba that “if there is a right to ‘put one’s case’ (about which we 
have our doubts) it must be modified for young or vulnerable witnesses.”30 In addition, the 
Criminal Practice Directions recognises that the court may dispense with normal practice and 
impose restrictions on “putting the case.” 31  
It is emphasised throughout case law that, despite restrictions that may be imposed 
during the cross-examination, the defendant still has the right to a fair trial and, if deemed 
necessary, the judge should explain the limitations to the jury. Research demonstrates that 
children are able to handle cross-examination if they are questioned appropriately.32 
                                                          
23Ceci and Bruck, “Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis” (1993). 
24 Andrews and Lamb, “How do lawyers examine and cross-examine children in Scotland?” (2017). 
25 Goodman, Jones, and McLeod, “Is There Consensus About Children’s Memory and Suggestibility?” (2017). 
26 Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, and Kingma, “The development of forgetting and reminiscence” (1990). 
27 Flin, Boon, Knox, and Bull, “The effect of a five-month delay on children's and adults' eyewitness memory” 
(1992).  
28 Hupbach and Dorskind, “Stress selectively affects the reactivated components of a declarative memory” 
(2014); Quas, Bauer, and Boyce, “Physiological reactivity, social support, and memory in early childhood” 
(2004). 
29 R v Barker [2010] EWCA Crim 4 
30 R v Lubemba [2015] 1 Cr. App.R 12, see also R v E [2011] EWCA Crim 3028, R v Wills [2011] EWCA 
Crim 3028 
31 CPD 3E.4 
32 Andrews and Lamb, “How do lawyers examine and cross-examine children in Scotland?” (2017); Klemfuss, 
Quas, and Lyon, “Attorney’s questions and children’s productivity in child sexual abuse criminal trials” (2014); 
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Specifically, the tone and language of ‘challenges’ differ from the traditional approach, by 
virtue of being briefer and gentler.  The case law and training described above are premised 
on the assumption that advocates can draft simple and direct questions that comply with 
ground rules and allow the witness to fairly deal with the advocate’s challenges. These issues 
should be dealt with prior to the cross-examination in Ground Rules Hearings (GRHs), 
sometimes with the assistance of intermediaries.33   
Historically, the adversarial style of questioning has been traumatic and counter-
productive when the witnesses are young or otherwise vulnerable.  It is now recognised, at 
least in theory, that leading questions (e.g., option-posing, suggestive, tagged, etc.) are risky 
because they may produce unreliable responses, thereby degrading the quality of evidence. 
Educational outreach and training opportunities, including programs such as ‘Advocacy and 
the Vulnerable’ and ‘The Advocates Gateway,’ have made acquiring this new knowledge and 
skillset increasingly accessible. However, research must continue to ensure that judges 
enforce and advocates adhere to the appropriate protocols dictated by the Criminal Practice 
Directions and Criminal Procedure Rules.   
Intermediaries and Ground Rules Hearings 
 The YJCEA introduced not only pre-recorded cross-examinations but also the use of 
intermediaries (s.29) for any or all of the examination of vulnerable witnesses. In 2003, the 
first Ministry of Justice (MoJ) intermediaries were trained “to assist the administration of 
justice and not the vulnerable individual represented.”34 The use of intermediaries was piloted 
in 2006,35 and reports produced in 2007 indicated that judges and advocates alike were 
overwhelmingly supportive of the intermediary system.36 The cited benefits of their 
involvement included: facilitating communication both prior to trial (e.g., assisting in 
planning more effective interviews) and at trial; increasing access to justice (e.g., ensuring 
that cases with vulnerable participants reached trial); and potentially saving time and money 
                                                          
Stolzenberg and Lyon, “How attorneys question children about the dynamics of sexual abuse and disclosure in 
criminal trials” (2014). 
33 i.e., court-appointed specialists responsible for facilitating communication between witnesses and lawyers 
34 Cooper and Wurtzel, “Better the second time around? Department of Justice Registered Intermediaries 
Schemes and lessons 
from England and Wales” (2014). 
35 Plotnikoff and Woolfson, “The ‘Go-Between’: evaluation of intermediary pathfinder projects” (2007). 
36 Id, Cooper and Wurtzel, “Better the second time around? Department of Justice Registered Intermediaries 
Schemes and lessons 
from England and Wales” (2014). 
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(e.g., assisting police in identifying prosecutable cases at an early stage).37 In 2007, the MoJ 
began to roll out the scheme nationally.38 
Because intermediaries must ensure that witnesses are questioned appropriately, they 
were taught to recommend ‘ground rules’ in their reports, and to request GRHs so these 
‘ground rules’ could be agreed upon. Thus, they would only need to intervene during 
questioning when a ground rule was breached.39 In 2013, a Criminal Practice Direction 
(CPD)40 required GRHs in cases involving intermediaries and identified them as good 
practice in all cases involving vulnerable witnesses.41 Ground Rules involve the setting down 
of basic principles to be followed at trial and these hearings are now an essential part of case 
management in trials involving the vulnerable. GRHs should be held in advance of trial 
except in the most exceptional cases.42 A thorough knowledge of practice and procedure in 
this area is required from advocates (and judges), and effective and interventionist case 
management is expected from the Bench.43  
Because intermediaries commonly set the agenda for GRHs, practical issues were 
identified by registered intermediaries and ‘The Advocate’s Gateway’ and these were 
compiled into the “Ground Rules Hearings Checklist” to facilitate the development of best 
practice (see Table 1).44 The checklist includes items that would assist vulnerable defendants, 
vulnerable witnesses, and intermediaries, and lists several issues to be discussed, including: 
what issues will be ‘put to’ the witness; whether a draft of proposed questions has been 
discussed and/or approved by the judge (and intermediary); and how to avoid repetitive 
                                                          
37 Plotnikoff and Woolfson, “The ‘Go-Between’: evaluation of intermediary pathfinder projects” (2007). 
38 In England and Wales, the accused has no access to the Registered Intermediary Scheme; Cooper and 
Mattison, “Intermediaries, vulnerable people and the quality of evidence: An international comparison of three 
versions of the English intermediary model” (2017).  
39 Cooper and Wurtzel, “Better the second time around? Department of Justice Registered Intermediaries 
Schemes and lessons from England and Wales” (2014). 
40 CPD 2013 
41 For a detailed history of the first 10 years of the intermediary scheme in England and Wales see Cooper and 
Wurtzel, “Better the second time around? Department of Justice Registered Intermediaries Schemes and lessons 
from England and Wales” (2014) 65(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 39. 
42 (Criminal Practice Directions [2015] EWCA Crim 430 18.3.2015 as amended April 2016, Paragraph 3.E.3, R 
v Lubemba [2015] 1 Cr App R 12 and Sir Brian Leveson Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings, January 
2015 para. 8.3.1,) 
43 A thought provoking article by Dr Emily Henderson dealing with some of these topics was published in the 
Criminal Law Review 2016, 181; “Taking control of cross-examination: judges, advocates and intermediaries 
discuss judicial management of the cross-examination of vulnerable people”. 
44 For a detailed history, see Cooper, Backen, and Marchant, “Getting to grips with Ground Rules Hearings: A 
Checklist for Judges, Advocates and Intermediaries to Promote the Fair Treatment of Vulnerable People in 
Court” (2015). 
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questions.45 Children are inherently more vulnerable than adults due to their age,46 and age is 
the most robust predictor of the quantity and quality of details encoded into memory.47 Thus, 
the younger a child is, the more likely an intermediary will be involved to facilitate the 
child’s participation.48 As such, intermediaries may play especially important roles in GRHs 
to ensure children are able to give their best evidence. 
The Criminal Practice Directions expressly state that pre-trial and trial processes 
should be adapted as necessary to allow for the effective participation of any vulnerable 
person.49 As such, discussions in GRHs aim to reduce children’s stress in order to facilitate 
better recall and communication50 (e.g., by ordering that the judge and advocates may not 
wear wigs and gowns; the judge may meet child witnesses before and familiarise them with 
the live link technology). 
The Criminal Practice Directions also state that ‘the judiciary is responsible for 
controlling questioning.’51 Therefore, discussions also address how children will be 
questioned during the evidence-in-chief (if applicable) and, in particular, the cross-
examination, to ensure that unnecessarily risky questions are not asked of child witnesses. 
The Criminal Procedure Rules specify that ground rules may include directions about 
‘putting one’s case,’ the manner and duration of questioning, questions that may or may not 
be asked, and the use of models or other aids.52  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 id  
46 YJCEA 1999, s.16; Cooper and Mattison, “Intermediaries, vulnerable people and the quality of evidence: An 
international comparison of three versions of the English intermediary model,” (2017). 
47 Flin, Boon, Knox, and Bull, “The effect of a five-month delay on children's and adults' eyewitness memory,” 
(1992). 
48 Cooper and Wurtzel, “Better the second time around? Department of Justice Registered Intermediaries 
Schemes and lessons from England and Wales” (2014). 
49 CPD [2015] EWCA Crim 1567 3D to G 
50 Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, and La Rooy, “Children and the law,” (2015). 
51 CPD 3E.1 to 3E.6 
52 CPR Part 3, Rule 3.9 (6) and (7), April 2016 
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Table 1 
Ground Rules Issues53  
Ground Rule % Yes 
ABE for Evidence-in-Chief 97.4% 
Mention Use of Intermediary 31.2% 
No Robes and/or Wig 28.6% 
Screens 5.2% 
Live Link 90.9% 
Other Special Measure (e.g., witness 
support person) 
7.8% 
Special Oath/ Children’s Promise 28.6% 
Advocate Location During 
Questioning 
2.6% 
Duration of Questioning 40.3% 
Witness Special Abilities 13% 
Scheduling/ Requesting Breaks 3.9% 
See Proposed Questions 32.5% 
Discuss Questioning Strategies 59.7% 
Discuss Repetitive Questions 3.9% 
How to Explain Cross-Examination 
Limitations to Jury 
6.5% 
Familiarise Witness with Court and 
Live Link Beforehand 
1.3% 
When to Refresh Witness’s Memory 58.4% 
Judge Meeting Witness Before Cross-
Examination 
41.6% 
Best Time of Day to Question Witness 0% 
Use of Aids During Questioning 24.7% 
Discuss Prosecutor’s Questions for 
Potential Re-examination 
5.2% 
How to Interpret Nonverbal 
Communication 
0% 
 
 
                                                          
53 Adapted from Cooper, Backen, and Marchant, “Getting to grips with Ground Rules Hearings: A Checklist for 
Judges, Advocates and Intermediaries to Promote the Fair Treatment of Vulnerable People in Court” (2015)  
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The Present Study 
This was the first study to quantitatively examine the contributions made by both 
Section 28 implementation and intermediaries during pre-trial preparations (and GRHs). The 
study examined 1) the effect of Section 28 on pre-trial preparation and GRHs, and 2) the 
effect of intermediary involvement on pre-trial preparation and GRHs. It also explored 3) 
whether the discussion of ground rules issues was associated with a reduction in the use of 
risky questions during the children’s cross-examinations. It was hypothesised that more 
issues would be discussed in cases that required GRHs, specifically Section 28 cases and 
cases involving intermediaries. It was further hypothesised that the discussion of more 
ground rules issues would be associated with less risky questioning during cross examination.   
Methods 
Sample 
The MoJ HM Courts and Tribunals Service identified 87 cases (44 Non-Section 28 - 
hereafter ‘NS28’ - cases, and 43 Section 28 - hereafter ‘S28’ - cases) that met the necessary 
criteria, i.e., they involved children under the age of 16 testifying as alleged victims of sexual 
assault. All S28 cases took place in 2014, while NS28 cases took place from 2012 to 2016. 
Analyses confirmed that the year of the case did not affect any dependent variables examined 
in the paper (i.e., number of GRH issues, proportions of question types), and thus all cases 
were included in analyses.54 Cases for the NS28 group came from Bradford, Durham, Hull, 
Luton, Newcastle, Norwich, and Oxford, while cases for the S28 group came from Liverpool, 
Leeds, and Kingston. The NS28 and S28 cases were matched with respect to child’s gender, 
child’s age at the time of cross-examination, frequency and severity of abuse, child-suspect 
relationship, and verdict.  
Recordings of the courtroom examinations were transcribed, anonymised, and coded, 
while the accompanying forensic interview (“Achieving Best Evidence”) transcripts and trial 
logs were also combed for relevant information.  The trial logs consisted of a detailed 
timeline of the legal proceedings, accompanied by court clerks’ notes, from the first 
preliminary hearing through trial and sentencing.  
                                                          
54 A linear regression assessing the association between year and the number of GRH issues discussed was not 
significant, F(1, 39) = .078, p = .78, R2 = .05; A linear regression assessing the association between year and the 
proportion of questions asked that were suggestive or option-posing was not significant, F(2, 41) = .71, p = .50, 
R2 = .18. 
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Coding 
 In this study, the trial logs were scoured for details regarding pre-trial preparation. 
Coding was adapted from Cooper and colleagues’ “Ground Rules Hearings Checklist.”55 22 
ground rules issues were coded as “1” if mentioned in the trial logs and “0” if not mentioned. 
For example, if the judge and/or lawyers considered the use of a live link but, in the end, the 
witness asked for a screen instead, this would be coded as a “1” for both live link and for 
screen. All ground rules issues considered are listed on Table 1 along with an indication of 
how often each was discussed. The numbers of issues discussed were tabulated in a ‘total 
score.’ An additional reliability coder scored a random selection of the trial logs (20%, n = 
15) to ensure consistency in the coding. Interrater reliability coefficients for all variables were 
high, K = 1.0, indicating consensus regarding the presence or absence of all GRH issues.  
A rater also extracted and recorded details about case facts: the complainant’s age at 
trial or S28 hearing; relationship to the defendant; verdict; and frequency and severity of 
alleged abuse. When the trial log indicated that there was a discussion about how to 
appropriately question the witness, the duration of the discussion was noted (N = 13, NS28; N 
= 33, S28).  Lastly, the proportions of option-posing and suggestive prompts used by the 
defence barristers during the cross-examination were calculated (Henderson & Lamb, 
2018).56   
Overall, 77 trial logs were coded, accounting for 87 child witnesses because several 
cases had multiple child witnesses. The Non-Section 28 (“NS28”) condition had 41 trial logs 
(44 children) and the Section 28 (“S28”) condition had 36 trial logs (43 children). 13 trial 
logs (6 NS28 cases, 7 S28 cases) referred to participation by intermediaries. Intermediaries 
were not used significantly more in the S28 cases than in the NS28 cases. As well, 
intermediary presence did not differ according to child’s age. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses  
To ensure that no extraneous variables would affect analyses and interpretations, 
discriminant function analyses were conducted to identify any associations between the 
                                                          
55 Cooper, Backen, and Marchant, “Getting to grips with Ground Rules Hearings: A Checklist for Judges, 
Advocates and Intermediaries to Promote the Fair Treatment of Vulnerable People in Court” (2015) 
56 Proportions were calculated out of question-response pairs. Thus, if a question was interrupted and the child 
was not given the opportunity to interrupt, the question was excluded from analyses.  
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number of GRH issues and any case facts (e.g., relationship to offender, severity, and 
frequency). Child’s age was the only variable significantly associated with the number of 
GRH issues discussed: 57 the child’s age affected the number of GRH issues discussed in pre-
trial preparation. Thus, the effect of child’s age on the GRH issues discussed is explored 
below.    
What GRH Issues were discussed? 
 The most frequently discussed GRH issue was the use of the ABE interview recording 
as the evidence-in-chief – only 2 trial logs (both NS28) did not mention discussion of this 
special measure, likely because those children only gave written witness statements when 
they disclosed. The use of live link (90%), questioning strategy (60%), and refreshing of the 
complainant witness’s memory (58%) were all mentioned frequently in the trial logs. 
However, the interpretation of nonverbal communication (e.g., nodding the head; 0%), the 
location of the advocate during questioning (3%), the scheduling of breaks during 
questioning (4%), the avoidance of repetitive questions (4%), familiarisation of the witness 
with the live link (1%), and the best time of day to question the witness (0%) were all seldom, 
or not at all, mentioned (see Table 1 for additional frequencies).  
Did Discussion of GRH Issues Differ by Condition? 
 Analyses revealed that significantly more GRH issues were discussed in the S28 
condition cases (M = 7, SD = 2) than in the NS28 condition cases (M = 5, SD = 3).58  Chi-
square analyses showed that preliminary hearings in the S28 condition were significantly 
more likely to mention the following issues: the use of live link; the duration of questioning; 
seeing a draft of proposed questions; discussing questioning strategies; refreshing the 
witness’s memory; barristers meeting the witness before questioning; and questioning 
strategies to be used in re-examination. 59  In the S28 condition, barristers, judges, and 
intermediaries (if applicable) discussed questioning strategy significantly longer (M = 23 
min, SD = 38) than in the NS28 condition (M = 5 min, SD = 12).60  
                                                          
57A discriminant function analysis was significant for child’s age,  = .77, χ2(8) = 18.13, p = .02, R2 = .28 
58 A generalised linear model (GLM) found a significant effect for condition, b = -2.38, Wald χ2(1) = 21.07, p < 
.001.  
59 Pearson’s chi-square analyses found significant relationship between trial conditions and GRH issues: 
c2(1, N = 77) = 6.76, p = .01; c2(1, N = 77) = 45.65, p < .001; c2(1, N = 77) = 16.44, p < .001; c2(1, N = 77) = 
28.65, p < .001; c2(1, N = 77) = 7.63, p = .01; c2(1, N = 77) = 5.45, p = .02; c2(1, N = 77) = 4.81, p = .04 
60 A GLM found a significant effect for duration, b = -16.99, Wald χ2(1) = 8.48, p = .004. 
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Did Discussion of GRH Issues Differ by Intermediary Presence? 
 Analyses revealed that significantly more GRH issues were discussed in cases 
involving intermediaries (M = 10, SD = 3) than in cases that did not involve intermediaries 
(M = 5, SD = 3).61 Chi-square analyses showed that cases involving intermediaries were more 
likely to mention the following GRH issues: advocate location during questioning; witness’s 
particular capabilities; and refreshing the witness’s memory. 62  Cases involving 
intermediaries discussed questioning strategy significantly longer (M = 34 min, SD = 58) than 
cases without intermediaries (M = 9 min, SD = 16).63  
Did the ground rules discussions reduce the use of risky questions? 
 Analyses revealed that defence barristers in the S28 condition (M = .10, SD = .12) 
used significantly fewer suggestive questions than in the NS28 condition (M = .27, SD = 
.19).64 Neither intermediary presence (No intermediary, M = .20, SD = .20; intermediary M = 
.17, SD = .11), nor the number of GRH issues discussed were significantly associated with 
the proportion of suggestive questions used in the cross-examination.  
 Similarly, trial condition was significantly associated with the proportion of option-
posing prompts used in cross-examination, whereas intermediary presence (No intermediary, 
M = .65, SD = .16; Intermediary, M = .68, SD = .11) and GRH issues were not.65 Defence 
barristers in the S28 condition used more option-posing prompts (M = .73, SD = .17) than in 
the NS28 condition (NS28, M = .60, SD = .15). 
Effects of Child’s Age on GRH issues 
 Analyses showed that child’s age was positively associated with the discussion of 
GRH issues: as child’s age increased, so did the number of GRH issues mentioned in trial 
preparation.66 However, age was not significantly associated with the duration of discussion 
regarding questioning strategies or the proportion of suggestive or option-posing questions 
asked in cross-examination.  
Discussion 
                                                          
61 A GLM found a significant effect for intermediary presence, b = -4.07, Wald χ2(1) = 35.10, p < .001. 
62 Pearson’s chi-square analyses found a significant relationship between intermediaries and GRH issues: 
c2(1, N = 77) = 10.11, p = .03; c2(1, N = 77) = 15.23, p = .001; c2(1, N = 77) = 4.41 p = .03 
63 A GLM showed a significant effect for duration, b = -23.91, Wald χ2(1) = 9.54, p = .002 
64 A GLM showed a significant effect for condition, b = 0.14, Wald χ2(1) = 12.54, p < .001. 
65A GLM showed a significant effect for condition, b = 0.10, Wald χ2(1) = 8.11, p = .004. 
66 A GLM showed a significant effect for age, b = 0.24, Wald χ2(1) = 4.87, p = .03. 
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The results demonstrated that, although Section 28 implementation, the holding of 
GRHs, and the use of intermediaries had the desired effects on the testimonial circumstances 
for child witnesses, considerable further progress could be made.  
 Cases involved in the Section 28 pilot study, as well as those in both conditions 
involving intermediaries, did discuss more GRH issues than the other cases. However, fewer 
than half, and sometimes, fewer than a quarter, of the GRH issues identified as appropriate 
were discussed, even in Section 28 cases and/or cases involving intermediaries. It was 
encouraging that questioning strategies were discussed in a majority of the cases, along with 
the use of the ABE interview as the evidence-in-chief, the use of live link, and when to 
refresh the witness’s memory. However, the other 18 ‘recommended’ GRH issues were not 
discussed in more than half of the cases. The best time of day to question the witness or how 
to interpret the witness’s nonverbal communication were not discussed in any case. However, 
courts have been advised to schedule the cross-examination in the morning so that children 
will more likely be “fresh” and able to complete their evidence in one day. 67 As well, failure 
to verbalise a child’s nonverbal responses may prevent them from being officially recorded, 
especially when transcripts rather than video recordings are later referenced (for example, 
upon appeal).  
 Cases in the Section 28 pilot study involved fewer suggestive questions in the cross-
examination than Non-Section 28 cases, perhaps because Section 28 cases were required to 
have Ground Rules Hearings, and therefore, were more likely to involve review and/or 
discussion of proposed cross-examination questions. The presence of an intermediary did not 
significantly reduce the number of risky questions asked, although cases involving 
intermediaries discussed questioning strategy longer than cases without intermediaries. It 
should also be noted that the risky question proportions involved question-response pairs, so 
when a question was interrupted and thus went unanswered, it would have been excluded 
from analyses.  
 These findings demonstrate that risky questioning strategies were still common, even 
in cases involving progressive and innovative special measures such as pre-recorded cross-
examinations and/or the use of intermediaries. The Section 28 cases did involve fewer 
suggestive questions, but a large minority of the questions asked were still suggestive, and 
                                                          
67 Plotnikoff and Woolfson, “Measuring up?: Evaluating Implementation of Government commitments to young 
witnesses in criminal proceedings” (2009). 
 71 
 
significantly more option-posing questions were asked than in the NS28 cases. Thus, for all 
cases, including those with Ground Rules Hearings (including Section 28 cases and those 
with intermediaries), it is important to underline the need to reduce the use of risky questions, 
including option-posing questions. While the latter do not explicitly suggest expected 
responses, they still reduce productivity and are associated with increased numbers of 
incorrect details in the responses they elicit.68  
 Unexpectedly, more issues were discussed in cases involving older than younger 
children, and there was no association between the testifying child’s age and either the 
duration of discussion regarding questioning strategies or the proportion of suggestive and 
option-posing prompts asked in cross-examination. Although children of all ages are 
vulnerable when subjected to risky questioning, older children encode a higher quality and 
quantity of details into memory,69 and are more resistant to suggestion than younger 
children.70 Younger children also have a more difficult time understanding commonly 
discussed concepts such as timing, frequency, duration, and references to other people’s 
intentions.71 It is also worth noting that age was not associated with the presence of an 
intermediary: younger children and older children were equally likely to have an intermediary 
involved.  
Our findings suggest that lawyers are failing to adequately recognise and adapt to 
children’s developmental limitations, thereby risking the elicitation of less reliable testimony.  
However, future research should address in closer detail the contents of GRHs and other pre-
trial preparation, because some of the GRH issues may have been discussed pre-trial but not 
so indicated in the trial logs (e.g., familiarising the witness with the live link, determining the 
best time of day to question the witness). As well, research should further investigate the 
effects of GRHs discussions on the quality of testimony and on children’s welfare.  
The study was the first to address the content of pre-trial preparation in the Section 28 
pilot study and its effect on children’s subsequent evidence. It showed that more issues were 
discussed in preliminary hearings in the Section 28 cases and this may have helped reduce the 
                                                          
68 Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin, and Horowitz, “A structured forensic interview protocol improves the 
quality and informativeness of investigative interviews with children: A review of research using the NICHD 
Investigative Interview Protocol” (2007). 
69 Flin, Boon, Knox, and Bull, “The effect of a five-month delay on children's and adults' eyewitness memory” 
(1992). 
70 Melnyk, Crossman, and Scullin, “The suggestibility of children’s memory” (2007). 
71 Hanna, Davies, Crothers and Henderson, “Questioning child witnesses in New Zealand’s criminal justice 
system: Is cross-examination fair?” (2012) 
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numbers of suggestive questions asked by the cross-examining barristers. Likewise, 
intermediary involvement also resulted in more thorough discussions of relevant issues in 
preliminary hearings. This suggests that these special measures, and others, should continue 
to be utilised in efforts to ensure that just outcomes are obtained in criminal trials.   
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Chapter 5: Does Implementation of Reforms Authorised in Section 28 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act Affect the Complexity of the Questions Asked of Young Alleged 
Victims in Court? 
 “In short, there seemed to be nothing essentially wrong with this child's 
competence as a speaker or competency as a witness in a court of 
law…There did seem to be something very wrong, however, with the 
adults' competence at asking questions.” - (Walker, 1993, p. 67) 
 Research consistently shows that children can be effective witnesses when they are 
questioned in developmentally appropriate ways (e.g., Jack, Leov, & Zajac, 2014; Lamb, 
Brown, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2018; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001; Walker, 
Kenniston, & Inada, 2013). Despite this, child witnesses are commonly subjected to 
developmentally inappropriate questioning in and out of court which adversely affects the 
richness and accuracy of their responses (Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Carter, Bottoms, & 
Levine, 1996; Hanna, Davies, Crothers, & Henderson, 2012; Lamb et al., 2018; Zajac, Gross, 
& Hayne, 2003). Not only are children frequently asked risky close-ended and suggestive 
questions (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Zajac, Westera, & Kaladelfos, 2017; see Table 1 for 
definitions) that have been found to contaminate the information provided (Lamb, Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Esplin, et al., 2007) and elicit self-contradictions (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; 
Orbach & Lamb, 2000), but they are often also asked questions whose complexity exceeds 
their developmental capabilities (Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Hanna et al., 2012; Zajac et al., 
2003). Accordingly, British lawyers have been instructed to adapt their questions to 
children’s developmental abilities (Criminal Practice Directions, 2015) but when children 
are asked complex, close-ended, and suggestive questions, they are unable to give their best 
evidence in court.  
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Table 1a 
Utterance Types 
 
 
 
Definition 
 
Example 
Invitation An open-ended request that the child recall 
information about the incident. 
“Tell me everything that happened” 
Directive A cued-recall prompt that focuses the 
child’s attention on information already 
mentioned and requests additional 
information of a specific sort, typically 
using wh-questions (who, what, when, 
where, how) 
“What color was the shirt?” (When the 
shirt had been mentioned) 
Option Posing A prompt that focuses the child’s attention 
on aspects or details not previously 
mentioned, requiring confirmation, 
negation, or selection of an interviewer-
given option 
“Did it hurt?” 
“Were your clothes on or off when it 
happened?” 
 
Suggestive An utterance that assumes information not 
disclosed by the child or implies that a 
particular response is expected 
“Did it hurt when he put his finger in 
you?” (When the child has not 
mentioned digital penetration). 
“He wanted you to kiss him, didn’t he?” 
Suggestive 
Confrontational 
A suggestive utterance used by the lawyer 
to either explicitly or implicitly confront the 
child and make them contradict their 
testimony or cast doubt upon their 
credibility. 
“Is what you are telling me true?” 
“I’m going to suggest that what you are 
saying happened did not really happen.” 
Suggestive 
Suppositional 
A suggestive utterance which is built on the 
suppositional that an undisclosed action has 
happened, which may ignore earlier 
contradicting responses that rules that event 
out of question. 
“What did X tell you?” (when the child 
did not mention that X told anything) – 
“Did it hurt when he touched you?” 
(When child said he was not touched) 
Suggestive 
Introductory 
A suggestive utterance where a lawyer 
introduces undisclosed information or 
provides restrictive, non-exhaustive options, 
is a forced-choice question. 
“Tell me what happened with/at [a 
person/place not mentioned by child]” 
 
Suggestive Tag A tag is a phrase, which when added to 
another statement can turn the statement 
into a question and often invites the victim 
to agree with the statement. 
“You told your mom what had 
happened to you, isn’t that right?” 
Suggestive  
‘Do you 
remember?’ 
Any utterance including the phrase ‘Do you 
remember?’ which implies that the event 
they are referring to actually took place. 
“Do you remember when your mom 
went to the store?” (No prior mention of 
this event taking place) 
Suggestive 
Declarative 
An utterance directed at the child, but not in 
the form of an interrogative. It does not 
directly ask a question but instead seems to 
be a question only because of the intonation. 
“Yeah, you're upset that that's quite 
important and you didn’t tell the police 
that,” 
a Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Lamb, et al., 2007 
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Recently, legal innovations have been implemented to improve conditions for child 
witnesses (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act [YJCEA], 1999). One such special 
measure, Section 28 of the YJCEA, pilot-tested from 2014 to 2016, introduced mandatory 
Ground Rules Hearings in advance of pre-recorded cross-examinations, which relieved 
children of the obligation to testify during the subsequent trials (Criminal Practice Directions, 
2015; Henderson & Lamb, 2017; Ministry of Justice, 2013). During the Ground Rules 
Hearing, lawyers, the judge, and the intermediary (if applicable) discuss how to best 
accommodate the child’s unique developmental capabilities.  In a previous analysis of the 
same transcripts analysed below, Henderson, Lamb, & Rafferty (under review) showed that 
implementation of these reforms indeed led defence lawyers to ask less risky questions than 
they otherwise would.  The goal of the current study was to examine whether the 
implementation of the Section 28 reforms also reduced the complexity of lawyers’ questions 
as intended (Criminal Practice Directions, 2015).  
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
 In 1989, the Criminal Justice Act introduced a provision (s.32a) allowing courts to 
receive video-recorded testimony from child witnesses. The provision was supported by legal 
experts who recommended that children should give their direct- and cross-examination 
testimony out of court and as early as possible (Pigot, 1989). However, a year later, 
Parliament authorised only that the evidence-in-chief could be replaced by video-recorded 
evidence (s.27 of  YJCEA, 1999). Since then child witnesses in England and Wales have 
participated in recorded evidential interviews by police officers (currently labelled 
‘Achieving Best Evidence’ [ABE] interviews; Home Office, 2011), and these constitute the 
majority of the relevant evidence-in-chief in contemporary trials (Henderson & Lamb, 2017). 
However, child witnesses are still required to return to court months or years after their initial 
reports to be cross-examined by the defence (Home Office, 2011). 
In 1999, Section 28 of the YJCEA authorised pre-recorded cross-examinations, and 
from 2014 to 2016, this reform was pilot-tested in Leeds, Liverpool, and Kingston Crown 
Courts. Section 28 aimed to reduce both systemic delay and risky questioning strategies via 
Ground Rules Hearings (GRHs) and subsequent pre-recorded cross-examinations (for 
additional information on GRHs, see Cooper, Backen, & Marchant, 2015). Henderson and 
Lamb (2017) found that the implementation of Section 28 significantly reduced systemic 
delays between initial disclosure (i.e., ABE interview) and cross-examination while also 
 76 
 
reducing the amount of time spent under oath.  Henderson, Andrews, and Lamb (in press) 
also found that Section 28 reduced the amount of suggestive questioning during the cross-
examinations although, somewhat worryingly, the proportion of prompts that were closed-
ended option-posing questions increased. However, Henderson et al. (in press) focused only 
on the information-seeking form of the questions asked and did not examine other 
developmentally relevant features, including their complexity. 
Children’s Developmental Limitations  
 Decades of developmental research has demonstrated that children bring unique 
capabilities and limitations into the legal system (for review, see  Lamb, Malloy, 
Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, 2015), including distinctive and potentially problematic linguistic 
and communicative skills. Children’s vocabulary is more literal (Walker, 1999), more 
idiosyncratic, and less descriptive than adults’ (Dale, 1976; De Villiers & De Villiers, 1979). 
As a result, children struggle to provide the thorough and comprehensive narratives that are 
required in a legal setting, and adults frequently misinterpret their narratives (Walker, 1999).  
Adults also overestimate children’s and adolescents’ comprehension of grammatically 
and linguistically complex sentences and vocabulary (Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers, & 
Rotherham, 2010; Walker et al., 2013). Questions involving ‘before’ and ‘after’ may give 
children difficulty (Lamb et al., 2015; Olds, 1968), and questions involving temporal (e.g., 
duration, frequency) and numerical (e.g., height, distance) attributes require advanced 
conceptual skills that can even challenge adults (Lyon & Saywitz, 2006; Olds, 1968; Orbach 
& Lamb, 2007; Walker, 1999; Walker et al., 2013). Children have problems processing 
complex negation (Olds, 1968; Walker, 1999), ‘why’ questions that invite speculation about 
others’ internal processes (Lamb et al., 2015; Walker, 1999), and verbs in passive voice 
(Slobin, 1966; Walker, 1999), all of which are likely to characterise many questions asked in 
court (Andrews & Lamb, 2017). Children and adolescents may not even realise that they have 
failed to understand complex questions (Perry et al., 1995; Walker, 1999).  All of these 
factors, coupled with children’s and adolescents’ reluctance to seek clarification (Walker, 
1999; Zajac et al., 2003), increase the likelihood of miscommunication.   
Question Complexity in Courtrooms 
The problem worsens in court where a high proportion of closed-ended and 
suggestive questions may be asked. Problematically, children often attempt to answer 
complex closed-ended questions even if they are incomprehensible or unanswerable 
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(Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2000) likely because a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ often satisfies the 
questioner (Walker, 1999).  Field research consistently demonstrates that both prosecutors 
and defence lawyers mostly ask option-posing ‘yes/no’ questions (Hanna et al., 2012; 
Klemfuss, Quas, & Lyon, 2014; Zajac & Cannan, 2009), and that defence lawyers ask more 
suggestive questions than prosecutors do (Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss et al., 2014; 
Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014; Zajac & Cannan, 2009).  Not only do closed-ended and 
suggestive questions elicit erroneous responses and self-contradictions (Lamb, Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Horowitz, & Abbott, 2007; Zajac et al., 2003; Zajac & Hayne, 2003), but they 
also tend to be more linguistically complex (Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Walker et al., 2013). 
Research has also determined that suggestive questions vary, with some being more complex 
than others (e.g., tagged prompts; Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Evans, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 
2017; Walker, 1999). For example, Andrews and Lamb (2017) reported that tagged 
suggestive questions (e.g., “And then you lied to your mom, isn’t that right?”) were more 
complex than untagged suggestive questions (e.g., “Why did you lie to your mom?” when the 
child had not admitted lying). In addition, suggestive suppositional prompts (e.g., “Did it hurt 
when he touched you?” when the child had not mentioned being touched) were less complex 
than both suggestive confrontational (e.g., “In your forensic interview, you said it was in 
May, but now you say it was in August…”) and suggestive introduction (e.g., “Tell me what 
happened with/at [a person/place not mentioned by child]”) prompts (Andrews & Lamb, 
2017).   
Despite the abundance of research identifying the difficulties that children and 
adolescents have with adult language, few researchers have examined the complexity of the 
questions lawyers ask when examining children in court.  Andrews and Lamb (2017) and 
Zajac et al. (2003) found that defence lawyers asked more complex questions than 
prosecutors, perhaps because defence lawyers use more suggestive prompts (Andrews & 
Lamb, 2016). Hanna et al. (2012) found that defence lawyers used more double negatives and 
questions with two or more subordinate clauses than prosecutors, but they also found that 
prosecutors asked more questions containing passive voice than defence lawyers. Hanna et al. 
(2012), Andrews and Lamb (2017), and Zajac et al. (2003) all showed that defence lawyers 
did not make accommodations for children’s age whereas Zajac et al. (2017) reported that 
younger children were asked less complex questions than older children.  
Thus, research indicates that suggestive questions are the most complex type of 
question and that defence lawyers often ask more complex questions than prosecutors. 
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However, additional research is needed to elucidate not only the specific problematic 
components of both prosecutors’ and defence lawyers’ questions, but also the relationship 
between child age and the complexity of lawyers’ questions. Because complex questions not 
only reduce children’s accuracy (Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Carter et al., 1996; Zajac et al., 
2003), but also affect juror perceptions (Kebbell & Johnson, 2000) and trial outcomes (Evans, 
Kang, & Lyon, 2008), it is important to identify and attempt to reduce the complexity of 
questions asked in court. 
Current Study 
No previous study has investigated the complexity of the questions asked in court 
during trials pilot-testing the Section 28 reforms (hereafter S28). Accordingly, the complexity 
of the different types of questions asked of children and youths of different ages by the 
prosecutors and defence lawyers participating in the S28 cases were compared with those 
asked in comparable trials not employing the S28 procedures (hereafter NS28). To account 
for the multifaceted nature of complexity, complexity was measured using several count (i.e., 
word count, clause count, and number of false starts) and presence-absence (i.e., multiple 
negatives, ‘why’ questions, temporal and numeric attributes, ‘before/after’, and passive 
voice) measures of each of the questions asked (see Table 2).  
Informed by the literature reviewed earlier, it was hypothesised that: (1) S28 lawyers 
would ask less complex questions than NS28 lawyers; (2) S28 lawyers would ask less 
complex questions when questioning younger children; (3) prosecutors would ask less 
complex questions than defence lawyers; (4) and suggestive utterances would be more 
complex than option-posing and directive utterances.  
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Table 2. 
Definitions of the different dimensions of complexity coded for each utterance 
 
Methods 
Sample 
 Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service identified 222 English Crown Court 
cases involving children younger than 16 years of age who testified as alleged victims of 
sexual abuse between 2012-2016. Of these, 44 NS28 cases and 43 S28 cases met all criteria 
for the current study: they involved children under the age of 16 who were alleged victims of 
sexual abuse and whose records contained complete trial recordings and ABE interview 
transcripts. Researchers made every attempt to obtain records of all S28 pilot study cases 
with these characteristics. The S28 cases came from Kingston (n = 1), Leeds (n = 16), and 
Liverpool (n = 26) Crown Courts whereas the NS28 cases came from Bradford (n = 6), 
Durham (n = 6), Hull (n = 7), Luton (n = 6), Newcastle (n = 12), Norwich (n = 5), and Oxford 
(n = 2) Crown Courts. Recordings of the relevant court proceedings were transcribed and 
anonymised at the Ministry of Justice in London. In all but 3 cases (all NS28 cases), the ABE 
 
 
Definition 
 
Example 
Word Count A count of audible, complete words   
Clause Count A count of the clauses (units containing both a 
subject and a predicate)  
“What happened that night?” = 1 
 
“[He said] [that you couldn’t], [he said] 
[you’re not allowed to],” = 4 
False Start A count of stumbles/ abrupt changes in topic  “Ok, but you did – did you see him on 
your birthday?” = 1 
Multiple Negatives Utterances containing 2 or more negative terms “And you replied that you didn’t 
know, didn’t you?” 
‘Why’ questions Questions that invite speculation about others’ 
internal processes 
“Why didn’t he like your brother?” 
 
Temporal and 
Numeric Attributes 
Utterances that either (1) request information 
about time or number, or (2) refer to a specific 
time or number and request additional 
information  
“Um, between the first and the last 
time, do you know roughly how long it 
was between that?” 
 
Before/After Utterances containing the word ‘before’ or 
‘after’ 
“So, the reason you’ve never 
mentioned this before is because it 
isn’t true?”  
Passive Voice Utterances containing a passive verb. A passive 
verb is the form of a verb in which the subject 
undergoes the action of the verb  
“Have you been promised money to 
say these things?” 
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interviews served as the majority of the evidence-in-chief; witnesses in the remaining 3 cases 
provided written statements to the police and were more extensively examined in court (see 
Henderson & Lamb, 2017).  
 The sample included 69 girls and 18 boys aged between 6 and 15 years with a mean 
age of 12.02 years (SD = 2.53) in the NS28 condition and 12.02 years (SD = 2.36) in the S28 
condition. Children were categorised into 2 age groups (12 years and younger, 13-15 years 
old) in accordance with the Sexual Offenses Act (2003), which states that children under the 
age of 13 can never legally give sexual consent. Children reported single (n = 36) or multiple 
(n = 44) incidents of abuse (in 7 cases, the number of alleged incidents was unclear).  The 
alleged offenses were categorised based on the most severe offense as defined by the Crown 
Prosecution Services Sexual Offense legislation (Crown Prosecution Service, 2003) and 
included rape or penetration (n = 38), sexual assault and sexual activity (n = 44), incitement 
to engage in sexual activity (n = 4), and grooming (n = 1). All defendants were male and 
were either ‘father’ figures (including mothers’ romantic partners; n = 22), other family 
members (n = 22), friends/acquaintances (n = 34), or strangers (n = 4). In 5 of the cases, the 
nature of the relationship was unknown. At trial, 49 of the defendants were found guilty and 
38 were acquitted.  
 Binary logistic regressions confirmed that NS28 and S28 conditions did not 
significantly differ with respect to child’s gender (p = 0.32), age (p = 0.76), frequency (p = 
0.14) or severity (p = 0.85) of abuse, relationship to offender (p = 0.37), or verdict (p = 0.74; 
see Table 3).  
Coding of Transcripts 
 The complexity of all substantive utterances by prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, 
and intermediaries was coded using each of the variables defined below, whereas for non-
substantive utterances, only word count, clause count, false starts, multiple negatives, and 
passive voice were coded.  The form of all utterances was also categorised (invitation, 
directive, option-posing, and suggestive prompts; suggestive tagged, declarative, ‘do you 
remember,’ confrontational, suppositional, and introductory prompts) using commonly used 
definitions (see Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Henderson, Andrews, & Lamb, in press) as 
described in Table 1. 
 
 81 
 
Table 3.   
Characteristics of Cases in the NS28 and S28 Conditions  
Variables a  NS28 
(44) 
S28 
(43) 
  pb 
Gender Male 
Female 
 
11 
33 
7 
36 
0.43 
Age  6-12 years old 
13-15 years old 
 
24 
20 
22 
21 
0.69 
Frequency Single 
Multiple 
Unknown 
 
20 
23 
1 
16 
21 
6 
0.77 
Intermediary Yes 
No 
 
6 
38 
8 
35 
0.55 
GRH  
 
Yes 
No 
 
6 
38 
43 
0 
0 .00* 
Severity Rape 
Penetration 
Sexual Assault 
Sexual Activity 
Inciting to Engage 
Grooming 
 
16 
3 
14 
7 
4 
0 
16 
3 
13 
10 
0 
1 
1.00 
Relationship 
to Child 
 
Father Figure 
Family Member 
Friend/Acquaintance 
Stranger 
Unable to determine 
 
10 
12 
21 
0 
1 
12 
10 
13 
4 
4 
0.85 
Verdict Guilty 
Not Guilty 
 
24 
20 
25 
18 
0.77 
a Variables adapted from Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Klemfuss, Quas, & Lyon, 2014. 
b Binary logistic regression was run to identify any significant differences between the conditions. 
 
Complexity codes.  
 Table 2 describes the measures of complexity used in the present study.  Absolute 
numbers of words, clauses, and false starts were tabulated for each utterance and analysed as 
count variables. The presence or absence of the other dimensions of complexity--multiple 
negatives, ‘why’ questions, temporal and numeric attributes, before/after, and passive voice-- 
was also noted in each utterance and were treated as binary categorical variables in the 
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analyses.  Temporal attributes included references to the date, number of occurrences (e.g., 
‘the third time he touched you’), duration, frequency, and time of day. Numeric attributes 
involved concepts such as weight, height, distance, and count estimation (e.g., ‘how many 
people were there?’).  
Inter-rater Reliability 
 An independent reliability coder recoded 20% of the transcripts (n = 18). Words were 
counted using Microsoft Word so inter-rater reliability was not assessed. Inter-rater reliability 
coefficients for the other variables were all high, Kappa (K) > 0.82, indicating good 
agreement regarding clause count , K = .94 (SE = .01), 95% CI [.92, .96], false starts K = .94 
(SE = .02), 95% CI [.90, .98], multiple negatives K = .94 (SE = .02), 95% CI [.90, .98], ‘why’ 
questions K = .93 (SE = .04), 95% CI [.85, 1.00], temporal and numeric attributes K = .91 
(SE = .01), 95% CI [.89, .93], before/after K = .83 (SE = .04), 95% CI [.75, .91], and passive 
voice K = .90 (SE = .03), 95% CI [.84, .96].  
Analysis Plan 
Scores for each of the measures of complexity were compared using Generalised 
Linear Mixed-effects Logistic Models (GLMMs). Individual analyses were run for both the 
count and binary dependent variables. Fixed effects included trial condition (NS28, S28), 
lawyer role (prosecutor, defence), trial condition x lawyer role, question type (directive, 
option-posing, suggestive), trial condition x question type, and child’s age (12 years old and 
below, 13-15 years old). Follow-up analyses examined the complexity of the different types 
of suggestive questions asked by defence lawyers (i.e., ‘do you remember prompts’ [DYR], 
tagged prompts, declarative prompts, and suggestive confrontational, suppositional, and 
introductory prompts) in both trial conditions. All GLMM models included a by-subject (i.e., 
‘child’) random intercept to control for the different number of questions addressed to each 
child (i.e., utterances were nested within child). For example:  
Word count ~ Condition x Lawyer role + Child’s age + (1|child) 
Complexity analyses were performed using the glmer function in the R package lme4  
with the bobyqa optimiser (Bates, Machler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). The logit function was 
used to address the dichotomous nature of the binary variables. GLMMs are preferable to 
traditional analysis of variance (ANOVA) models because they maximise power while 
simultaneously estimating between-subject variance (Bates et al., 2014, 2015; Galecki & 
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Burzykowski, 2013; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). The most complex converged models are 
reported below, accompanied by the fixed effect estimates (β), standard errors of the 
estimates (SE), and estimates of significance (Z and p values). Only significant findings (p < 
.05) are reported below.  
Results 
Table 4 details the complexity of all speakers’ (i.e., prosecutor, defence lawyer, judge, 
and intermediary) substantive and non-substantive utterances in both trial conditions. 
Because the analyses were designed to examine the complexity of the lawyers’ substantive 
prompts, all non-substantive utterances and all judicial and intermediary utterances were 
excluded from the analyses reported below.  
Overall Question Complexity 
The initial analyses included condition (NS28, S28), lawyer role (prosecutor, 
defence), condition x lawyer role, and child’s age (12 and under, 13-15) as fixed effects, child 
as a random effect variable, and each of the measures of complexity as dependent variables. 
All significant main and interaction effects are detailed in Table 5.  
Condition. Lawyers made fewer false starts in the S28 condition than in the NS28 
condition.  
Lawyer role. Defence lawyers asked questions containing fewer words and fewer 
clauses than prosecutors and were less likely to use passive voice. However, defence lawyers 
were more likely than prosecutors to ask ‘why’ questions. 
Child’s age. Older children were asked questions containing more words and more 
clauses than younger children. In addition, when questioning older children, lawyers more 
frequently used ‘before’ and ‘after’ and passive voice than when addressing younger 
children.   
Lawyer role x Condition interaction. Defence lawyers in the S28 condition used 
fewer words and clauses per utterance and fewer multiple negatives than defence lawyers in 
the NS28 condition. There were no comparable differences between prosecutors in the two 
conditions.  
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Table 4.  
Descriptive Statistics for of Complexity for All Substantive and Non-Substantive Utterances 
   Non-Section 28 Section 28 
 Complexity Measure Speaker M SD N M SD N 
Substantive Word Count Prosecutor 15.48 14.07 1243 16.60 12.47 192 
  Defence 14.51 10.93 5720 12.88 8.27 3146 
  Judge 15.25 16.64 183 12.20 8.08 50 
  Intermediary 11.48 9.44 29 10.26 11.54 19 
 Clause Count Prosecutor 2.40 2.23 1243 2.77 2.13 192 
  Defence 2.36 1.83 5720 2.11 1.47 3146 
  Judge 2.60 2.84 183 2.24 1.62 50 
  Intermediary 1.86 1.64 29 1.68 1.97 19 
 False Start Prosecutor 0.14 0.40 1243 0.11 0.39 192 
  Defence 0.12 0.39 5720 0.09 0.35 3146 
  Judge 0.17 0.46 183 0.04 0.20 50 
  Intermediary 0.14 0.35 29 0.05 0.23 19 
 Multiple Negatives Prosecutor 0.02 0.13 1243 0.04 0.19 192 
  Defence 0.03 0.17 5720 0.01 0.11 3146 
  Judge 0.03 0.18 183 0.02 0.14 50 
  Intermediary 0.00 0.00 29 0.05 0.23 19 
 ‘Why’ Questions Prosecutor 0.00 0.07 1243 0.00 0.00 192 
  Defence 0.02 0.14 5720 0.03 0.17 3146 
  Judge 0.00 0.00 183 0.00 0.00 50 
  Intermediary 0.03 0.19 29 0.00 0.00 19 
 Temporal/ Numeric   Prosecutor 0.18 0.38 1243 0.18 0.39 192 
  Defence 0.15 0.35 5720 0.14 0.35 3146 
  Judge 0.13 0.34 183 0.18 0.39 50 
  Intermediary 0.07 0.26 29 0.16 0.38 19 
 Before/After Prosecutor 0.07 0.25 1243 0.15 0.35 192 
  Defence 0.05 0.23 5720 0.06 0.24 3146 
  Judge 0.06 0.24 183 0.02 0.14 50 
  Intermediary 0.03 0.19 29 0.05 0.23 19 
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 Passive Voice Prosecutor 0.05 0.21 1243 0.08 0.27 192 
  Defence 0.03 0.17 5720 0.03 0.16 3146 
  Judge 0.02 0.15 183 0.04 0.20 50 
  Intermediary 0.03 0.19 29 0.00 0.00 19 
Non-Substantive Word Count Prosecutor 17.45 18.05 370 11.22 10.87 78 
  Defence 15.45 15.58 653 13.49 11.49 294 
  Judge 18.59 23.24 1145 19.13 19.79 571 
  Intermediary 10.20 10.11 97 13.51 14.50 43 
 Clause Count Prosecutor 2.55 3.07 370 1.51 1.86 78 
  Defence 2.37 2.58 653 1.95 1.85 294 
  Judge 2.68 3.34 1145 3.10 3.51 571 
  Intermediary 1.84 1.57 97 1.81 1.53 43 
 False Start Prosecutor 0.11 0.44 370 0.06 0.30 78 
  Defence 0.11 0.37 653 0.06 0.32 294 
  Judge 0.09 0.33 1145 0.05 0.27 571 
  Intermediary 0.06 0.24 97 0.02 0.15 43 
 Multiple Negatives Prosecutor 0.01 0.10 370 0.01 0.11 78 
  Defence 0.03 0.18 653 0.03 0.17 294 
  Judge 0.04 0.19 1145 0.07 0.25 571 
  Intermediary 0.01 0.10 97 0.00 0.00 43 
 Passive Voice Prosecutor 0.09 0.28 370 0.08 0.27 78 
  Defence 0.04 0.19 653 0.04 0.19 294 
  Judge 0.06 0.24 1145 0.08 0.26 571 
  Intermediary 0.05 0.22 97 0.19 0.39 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
 
Table 5.  
Results of GLMM Analyses Exploring Effects of Condition, Lawyer Role, and Child’s Age on 
Dimensions of Complexity  
 Fixed Effect β SE z value p 
Word Count Condition -0.05 0.05 -1.05 0.29 
 Lawyer -0.07 0.01 -7.73 <0.001 
 Child’s Age 0.15 0.05 3.20 0.001 
 Condition*Lawyer -0.09 0.02 -4.14 <0.001 
Clause Count Condition 0.04 0.07 0.65 0.51 
 Lawyer -0.05 0.02 -2.02 0.04 
 Child’s Age 0.13 0.04 3.13 0.002 
 Condition*Lawyer -0.18 0.06 -3.18 0.001 
False Start Condition -0.56 0.28 -1.98 0.047 
 Lawyer 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.90 
 Child’s Age -0.03 0.14 -0.24 0.81 
 Condition*Lawyer 0.07 0.26 0.29 0.77 
Multiple Negatives Condition 0.48 0.54 0.89 0.37 
 Lawyer 0.44 0.25 1.74 0.08 
 Child’s Age 0.31 0.24 1.29 0.20 
 Condition*Lawyer -1.52 0.53 -2.86 0.004 
‘Why’ Questions Condition -12.99 11.80 -1.10 0.27 
 Lawyer 1.30 0.43 3.01 0.003 
 Child’s Age -0.40 0.27 -1.51 0.13 
 Condition*Lawyer 13.19 11.80 1.12 0.26 
Before/After Condition 0.38 0.30 1.28 0.20 
 Lawyer -0.26 0.14 -1.82 0.07 
 Child’s Age 0.40 0.15 2.60 0.009 
 Condition*Lawyer -0.28 0.28 -1.00 0.32 
Passive Voice Condition 0.44 0.38 1.17 0.24 
 Lawyer -0.64 0.17 -3.71 <0.001 
 Child’s Age 0.78 0.20 3.81 <0.001 
 Condition*Lawyer -0.57 0.37 -1.56 0.12 
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Complexity of Different Types of Questions 
Because prosecutors asked relatively few substantive questions (n = 1435, 7.2%), 
only the types of questions asked by defence lawyers were further examined. Because so few 
invitations were used by defence lawyers (n = 12), these too were excluded from further 
analyses. Fixed effects included the utterance type (i.e., directive, option-posing, and 
suggestive), condition, condition x utterance type, and child’s age, whereas ’child’ was 
modelled as a random effect. Table 6 describes the complexity of prosecutors’ and defence 
lawyers’ directive, option-posing, and suggestive utterances in both conditions, and Table 7 
shows the significant main and interaction effects involving question type variables. 
Next, the complexity of the different types of suggestive questions (i.e., DYR 
prompts, tagged prompts, declaratives, and the suggestive subtypes) and of their other 
prompts (e.g., tagged suggestive prompts vs. untagged suggestive, directive, and option-
posing prompts) were compared. Table 8 describes the complexity of the different types of 
suggestive questions. Fixed effects included the types of suggestive questions, condition, and 
condition x suggestive question type with ‘child’ as a random effect. The significant effects 
are reported in Table 9.  
Condition. The questions asked by defence lawyers in the S28 condition involved 
fewer words and fewer clauses than those asked by defence lawyers in the NS28 condition. In 
addition, defence lawyers in the S28 condition made fewer false starts and were less likely to 
refer to temporal and numeric attributes than defence lawyers in the NS28 condition. 
Question types. Compared to option-posing prompts, directive utterances contained 
fewer words and clauses, while suggestive utterances contained more words and clauses. 
Suggestive utterances were more likely than option-posing utterances to be ‘why’ questions 
and were more likely to contain multiple negatives. Both suggestive and directive utterances 
were more likely than option-posing utterances to make reference to temporal and numerical 
attributes. However, directive utterances and suggestive utterances were both less likely to 
include ‘before/after’ than option-posing utterances. Lastly, directive utterances were less 
likely to contain passive voice than option-posing utterances.  
Suggestive DYR prompts contained more words, clauses and false starts than the 
defence lawyers’ other prompts. Tagged suggestive prompts contained more words and 
clauses than untagged prompts and were more likely to make reference to temporal and 
numeric attributes, passive voice, and multiple negatives.  Declarative suggestive prompts 
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contained fewer words, fewer clauses and fewer false starts than defence lawyers’ other 
prompts and were less likely to ask ‘why’ or use ‘before/after.’  
Compared to confrontational utterances, suppositional questions contained more 
words and clauses, whilst introductory questions contained fewer words and clauses. Both 
suppositional and introductory suggestive utterances were more likely to contain references 
to temporal and numerical attributes than confrontational suggestive utterances and were less 
likely to contain multiple negatives.  
Child’s age. On average, the questions asked of older children by defence lawyers 
included more words, clauses, and ‘before/after’ references, and were more likely to involve 
passive voice than the questions they asked of younger children.   
Question type x condition. Directive utterances in the S28 condition included fewer 
false starts and were less likely to be ‘why’ questions than directive utterances in the NS28 
condition. Both DYR prompts and tagged prompts in the S28 condition contained fewer 
words than those in the NS28 condition whereas declarative prompts in the S28 condition 
contained more words and more clauses and were more likely to ask ‘why’ than declarative 
prompts in the NS28 condition. Lastly, in the S28 condition, both suppositional and 
introductory utterances, respectively, contained fewer words and clauses than their 
counterparts in the NS28 condition.  
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Table 6.  
Complexity of Lawyers’ Directive, Option-Posing, and Suggestive Utterances in both S28 
and NS28 Cases 
   Non-Section 28 Section 28 
  Speaker M SD N M SD N 
Prosecutor Word Count Directive 14.60 12.25 504 16.66 13.60 80 
  Option-Posing 16.85 15.48 653 16.83 11.75 104 
  Suggestive 17.07 9.24 30 10.50 7.68 4 
 Clause Count Directive 2.33 1.94 504 2.91 2.30 80 
  Option-Posing 2.54 2.44 653 2.68 1.96 104 
  Suggestive 2.80 1.58 30 1.75 1.50 4 
 False Start Directive 0.16 0.44 504 0.11 0.36 80 
  Option-Posing 0.12 0.38 653 0.10 0.33 104 
  Suggestive 0.13 0.35 30 0.00 0.00 4 
 Multiple Negatives Directive 0.02 0.14 504 0.04 0.19 80 
  Option-Posing 0.02 0.12 653 0.02 0.14 104 
  Suggestive 0.00 0.00 30 0.25 0.50 4 
 ‘Why’ Questions Directive 0.01 0.09 504 0.00 0.00 80 
  Option-Posing 0.00 0.06 653 0.00 0.00 104 
  Suggestive 0.00 0.00 30 0.00 0.00 4 
 Temporal/ Numeric   Directive 0.19 0.39 504 0.20 0.40 80 
  Option-Posing 0.29 0.45 653 0.18 0.39 104 
  Suggestive 0.20 0.41 30 0.00 0.00 4 
 Before/After Directive 0.06 0.24 504 0.08 0.27 80 
  Option-Posing 0.07 0.26 653 0.21 0.41 104 
  Suggestive 0.10 0.31 30 0.00 0.00 4 
 Passive Voice Directive 0.03 0.16 504 0.05 0.22 80 
  Option-Posing 0.06 0.24 653 0.11 0.31 104 
  Suggestive 0.10 0.31 30 0.00 0.00 4 
Defence  Word Count Directive 11.33 8.73 863 11.31 7.69 610 
  Option-Posing 14.36 10.64 3198 13.04 7.96 2123 
  Suggestive 17.40 11.66 1528 14.68 9.54 384 
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 Clause Count Directive 1.88 1.46 863 1.94 1.41 610 
  Option-Posing 2.31 1.80 3198 2.10 1.41 2123 
  Suggestive 2.89 1.90 1528 2.47 1.67 384 
 False Start Directive 0.10 0.38 863 0.06 0.27 610 
  Option-Posing 0.13 0.38 3198 0.09 0.35 2123 
  Suggestive 0.13 0.42 1528 0.12 0.44 384 
 Multiple Negatives Directive 0.01 0.10 863 0.01 0.10 610 
  Option-Posing 0.02 0.12 3198 0.01 0.09 2123 
  Suggestive 0.07 0.25 1528 0.03 0.16 384 
 ‘Why’ Questions Directive 0.01 0.11 863 0.01 0.11 610 
  Option-Posing 0.02 0.13 3198 0.03 0.16 2123 
  Suggestive 0.03 0.17 1528 0.07 0.26 384 
 Temporal/ Numeric   Directive 0.22 0.42 863 0.23 0.42 610 
  Option-Posing 0.12 0.33 3198 0.12 0.32 2123 
  Suggestive 0.16 0.37 1528 0.11 0.32 384 
 Before/After Directive 0.04 0.20 863 0.04 0.21 610 
  Option-Posing 0.06 0.24 3198 0.07 0.25 2123 
  Suggestive 0.05 0.22 1528 0.06 0.23 384 
 Passive Voice Directive 0.01 0.12 863 0.02 0.14 610 
  Option-Posing 0.03 0.17 3198 0.03 0.16 2123 
  Suggestive 0.04 0.19 1528 0.04 0.19 384 
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Table 7.  
Results of GLMM Analyses Exploring Effects of Condition, Question Type, and Child’s Age 
on Dimensions of Complexity  
 Fixed Effect a Β SE z value p 
Word Count Condition -0.13 0.05 -2.94 0.003 
 Directive -0.13 0.01 -12.61 <0.001 
 Suggestive 0.15 0.01 17.04 <0.001 
 Child’s Age 0.13 0.05 2.76 0.006 
 Condition*Directive 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.98 
 Condition*Suggestive -0.04 0.02 -1.86 0.06 
Clause Count Condition -0.11 0.04 -2.56 0.01 
 Directive -0.10 0.02 -4.09 <0.001 
 Suggestive 0.19 0.02 8.63 <0.001 
 Child’s Age 0.11 0.04 2.70 0.007 
 Condition*Directive 0.04 0.04 0.87 0.38 
 Condition*Suggestive -0.05 0.05 -1.17 0.24 
False Starts Condition -0.48 0.16 -3.00 0.003 
 Directive 0.05 0.10 0.51 0.61 
 Suggestive 0.07 0.10 0.74 0.46 
 Child’s Age -0.07 0.15 -0.50 0.63 
 Condition*Directive -0.49 0.21 -2.36 0.02 
 Condition*Suggestive 0.21 0.20 1.03 0.30 
Multiple Negatives Condition -0.51 0.31 -1.62 0.11 
 Directive 0.19 0.28 0.69 0.49 
 Suggestive 1.53 0.19 7.87 <0.001 
 Child’s Age 0.07 0.22 0.31 0.76 
 Condition*Directive 0.08 0.51 0.17 0.87 
 Condition*Suggestive -0.64 0.48 -1.34 0.18 
‘Why’ Questions Condition 0.52 0.33 1.57 0.12 
 Directive 0.11 0.32 0.35 0.72 
 Suggestive 0.83 0.25 3.29 0.001 
 Child’s Age -0.50 0.30 -1.63 0.10 
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 Condition*Directive -1.13 0.54 -2.08 0.04 
 Condition*Suggestive 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.99 
Temporal/ Numeric   Condition -0.34 0.16 -2.06 0.04 
 Directive 0.70 0.10 7.24 <0.001 
 Suggestive 0.23 0.10 2.28 0.023 
 Child’s Age 0.10 0.15 0.67 0.50 
 Condition*Directive 0.12 0.16 0.80 0.42 
 Condition*Suggestive -0.25 0.22 -1.11 0.27 
Before/After Condition -0.00 0.18 0.01 0.99 
 Directive -0.36 0.17 -2.16 0.03 
 Suggestive -0.33 0.15 -2.15 0.03 
 Child’s Age 0.46 0.17 2.71 0.007 
 Condition*Directive -0.21 0.27 -0.79 0.43 
 Condition*Suggestive 0.28 0.30 0.94 0.35 
Passive Voice Condition -0.39 0.21 -1.85 0.06 
 Directive -0.58 0.24 -2.41 0.02 
 Suggestive 0.07 0.17 0.41 0.68 
 Child’s Age 0.67 0.19 3.60 < 0.001 
 Condition*Directive 0.23 0.40 0.57 0.57 
 Condition*Suggestive 0.14 0.39 0.37 0.71 
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Table 8.  
Complexity of Defence Lawyers’ Suggestive Questions in the S28 and NS28 Cases 
  Non-Section 28 Section 28 
 Question Type M SD N M SD N 
Word Count DYR 23.44 14.92 133 16.60 7.92 47 
 Tag 18.16 12.37 649 14.16 7.46 82 
 Declarative 14.70 9.25 587 13.66 10.73 182 
 Confrontational 18.07 13.40 295 17.32 15.60 56 
 Suppositional 22.83 14.31 155 16.60 7.64 50 
 Introductory 16.44 10.44 1078 13.81 8.03 278 
Clause Count DYR 3.96 2.54 133 2.94 1.13 47 
 Tag 3.23 1.89 649 2.60 1.16 82 
 Declarative 2.26 1.52 587 2.19 1.97 182 
 Confrontational 3.18 2.29 295 3.25 2.60 56 
 Suppositional 3.83 2.44 155 2.86 1.11 50 
 Introductory 2.67 1.62 1078 2.24 1.45 278 
False Start DYR 0.17 0.42 133 0.13 0.34 47 
 Tag 0.12 0.39 649 0.13 0.49 82 
 Declarative 0.12 0.42 587 0.12 0.47 182 
 Confrontational 0.10 0.35 295 0.13 0.51 56 
 Suppositional 0.18 0.42 155 0.16 0.42 50 
 Introductory 0.14 0.43 1078 0.12 0.43 278 
Multiple Negatives DYR 0.04 0.19 133 0.02 0.15 47 
 Tag 0.09 0.29 649 0.05 0.22 82 
 Declarative 0.05 0.22 587 0.02 0.13 182 
 Confrontational 0.13 0.34 295 0.02 0.13 56 
 Suppositional 0.04 0.19 155 0.02 0.14 50 
 Introductory 0.06 0.23 1078 0.03 0.17 278 
‘Why’ Questions DYR 0.02 0.12 133 0.04 0.20 47 
 Tag 0.04 0.20 649 0.04 0.19 82 
 Declarative 0.02 0.14 587 0.09 0.28 182 
 Confrontational 0.00 0.06 295 0.00 0.00 56 
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 Suppositional 0.02 0.14 155 0.06 0.24 50 
 Introductory 0.04 0.20 1078 0.09 0.29 278 
Temporal/ Numeric   DYR 0.19 0.39 133 0.06 0.25 47 
 Tag 0.16 0.37 649 0.13 0.34 82 
 Declarative 0.16 0.37 587 0.12 0.33 182 
 Confrontational 0.08 0.27 295 0.04 0.19 56 
 Suppositional 0.17 0.38 155 0.08 0.27 50 
 Introductory 0.18 0.39 1078 0.13 0.34 278 
Before/After DYR 0.07 0.25 133 0.04 0.20 47 
 Tag 0.05 0.22 649 0.04 0.19 82 
 Declarative 0.04 0.19 587 0.07 0.25 182 
 Confrontational 0.05 0.22 295 0.02 0.13 56 
 Suppositional 0.07 0.26 155 0.04 0.20 50 
 Introductory 0.05 0.21 1078 0.07 0.25 278 
Passive Voice DYR 0.03 0.17 133 0.06 0.25 47 
 Tag 0.05 0.21 649 0.01 0.11 82 
 Declarative 0.03 0.18 587 0.04 0.19 182 
 Confrontational 0.03 0.18 295 0.04 0.19 56 
 Suppositional 0.03 0.16 155 0.06 0.24 50 
 Introductory 0.04 0.20 1078 0.04 0.19 278 
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Table 9.  
Results of GLMM Analyses Exploring Effects of Trial Condition and Types of Suggestive 
Questions on Dimensions of Complexity 
Suggestive Question  Complexity Measure Fixed Effect a Β SE z value p 
‘DYR’ Word Count Condition -0.15 0.05 -2.95 0.003 
  DYR subtype 0.45 0.01 31.65 <0.001 
  Condition*DYR  -0.10 0.028 -3.60 <0.001 
 Clause Count Condition -0.13 0.05 -2.75 0.006 
  DYR subtype 0.52 0.03 15.41 <0.001 
  Condition*DYR  -0.11 0.07 -1.74 0.08 
 False Start Condition -0.48 0.16 -3.07 <0.001 
  DYR subtype 0.41 0.16 2.65 0.008 
  Condition*DYR  0.41 0.27 1.49 0.14 
Tagged Prompts Word Count Condition -0.13 0.05 -2.72 0.007 
  Tag 0.19 0.01 21.40 <0.001 
  Condition*Tag -0.06 0.02 -2.94 0.003 
 Clause Count Condition -0.08 0.04 -1.88 0.06 
  Tag 0.33 0.02 15.35 <0.001 
  Condition*Tag -0.06 0.05 -1.20 0.23 
 False Start Condition -0.43 0.16 -2.75 0.006 
  Tag 0.08 0.10 0.82 0.41 
  Condition*Tag 0.01 0.25 0.04 0.97 
 Multiple Negatives Condition -0.61 0.30 -2.05 0.04 
  Tag 1.20 0.19 6.32 <0.001 
  Condition*Tag -0.92 0.65 -1.41 0.16 
 Temporal/ Numeric   Condition -0.36 0.17 -2.14 0.03 
  Tag 0.25 0.10 2.45 0.01 
  Condition*Tag 0.09 0.25 0.35 0.73 
 Passive Voice Condition -0.32 0.22 -1.48 0.14 
  Tag 0.36 0.17 2.12 0.03 
  Condition*Tag 0.27 0.41 0.67 0.51 
Declarative Prompts Word Count Condition -0.20 0.05 -3.97 <0.001 
  Declarative -0.29 0.01 -30.30 <0.001 
  Condition*Declarative 0.12 0.02 6.46 <0.001 
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 Clause Count Condition -0.19 0.05 -3.95 <0.001 
  Declarative -0.32 0.02 -13.67 <0.001 
  Condition*Declarative 0.16 0.04 3.60 <0.001 
 False Start Condition -0.50 0.16 -3.14 0.002 
  Declarative -0.26 0.10 -2.57 0.01 
  Condition*Declarative 0.22 0.20 1.10 0.27 
 Why Questions Condition 0.07 0.35 0.20 0.84 
  Declarative -0.70 0.33 -2.14 0.03 
  Condition*Declarative 0.89 0.43 2.09 0.04 
 Before/After Condition 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.88 
  Declarative -0.36 0.15 -2.37 0.02 
  Condition*Declarative 0.26 0.26 1.00 0.32 
Suggestive Subtype Word Count Condition 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.92 
  Suppositional 0.27 0.03 10.74  < 0.001 
  Introductory -0.12 0.02 -6.63  < 0.001 
  Condition*Suppositional -0.26 0.06 -4.10  < 0.001 
  Condition*Introductory -0.12 0.05 -2.36 0.02 
 Clause Count Condition 0.09 0.11 0.82 0.41 
  Suppositional 0.20 0.06 3.29  <0 .001 
  Introductory -0.19 0.04 -4.46  <0 .001 
  Condition*Suppositional -0.34 0.14 -2.40 0.02 
  Condition*Introductory -0.22 0.11 -2.0 0.047 
 Multiple Negatives Condition -1.74 1.04 -1.66 0.10 
  Suppositional -1.23 0.50 -2.47 0.01 
  Introductory -0.90 0.25 -3.62 <0 .001 
  Condition*Suppositional 1.20 1.52 0.79 0.43 
  Condition*Introductory 0.96 1.13 0.85 0.40 
 Temporal/ Numeric   Condition -0.62 0.79 -0.80 0.43 
  Suppositional 0.85 0.35 2.41 0.02 
  Introductory 1.03 0.27 3.86 <0 .001 
  Condition*Suppositional -0.11 0.97 -0.12 0.91 
  Condition*Introductory 0.08 0.80 0.10 0.92 
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Discussion 
 The present study demonstrated that, overall, the S28 reforms reduced the complexity 
of the questions asked by defence lawyers. It also showed that, although directive, option-
posing, and suggestive questions were sometimes complex, suggestive questions were the 
most complex. Regardless of condition, defence lawyers appeared to adapt the complexity of 
their questions in accordance with children’s ages. Details, interpretations, and implications 
of the research findings are discussed below.  
Key Findings 
Contrary to our hypothesis and previous findings (Andrews & Lamb, 2017), 
prosecutors’ questions contained more words and clauses than defence lawyers’ questions. 
However, the finding should be interpreted cautiously because the prosecutors asked so few 
questions, especially in comparison with the Scottish prosecutors in Andrews and Lamb’s 
(2016) study, because most of the children’s evidence-in-chief was provided in England by 
playing the pre-recorded ABE interviews. This fact underlines the importance of studying the 
complexity of the questions asked by the police officers who conduct most of the ABE 
interviews.   
Both prosecutors and defence lawyers often asked questions that were quite complex. 
As in previous research (Hanna et al., 2012), prosecutors used passive voice more often than 
defence lawyers. This emphasises the need to ensure that both defence lawyers and 
prosecutors question children appropriately; passive voice questions are much harder than 
active voice questions for children and adolescents to understand (Walker, 1999) and it is not 
difficult to rephrase passive voice questions in the active voice (Hanna et al., 2010).  
On the other hand, defence lawyers asked more ‘why’ questions which involved speculating 
about other people’s internal states. Lay witnesses should testify only about facts observed 
and should not offer opinions (Tapper, 2010) so ‘why’ questions both violate the laws of 
evidence and unnecessarily tax children’s capabilities.  
 Both prosecutors and defence lawyers in the S28 condition made fewer false starts 
than in the NS28 condition, perhaps because judges in the S28 condition frequently requested 
drafts of proposed questions in the Ground Rules Hearings (Henderson et al., in press), 
thereby ensuring pre-trial preparation. Defence lawyers in the S28 condition also asked 
questions that were simpler and less complex: They contained fewer words, clauses, false 
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starts, multiple negatives, and references to temporal and numerical attributes than in the 
NS28 condition. This underlines that the S28 reform attained the stated goal of making 
questions more developmentally appropriate.   
 Contrary to previous findings (Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Hanna et al., 2012; Zajac et 
al., 2003), both prosecutors and defence lawyers asked younger children less complex 
questions (i.e., questions containing fewer words, fewer clauses, fewer uses of ‘before/after’ 
and less passive voice) than they asked older children. This finding is particularly 
encouraging, and may reflect the effectiveness of a number of recent initiatives and training 
programs aimed at educating lawyers and judges about current psychological research (see 
"The Advocate’s Gateway,” 2016). 
 Prosecutors asked too few questions to allow an analysis of different types of 
questions, but defence lawyers’ directive utterances contained fewer words, clauses, uses of 
‘before/after,’ and uses of passive voice than their option-posing prompts. Although directive 
utterances included more references to temporal and numerical attributes than option-posing 
questions overall, the defence lawyers’ directive utterances were less complex than their 
option-posing utterances. On the other hand, defence lawyers’ suggestive utterances 
contained more words, clauses, ‘why’ questions, multiple negatives, and temporal and 
numerical attributes than option-posing prompts, indicating that they were the most complex. 
Option-posing prompts, however, contained more ‘before/after’ terms than suggestive 
prompts, demonstrating that all types of questions could be complex. Results also showed 
that directive utterances in the S28 condition involved fewer false starts and were less likely 
to be ‘why’ questions than directive utterances in the NS28 condition, further demonstrating 
that implementation of the S28 special measures successfully reduced question complexity.   
 Interesting trends were identified when examining the complexity of the different 
types of suggestive questions asked. Both ‘do you remember’ (e.g., “Do you remember when 
your mom and dad got into a fight?” when the child has never mentioned a fight) and tagged 
suggestive prompts (e.g., “And then they got in a fight, right?” when the child has never 
mentioned a fight) contained more words and clauses than other questions. As well, ‘do you 
remember’ prompts contained more false starts, and tagged prompts included more references 
to temporal and numerical attributes, multiple negatives, and passive voice, demonstrating 
that these questions are often highly complex. Interestingly, however, the opposite was true 
for declarative suggestive prompts (e.g., “And then they got in a fight…?”): they contained 
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fewer words, clauses, false starts, ‘why’ questions, and use of ‘before/after’ than other 
questions. Klemfuss et al. (2014) showed that declarative questions are commonly used in 
court where they elicit responses similar to those elicited using traditional suggestive 
questions.  These findings suggest that ‘do you remember’ and tagged suggestive prompts 
may be more complex than declarative suggestive prompts. However, because question 
complexity is a multifaceted concept, it is also possible that the complexity of declarative 
questions was not captured by the measures used in this study. Researchers should thus 
continue to investigate the complexity of declarative questions and its effect on the accuracy 
of children’s responses.  
When we compared the types of suggestive questions asked in the two conditions, 
both ‘do you remember’ and tagged suggestive prompts in the S28 condition were less 
complex, containing fewer words than their NS28 counterparts. However, declarative 
suggestive prompts in the S28 condition were more complex, containing more words, 
clauses, and uses of ‘why’ than those asked in the NS28 condition. In fact, declarative 
suggestive questions were the only types of questions examined in this study that were more 
complex in the S28 condition. This is concerning, not only because such questions are 
frequently asked in cross-examinations (Klemfuss et al., 2014), but also because the 
suggestiveness and complexity of declarative questions has yet to be studied. In recent years, 
the risks associated with tagged prompts have been extensively documented by researchers 
(Andrews & Lamb, 2016, 2017; Lamb et al., 2018; Spencer & Lamb, 2012; Walker et al., 
2013) and in legal training manuals (“Ground rules hearings and the fair treatment of 
vulnerable people in court,” 2016; “The 20 Principles of Questioning,” 2017; “The 
Advocate’s Gateway,” 2016). To a lesser extent, the complexity of ‘Do you remember’ 
prompts has also been noted (Evans et al., 2017; “The 20 Principles of Questioning,” 2017). 
However, as noted by Klemfuss et al. (2014), there has been little research or educational 
outreach regarding the complex and leading nature of declarative prompts. Thus, the present 
findings may demonstrate that S28 lawyers are replacing one well-recognised type of risky 
question with another subtler form: declarative suggestive prompts.  
 Compared to confrontational suggestive prompts, suppositional suggestive prompts 
contained more words and clauses while introductory suggestive prompts contained fewer 
words and clauses. Confrontational suggestive prompts also contained fewer temporal and 
numerical attributes and more multiple negatives than both suppositional and introductory 
suggestive prompts.  The suppositional and introductory suggestive prompts asked by 
 100 
 
defence lawyers in the S28 condition contained fewer words and clauses than those asked by 
defence lawyers in the NS28 condition. Again, these findings indicated that the S28 reforms 
had successfully reduced the complexity of lawyers’ questions.  
Limitations 
 A number of limitations of the study should be noted. First, outside the ABE 
interviews, the majority of the children’s evidence was provided in response to closed-ended 
questions asked by defence lawyers. This reduced statistical power necessary to thoroughly 
examine the question subtypes, and therefore, future research should examine these and 
additional dimensions of complexity in a larger and more varied data set. The reliance on 
ABE interviews as evidence-in-chief also restricted our ability to explore the effects of 
complexity on children’s responsiveness. However, research has shown that complex 
questions elicit less accurate responses from children (Andrews & Lamb, 2017; Carter et al., 
1996; Zajac et al., 2003).  
In addition, a limited number of young children testified in court, thereby restricting 
our ability to thoroughly explore the effects of age. However, the study included all relevant 
S28 cases (i.e., all of those in which young alleged victims of sexual abuse testified). Thus, 
these results have high ecological validity, despite the relatively small sample sizes, and are 
likely to reflect current practices in the English system accurately.  
 Although the ABEs made up the majority of the evidence-in-chief, the complexity of 
questions asked (typically by police investigators) in the ABEs was not investigated. The 
current study focused on the complexity of lawyers’ questioning; however, it is important to 
examine the complexity of forensic interviewing, particularly as these interviews may 
determine whether or not cases proceed to trial. Hanna et al. (2012) found that the questions 
posed by forensic interviewers in New Zealand were superior to those posed by both types of 
lawyers and rarely involved passive verbs, complex vocabulary, or double negatives. It 
remains to be determined whether the ABE questioning experienced by the children in the 
current study was superior to the quality of questioning that children would have endured had 
they been directly examined by prosecutors (as in Andrews & Lamb’s 2017 study in 
Scotland).  
 Lastly, all judges in the S28 condition agreed to participate in the pilot study and thus 
the benefits associated with implementation of the special measures may have been 
exaggerated by their self-selection. However, it is promising that, in both conditions, lawyers 
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seemed to adapt their questioning strategies to the children’s ages. Because Ground Rules 
Hearings have been found to improve questioning strategies regardless of whether the cross-
examinations were pre-recorded (Henderson et al., 2017), the present findings similarly 
indicate that lawyers, judges, and intermediaries are making appropriate accommodations.  
Conclusions  
 The current study demonstrated not only that the implementation of S28 reduced the 
complexity of the questions asked, but also that lawyers in the English system were 
appropriately accommodating younger children by asking them less complex questions. The 
results also provide additional evidence regarding the complexity of suggestive questions, 
and in particular the complexity of different types of suggestive questions. However, the 
results also raise new questions regarding the effect of declarative suggestive questions on the 
accuracy of children’s responses and the effect of using pre-recorded ABE interviews in court 
on prosecutors’ questioning strategies.  
 Overall, the present findings show that the English system is evolving towards a fairer 
process in which children are being enabled to give their best evidence. These changes are 
likely attributable not only to progressive legislative reform such as S28, but also to 
educational and training programs, and crucially, to the dedication and efforts of judges and 
lawyers who are willing to accommodate the cognitive and linguistic limitations of young 
witnesses.   
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Chapter 6: General Discussion  
Overall, the four studies described above showed that Section 28 was successful in 
reducing systemic delay, improving pre-trial preparation, and minimising the risky 
adversarial nature of questioning. The study described in Chapter 2 showed that children 
whose cross-examinations were pre-recorded resolved their participation in the system 
sooner, spent less time on the stand under oath, and gave their testimony earlier in the day, 
thereby granting them earlier freedom from the legal process. Because age is a major 
determinant of the accuracy and richness of memory, earlier cross-examination reduces the 
risk of forgetting or contamination and ensures that children could draw on higher quality 
memories when giving evidence. As well, children spent significantly less time in the 
courthouse, thereby reducing the amount of stress endured waiting to testify and further 
increasing children’s ability to effectively communicate their evidence. The reduction in 
delay and stress, as Pigot reasoned in 1989, should improve the quality of evidence obtained, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that just verdicts will be reached (Pigot, 1989; Spencer & 
Lamb, 2012).  
Chapter 3 reported that, although the majority of both lawyers’ questions were option-
posing, defence lawyers in the Section 28 condition asked fewer suggestive questions than 
their counterparts. Similarly, defence lawyers in cases that involved GRHs asked fewer 
suggestive and more directive questions. However, younger children were more compliant to 
defence lawyers’ suggestive questions than older children. These findings were significant for 
several reasons. Firstly, lawyers successfully adopted protocols that subsequently improved 
their questioning strategies; by reducing their use of suggestive questions, defense lawyers 
decreased the likelihood of contaminating children’s evidence and ensured higher quality 
evidence for trial. The results also importantly demonstrate younger children’s vulnerability 
to suggestive questions, demonstrating that their language abilities and/or reduced memory of 
the event made them particularly compliant to defense lawyers’ suggestions.  
Chapter 4 reported that both the implementation of Section 28 special measures and 
the use of intermediaries increased both the number of Ground Rules issues discussed in pre-
trial preparation, as well as the duration of discussion regarding questioning strategies for 
cross-examination. Section 28 was associated with more option-posing and fewer suggestive 
questions, while the use of intermediaries and the number of discussed Ground Rules issues 
were not associated with the number of risky questions asked in cross-examination. The pre-
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trial issues in the checklist aimed to address many of children’s developmental limitations 
that may prevent their effective participation in legal proceedings. An increase in the 
discussion of GR issues would theoretically make children more comfortable (e.g., removal 
of wigs and gowns, greeting the child before giving evidence), thereby reducing their stress 
and improving their descriptions of the alleged event(s). As well, if lawyers discuss the 
appropriate manner in which to question the children during GRHs, children will further 
provide more reliable evidence with little risk of contamination. Hence, it is critical that 
lawyers and judges take advantage of special measures offered to them, such as those noted 
in the GRH checklist, so that children’s best quality evidence can be elicited for trial.     
Lastly, Chapter 5 determined that Section 28 defence lawyers asked less complex 
questions than their Non-Section 28 counterparts. In addition, both prosecutors and defence 
lawyers, regardless of trial condition, asked younger children less complex questions than 
older children. The findings were significant demonstrations of defense lawyers’ 
improvement in questioning strategies. Children, and in particular young children, struggle 
with adult language and grammar; thus, the reduction in question complexity will ensure that 
lawyers elicit more reliable evidence from child witnesses. It was particularly noteworthy that 
lawyers also accommodated children’s age by asking younger children less complex 
questions than older children, again highlighting the successes of current training protocols. 
Because children are often unaware of incomprehension and are also reluctant to ask for 
clarification, it is imperative that lawyers continue to ask children less complex questions to 
ensure reliable evidence and, ultimately, just verdicts.   
Overall, the results revealed the enormous progress being achieved within the English 
criminal justice system, likely as a result of special measures, GRHs, intermediary and 
judicial involvement, and training programs (e.g., “The Advocate’s Gateway,” 2016). Even in 
the Non-Section 28 condition, English defence lawyers used proportionally fewer suggestive 
questions than defence lawyers in Scotland (Andrews & Lamb, 2016), New Zealand (Hanna 
et al., 2012), and the United States (Andrews, Lamb, & Lyon, 2015a).  This may reflect the 
value of special measures implemented in England, alongside a cultural shift amongst 
English legal practitioners. GRHs alone reduced the use of suggestive questions and 
increased the use of directive questions, demonstrating the willingness of judges and lawyers 
to accept and adopt these progressive special measures regardless of their involvement in the 
pilot study. Similarly, regardless of condition or lawyer role, lawyers asked younger children 
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less complex questions, again emphasising the ability to and desire of legal practitioners to 
appropriately question children.  
The implementation of Section 28 itself reflected the enlightened nature of the 
English legal system, and the progress seen in these studies highlights the significant 
improvements being made in the treatment of vulnerable victims. Rather than halt these 
efforts, however, this progress should encourage all parties to strive for even higher-quality 
questioning procedures, as it has been noted that there is still notable room for improvement. 
Regardless, the current trajectory of English lawyers’ acceptance and implementation of 
special measures bodes well for continued progress in the future.  
Limitations  
 As noted in the previous chapters, there are a number of limitations that should be 
mentioned. First, due to Section 27 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (1999), 
children’s evidence-in-chief examinations were often replaced by their pre-recorded forensic 
interviews. The current studies did not investigate the content, style, or quality of the forensic 
interviews; however, this should be examined as the quality of the interviews not only affects 
whether cases progress to trial, but also, how jurors later reach a verdict. It would also be 
fruitful to compare the quality of forensic interviews in cases that did and did not proceed to 
trial.  
 Second, because forensic interviews replaced the prosecutors’ evidence-in-chief, the 
majority of children’s evidence was elicited by close-ended questions posed by defence 
lawyers. This restricted the ability to further investigate how children were examined in court 
(e.g., the use of invitations), as well as the effects of question type on children’s 
responsiveness. However, all relevant Section 28 cases were included in the study, and thus, 
the results have high ecological validity and reliably reflect the current practices in the 
English legal system.  
 Third, while children’s experiences in court are defined by a multitude of factors, the 
current study could examine only a handful of elements likely to affect children’s accuracy, 
informativeness, and welfare. Regarding children’s evidence, several factors other than 
question type and complexity may affect children’s accuracy and informativeness, including 
the content (Andrews & Lamb 2018; Candel, Merckelbach, Jelicic, Limpens, & 
Widdershoven, 2004) and repetition of questions (Andrews et al., 2015b; 2017). Similarly, 
the current study only investigated the effect of pre-trial planning on the use of risky prompts. 
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Future research should investigate the effects of GRHs, intermediaries, and other pre-trial 
planning not only on the types of questions used, but also on children’s responses and well-
being throughout the process.  
Finally, in the Section 28 condition, judges chose to participate and, as a result, their 
willingness may inflate benefits of the special measures. However, it is promising that all 
lawyers, regardless of condition, used less complex questions when questioning children. As 
well, it appears that judges who held Ground Rules Hearings in the Non-Section 28 condition 
imposed constructive restrictions similarly to their Section 28 counterparts. Regardless, future 
research should continue to evaluate the implementation of Section 28 as it is rolled out 
nationally. 
Recommendations for Researchers and Practitioners   
 The research has identified several topics that merit additional research. Chapter 2 
found that younger children experienced longer delays between forensic interview and cross-
examination. It is imperative that researchers continue to identify causes of delay as well as 
strategies to reduce it so that children, particularly younger children, can provide their best 
evidence. The results also suggested that increased conviction rates were negatively 
correlated with delay between forensic interview and cross-examination. While this finding 
was not significant when outliers were excluded from the analyses, it does raise important 
questions regarding the effects of Section 28 and other special measures on conviction rates. 
Because special measures are not intended to directly increase conviction rates, but instead, 
aim to improve the treatment of witnesses and increase accessibility to justice, this does not 
imply that the special measures are ineffective. Rather, it demonstrates that future research 
should continue to investigate the relationship between special measures, juror perceptions, 
and conviction rates.  
Chapter 4 found that judges made more accommodations for older children in pre-trial 
preparation. Future research should explore the reasons for this and the effects of pre-trial 
preparation on children of all ages, particularly in cases involving Ground Rules Hearings 
and/or intermediaries. Lastly, due to the restricted sample of question types, problematic 
question types such as declarative questions (noted in Chapter 5) could not be examined 
further. Future research should continue to identify risky questioning strategies that reduce 
accuracy and informativeness, particularly because results of Chapter 3 indicate that lawyers 
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may swap suggestive questions for option-posing questions, rather than increasing their use 
of open-ended utterances.   
 The results of these studies also inform recommendations that may improve 
practitioners’ interactions with children in the legal system. Firstly, although policy barriers 
prevent pre-recorded cross-examinations from being mandated nationally, Ground Rules 
Hearings can and should be employed in all cases involving vulnerable witnesses. Analyses 
revealed only positive effects of Ground Rules Hearings, even though advocates failed to take 
full advantage (Chapter 4). This suggests that as Ground Rules Hearings become more 
common, the treatment of child witnesses will continue to improve. Secondly, background 
literature, particularly in Chapter 2, demonstrates the necessity to include children’s 
perspectives on these issues. Research demonstrates that adults overestimate children and 
adolescent’s capabilities (Chapter 5) and similarly that there are long-term negative effects of 
children’s involvement in the legal system (Chapter 2). It is imperative that practitioners 
seriously consider the well-being of all involved parties, so the legal system does not 
unintentionally victimize its participants. Lastly the findings demonstrate the efficacy of 
interdisciplinary cooperation. The roll-out of special measures, increased training and 
awareness, and subsequent improvements in the English criminal justice system are the result 
of tireless cooperation both within and between social scientists, legal practitioners, and 
policy makers. The noted improvements should hopefully inspire further cooperation and 
additional progress, rather than inviting complacency.  
Implications 
 Nearly 30 years ago, the Pigot committee suggested ‘that a fundamental change of 
attitude towards children in the legal context is now required’ (Pigot, 1989, para. 7.9). At that 
time, lawyers and judges accepted that cross-examination was theoretically intended to 
‘discover the truth.’ However, they simultaneously welcomed the opportunity to persuade 
jurors, and they were fully aware that their questioning tactics might impact the reliability of 
the elicited evidence (Henderson, 2015b). In 2009, Lord Chief Justice Sir John Thomas 
further emphasised, “[T]he real need [is] – not yet more initiatives and reforms, but the 
cultural change that is necessary to make the new framework a reality” (Plotnikoff & 
Woolfson, 2009, pp. i-ii). That ‘cultural change’ came a year later in the form of a 
transformative judicial decision (i.e., R v Barker [Barker], 2010) in which the English Court 
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of Appeals began to introduce research-informed judgements regarding the appropriate and 
inappropriate manners for questioning child witnesses.  
In 2013, research examining practitioners’ opinions following the Barker decision 
found astonishingly optimistic results (Henderson, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). Both lawyers and 
judges seemed to have abandoned the 1990s interpretation of cross-examination as a way to 
influence jurors’ opinions, and instead, they were increasingly concerned about the 
incomprehensibility and leading nature of their cross-examinations. They seemed to accept 
and embrace the Barker model of cross-examination, in which one must seek the best 
evidence rather than purely advocating for one’s client (Henderson, 2015b). One judge 
remarked that ‘Barker has been a turning point … change isn’t in the last ten years but in the 
last five years and Barker is the reason because that gave permission to everyone to behave 
differently,’ (Henderson, 2016). However, as Henderson (2016) noted, the study’s 
conclusions need to be tested against a proper English transcript analysis of recent cross-
examinations. The current study was the first to independently investigate the effects of the 
Section 28 reforms on children’s questioning procedures. In addition, this study was the first 
proper transcript analysis of recent English cross-examinations, and as such, provided 
unprecedented insight into the effects of the both Section 28 and the Barker case on English 
lawyers’ behaviour.  
It is difficult to separate the success of Section 28 from the Barker decision in 2010. 
In fact, the optimistic results from Henderson’s qualitative study (2015a, 2015b, 2016) are 
mirrored in the results of the current analyses. The Section 28 special measures and the 
Barker decision complement each other: Barker instigated the cultural change necessary for 
real, achievable progress, and Section 28 provided invaluable tools to implement this new 
culture. In 2010, Barker incited a spark that ignited legal reform. GRHs were discussed as 
early as 2000; however, it was a decade before they were officially recommended for trials 
involving vulnerable people (Cooper, Backen, & Marchant, 2015; Henderson, 2016). 
Similarly, the pre-recorded cross-examination was recommended in 1989 (Pigot, 1989), but 
was not implemented for 25 years. Without the cultural revolution of Barker, these Section 
28 special measures may have been yet another failure on a growing list of reform failures.  
While legal philosophy was drastically altered, the improvement in judges’ and 
lawyers’ skills and expertise understandably lagged behind (Henderson, 2015a). In 2013, the 
majority of judges and lawyers called for increased training, and while the majority had a 
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huge desire to improve their questioning style, they noted the difficulty in translating research 
into practice (Henderson, 2015a). Encouragingly, the current analyses also demonstrate that 
English lawyers in the Section 28 pilot study did successfully translate research into practice. 
Although there is room for further improvement, they did use fewer suggestive prompts and 
ask less complex questions than their counterparts, highlighting that English practitioners are 
willing to take advantage of increased education (e.g., GRHs, training programs) and 
subsequently adjust their behaviour.  
 The success of Section 28 has implications for other jurisdictions that are hoping to 
improve the treatment of vulnerable witnesses yet are facing resistance within the legal 
culture. They should recognise the prevailing strength of a judiciary-led legal reform. As 
Henderson (2015a) notes, ‘it is practitioners, not the legislature, who govern what happens in 
cross-examination,’ and thus, ‘a cultural revolution requires leadership from within the 
culture.’ By reminding lawyers and judges that they are ‘guardians of the fair trial,’ the 
current English system demonstrates that lawyers and judges can (and will) become 
‘revolutionaries’ fighting for a fairer system (Henderson, 2015b).  
While the Barker decision may seem to be a reinterpretation of cross-examination, it 
is, in actuality, a powerful reiteration of principles that have been embedded in the English 
legal system as long as cross-examination itself, namely to protect the fairness of the justice 
system by eliciting the best evidence (Henderson, 2015b). English lawyers were reminded by 
Barker of the fundamental concern to address fairness, and ‘once convinced [that] their 
current practices impede[d] fairness, they [became] the drivers of reform,’ (Henderson, 
2015b, p. 14). The implementation and subsequent success of Section 28 is a result of this 
cultural shift, and the current studies amply demonstrate that Section 28 can and should be 
fully endorsed, nationally rolled-out, and dutifully implemented.  
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